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Abstract 
The period from 1960 to 2000 saw a major evolution in monetary policy and institutions. This 
dissertation makes the claim that there is a better explanation of these events than the typical 
narrative, or dominant discourse. 
The typical narrative is that a relationship between inflation and unemployment (the Phillips 
Curve) was proposed around 1960. One interpretation of the relationship was that increasing 
aggregate demand would reduce unemployment with some acceptable inflation. Milton 
Friedman then stated in 1968 that, in the long run, this practice would entrench inflationary 
expectations and there would be no useful employment benefits. This was accepted by the 
economics profession, especially by the mid-1970s, around the time of the first oil shock. This 
period also saw the rise of stagflation and the countries that managed the inflationary outbreak 
best were those where independent central banks were able to withstand politicians’ short 
term instincts. Economists attributed this to a commitment concept; if governments could 
override their central bank only at the cost of legislation or constitutional change, then 
monetary policy would focus more on long term expectations, rather than the political short 
term. Empirical work in the 1990s established this relationship and many countries made their 
central banks more independent during this decade. 
A better view acknowledges some features of this narrative. For example, Milton Friedman’s 
theory of expectations was very influential. (Chapter 2). But there is reduced evidence for the 
rest of this narrative. For example, the Federal Reserve did tighten monetary policy after 1982 
compared with the period before 1979, but this appears to have been through placing less 
emphasis on output instead of being more inflation averse. Further, policymakers in the late 
1960s and 1970s underestimated the level of unemployment at which inflation started 
increasing. (Chapter 3). Politicians were generally involved in disinflations, but their role and 
visibility decreased as legal inflation and central bank independence (CBI) increased. This 
suggests that, in practice, legal independence bestows the disinflation role on the central bank 
(Chapter 4). The role of politicians, however, is not fully clear because the proportion of 
elections where a voter backlash against inflation occurred was small. Therefore, the political 
dynamic against inflation may have occurred through elites, rather than popular opinion 
(Chapter 5). Finally, there was not a strong correlation between CBI in developed countries 
because the literature made errors of omitted variable bias and not examining whether CBI was 
endogenous. Inflation in the 1970s and 1980s was more clearly related to economic factors such 
as currency performance, output, past inflation, oil prices, and a time trend (Chapter 6). 
v 
The weakness of CBI theory is that, by excluding politics, it overstates the costs of overriding a 
central bank. If there is little popular support for disinflation, then the costs of overriding the 
central bank will be low, regardless of the legal arrangements in place. Central banks perceive 
this and deliver policy within the politically palatable decision set. 
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1 – Introduction 
Overview 
This thesis examines the theory of central bank independence (CBI) and the statistical work 
used to support it. The CBI argument is that politicians face the wrong incentives to make 
optimal decisions about monetary policy, and this problem can be largely overcome by 
delegating responsibility to an inflation averse central banker. The theory developed as a 
consequence of the Great Inflation, a period of high inflation that started in the late 1960s. It 
concluded in most developed countries at the cost of higher unemployment and lower growth 
during the 1980s. CBI theory came about because political scientists, and particularly 
economists, drew two conclusions about the Great Inflation: that political leaders had no 
appetite to control inflation; and that countries with central banks that were legally 
independent from government, especially Germany and the United States, had lower 
inflation. 
Economists have clear ideas about how economies should be managed, based on principles 
that include the free market, manageable debt, and low inflation. However, political leaders 
regularly disappoint economists, by being tempted to protect popular industries and to spend 
with less regard for paying it back, or what this may do to price stability. CBI theory represents 
a major chance for economists to gain control of economic policy. However, the theory has 
little to say about politics or power. It is really a picture of Utopia, where politicians and the 
public all do what economists tell them to. How this might occur, or what might change to get 
everyone on board, is not explained. 
There is no particular problem with economists’ preferred policies. Undoubtedly, they have 
the capacity to raise living standards. A country that can implement good economic policy will 
increase its output and influence. It will be able to better protect its interests and reduce the 
chances of invasion by a hostile power. The difficulty is to convince voters that the policies are 
worth it in the long run, especially during the transition phase.  
There are various approaches to improve economic policy. One involves political debate and 
the passage of time. If certain policies are worthwhile, they stand a chance in the long run, 
even if they are abolished and need to be re-introduced. The advantage of this method is that 
political debate gives leaders a chance to influence public opinion and bring it closer to 
economists’ preferred point. A second approach is to establish an institution that embodies 
these policies. Institutions have the appearance of permanence, but they can be wound up, 
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especially in systems with less division of power. This thesis argues that the institutional 
approach offers no improvement because the preferences and incentives that determine how 
politicians might conduct monetary policy also apply to the extent to which politicians 
delegate monetary policy and the extent to which it is maintained. 
Riker put this in general terms in 1980. He argued that policies will tend to reflect the public’s 
preferences, but that institutions can slow down this process. However, they cannot prevent it 
occurring because the losers from the institution’s decisions will lobby to produce outcomes 
more to their liking. I would also suggest that it does not progress policy attitudes; the lack of 
debate and politicians’ evasion of responsibility merely parks the issue for later. 
Two central banks that played a key role in disinflating in the 1980s were in the United States 
and Germany. Although they had a fair degree of legal independence, these central banks also 
operated in environments with a large division of power. For example, both countries had 
strong bicameralism, where the legislature’s upper house has similar powers to the lower 
house, but a different electoral system. The US Federal Reserve system is, financially, very 
much a creature of the private sector. Its twelve constituent banks are owned by private 
banks and they do not appear in the financial statements of the US Government. The banks 
are also represented on the Federal Open Markets Committee, the main policy-setting body 
of the Board of Governors. During the Great Inflation, the Bundesbank’s policy-setting body 
was dominated by the Presidents of the central banks of the Länder (German states), who 
were appointed by the provincial governments. This was descended from a structure imposed 
on Germany by the US after World War II. 
A key argument of this thesis is that the central banks in these countries took on a more 
visible role during disinflation due to their legal independence. Practically, they played a key 
role through monetary policy. And in economic policy terms, politicians took a step back. But 
politically, leaders such as Reagan and Kohl contributed to central banks’ success by giving 
them policy space in which to work. Politicians can combine leadership and delegation. 
This chapter outlines the thesis and discusses the literature, both for and against CBI. 
Literature on central bank independence to the 1970s 
There was a literature on central banks prior to the Great Inflation and there were three main 
ideas. The first idea was the precursor to CBI theory, namely that central banks should be free 
of political direction because politicians will otherwise print money and generate inflation or 
push for easy money prior to elections. Woolley (1977) quotes some authors making these 
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arguments, including: David Grove in 1952 in a memorandum for the International Monetary 
Fund; Karl Blessing, who was President of the German Bundesbank between 1958 and 1969, 
quoted in 1970; and Nordhaus’s famous theory about the political business cycle (1975). The 
League of Nations was an early advocate for CBI. A post-war conference in 1920 resolved that 
central banks should be “free of political pressure” in managing domestic credit (Davis 1920). 
Southard (1969) made the argument about financing the deficit and stated that he supported 
a “high degree of central bank independence.” However, he clarified how this might work in 
practice. He suggested that a central bank would have to accept that it was part of the 
broader framework of government and that it had to acknowledge government objectives. 
Therefore, the central bank would need to be a “full-fledged partner” in economic policy and 
that governments could not create situations of fait accompli where the central bank had no 
choices. 
The second idea was that central banks should work with treasury departments as equal 
partners. This approach was more supportive of political influence. Goldenweiser (1936) 
argued that central banks cannot ever be independent of the government of the day and that 
treasury departments and central banks needed to cooperate. Over time, a competent central 
bank would develop public trust and confidence. Kriz (1948) also made the cooperation 
argument and said that the quality of cooperation would depend on political and business 
conditions, the quality of political and business leadership, and the “political education of the 
people”. Taking the example of the Federal Reserve, Robinson (1949) noted that some 
political influence on a central bank is justified because a President should be able to 
implement their economic policy. 
The third idea was promoted by Milton Friedman (1968a). Friedman was concerned about the 
democratic problems with CBI. On the one hand, central banks have a great deal of power. 
Concentrating a large amount of power within a single entity is contrary to traditional liberal 
ideas. On the other hand, he argued that governments have had a poor track record in 
managing currencies. Examples are clipping coins, printing cash when convenient, or using 
book entries to balance a budget. Friedman sought an approach that gave governments a 
measure of responsibility for monetary policy. Therefore, he supported a legislated policy 
outcome for central banks, in particular targets for growth of the money supply. This would be 
more achievable for a central bank than an inflation target. 
Friedman (1968a) used democratic principles to produce conservative conclusions. Strictly 
adhering to a monetary target would be a strong policy for price stability. Some countries 
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have experimented with it, but many did not keep it. The Federal Reserve had strict targets 
from 1979 to 1982, as did the Bundesbank from 1974. The Bank of England had “soft” targets 
from 1976 to 1987. More countries have preferred to increase CBI instead. 
So while there were opinions for and against CBI, papers were published rarely. Inflation was 
not a major issue until the 1970s. 
The development of CBI theory 
This section covers the key papers in support of CBI. Although they are well-known, they are 
summarised here for completeness. They are critiqued later in the chapter. 
Kydland and Prescott (1977) 
This paper had two key definitions: policy is “consistent” where it maximises social utility now 
and at each future point in time, given economic agents’ past decisions; and policy is 
“optimal” where is maximises social utility subject to the constraints of agents’ decisions. The 
paper argued that the changing nature of agents’ expectations meant that deciding policy at 
each point in time leads to sub-optimal policy. The problem is that there is no link from future 
policy decisions back to the current decisions of agents. A decision-making rule is preferable 
because it leads to credible policy and is a means of managing agents’ expectations. 
An example of the problem is building on flood plains. A government may state that it will not 
compensate home owners and residents for building on a flood plain. But if people do not 
believe the government and build, and a flood occurs, then the risk is that the general feeling 
of sympathy will induce the government to compensate the victims. Society would be better 
off if no-one built on the flood plains.  
In the language of Kydland and Prescott (1977), the government cannot use the later 
compensation decision to influence agents not to build on the flood plain. The government 
might announce that it will not compensate people in future, but people’s actions will depend 
on whether this statement is credible. A commonly proposed example of credibility is where 
the policy is enshrined in the constitution. Another example of credibility would be where a 
policy has bipartisan support. 
Barro and Gordon (1983a) 
In this paper, the authors state that their goal was to develop a model that demonstrates 
some features of public policy at the time: higher rates of inflation and money growth; and 
activist monetary policies. 
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The paper constructs a model of the economy where unemployment depends on inflation 
surprises. Society’s loss function depends on the square of inflation (zero inflation being the 
target) plus the square of the extent to which unemployment deviates from the non-
accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU, Un). Unemployment at or above the 
NAIRU will not lead to increased inflation. Below this point, inflation will start to increase due 
to higher wages caused by labour shortages. 
The paper gives the inflation and unemployment components a relative weight. Another 
weighting is applied for the way in which unemployment deviates from the NAIRU. This 
weighting, “k,” (a number between 0 and 1) is important. If no weighting were applied, then 
deviations either side of the NAIRU would be equally penalised. The weighting serves to 
penalise unemployment above the NAIRU more than unemployment below it. The authors 
state that they make the assumption to generate activist policy. It implies that policy makers 
are happy to drive unemployment below the NAIRU and wish to achieve a target 
unemployment rate of kUn. 
Economic agents base their inflationary expectations in a period on information from the last 
period. In equilibrium, expected inflation equals actual inflation. Therefore, there are no 
inflation surprises and unemployment is at the NAIRU. Policy makers are not bound by 
decision rules and therefore have an incentive to implement inflation surprises, leading to 
expectations of inflation, which leads to actual inflation. Its value is given by the relative 
importance of unemployment above inflation and k. Although there is some discussion of 
Kydland and Prescott (1977), this paper is also a more technical version of Friedman’s famous 
paper (1968b) with the assumption of a drive to lower unemployment below the NAIRU. The 
authors conclude by raising the question of what mechanisms can restrict future money 
growth, such as a commodity standard or legal restrictions. 
Rogoff (1985) and Lohmann (1992) 
The later paper generalised the earlier paper. Lohmann develops a model of the economy 
with a supply function that is affected by the expectations of wage setters. Policy makers seek 
to minimise a loss function similar to that in Barro and Gordon (1983a). The model produces 
the same sort of inflation bias, which can be changed by an economic shock. Delegating 
monetary policy to an independent, conservative central banker reduces both the inflation 
bias and the inflationary effect of the shocks. However, this also increases output distortions 
in response to the shocks. The paper can be seen as a way of modelling shock responses. 
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Delegating to the central banker has two components. Firstly, the extent of independence is 
determined by the cost to the policy maker of overriding the central bank. Secondly, there is 
the question of the level of conservativeness of the central banker. Combining these two leads 
to two types of responses to economic shocks. For small shocks, the central bank is allowed to 
implement conservative policy. For large shocks, the policy maker is better off overriding the 
central bank. For example, it will implement easier policy in the case of a large negative shock, 
rather than letting the central bank implement tighter policy. A larger cost means that a shock 
must be larger for the policy maker to override the central bank. Greater central bank 
conservatism increases the distortionary effects of its response to the economic shock. 
Lohmann (1992) argues that increasing the cost of overriding the central bank is a more 
efficient approach than increasing central bank conservatism. 
Walsh (1995) 
This is a refinement of the previous two papers. He proposed that the output distortions of 
CBI could be addressed through an appropriately structured contract between the central 
bank and the government. Using a model similar to the previous papers, he argued that a 
transfer payment from the government to the bank could be introduced. In its simplest 
version, it would decrease with the size of the effect of the inflation surprise on output, 
growth in the money supply (or deviation from a growth target), and the extent to which 
target output exceeds equilibrium output. This approach is preferable to delegating monetary 
policy to an independent central bank (as modelled in Lohmann 1992) because it implicitly 
includes both a linear and quadratic response to inflation, and delegating only has a quadratic 
response. This more sophisticated response removes the last components of inflation bias and 
output distortion. 
Comment 
These theories are successors to Friedman’s work. Much of his research revolved around 
implementing long run, stable policy, compared with short term, output-first policy (see, for 
example, his 1948 paper). In the US, this identified him with the right of politics. In other 
countries, for example Germany, these policies had bipartisan support, at least after the 
Gurzenich affair in 1956 and the SPD’s adoption of the social market economy in 1959 at Bad 
Godesberg (Mierzejewski 2004; Nicholls 1994). 
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Statistical work on CBI 
Early regression studies 
The main early papers were Grilli et al (1991), Cukierman et al (1992) and Alesina and 
Summers (1993). The first paper developed an index of CBI based on political and financial 
indicators of central bank legislation for eighteen OECD countries. This included appointments 
to the central bank, the financial relationship between the bank and the government, whether 
the government needed to approve monetary policy, whether the central bank also 
supervised commercial banks, and whether procedures were set down for resolving conflicts 
between the central bank and the government. 
The authors then ran regressions on inflation, measured by decades for 1950-1989, using 
these indices, as well as some political instability variables. The CBI variables had statistically 
significant coefficients for some decades and for the overall period as well. However, CBI 
variables were not correlated with output growth. The authors described these results as a 
“free lunch” in that CBI could control inflation without output effects (375). 
Cukierman et al (1992) built on this with their own index, but for developing countries as well. 
Their sample comprised seventy-two countries, but again the time periods were decades 
based on 1950-1989. They found that their index of legal CBI was negatively correlated with 
inflation in industrial countries, but not in developing countries, and not in the total sample. 
They used the turnover of central bank governors as an alternative, de facto indicator of CBI. 
The higher the turnover, the lower the CBI. They found this turnover variable to be positively 
correlated with inflation. They also explored the relationship between CBI and inflation and 
concluded that sustained high inflation erodes CBI, which then produces more inflation. 
Alesina and Summers (1993) examined the relationship between CBI and real economic 
variables such as real growth, the variance in real growth, unemployment, the variance in 
unemployment, the real interest rate, and its variance. For CBI, they averaged the indices 
from Grilli et al (1991) and Alesina (1988). The study covered sixteen countries using averaged 
data from the mid-1950s to the late 1980s. The authors confirmed the inverse relationship 
between CBI and inflation and found no relationship between CBI and real economic 
variables. They suggested that CBI reforms would have inflation benefits that would outweigh 
output costs. They also noted that CBI could be endogenous, but considered this would not be 
an issue in the time frame of their study. 
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These papers led to a strong literature on CBI and in particular its relationship with inflation. 
One of the weaknesses of the early papers was they used few other economic or political 
variables, if at all. Later papers were able to still find a CBI effect with the inclusion of other 
variables, such as Brumm (2000) and Franzese (1999). Other papers proposed refinements to 
CBI theory. For example, Keefer and Stasavage (2003) concluded that delegation to increase 
CBI has a greater effect on inflation when political leaders are subject to greater constraints, 
or veto players. They explain the results of Cukierman et al (1992) that legal CBI was 
correlated with inflation in industrial countries, but not developing ones. Stasavage (2003) 
presented data to argue that more transparent central banks would find it easier to acquire a 
reputation, be more credible, and have a lower sacrifice ratio. Way (2000) concluded that the 
left/right partisanship of the government of the day interacted with CBI. Under left 
governments, high CBI produces lower inflation and higher unemployment. Under right 
governments, it produces little change in inflation and lower unemployment.  
The recent literature 
Later CBI papers have been more circumspect. The idea that turnover represents de facto CBI 
was challenged in Dreher et al (2008). This paper examined data for one hundred and thirty-
seven countries from 1970 to 2004. The authors found that high inflation tended to trigger a 
change in a central bank governor. In other words, turnover of central bank governor is 
endogenous, rather than a causal variable. Klomp and de Haan (2010a) conducted a large-
scale study of over a hundred countries for the period from 1980 to 2005. Pooled OLS for both 
legal CBI and turnover CBI shows the expected correlations. However, when the authors use a 
random coefficient model to take into account dynamic change, the coefficients are no longer 
statistically significant across the sample. The coefficients are statistically significant for no 
more than a quarter of the sample. The authors suggest that the future task is to determine 
the conditions upon which CBI coefficients might be statistically significant. 
The reforms to legal CBI in the 1990s could either be interpreted as politicians accepting the 
wisdom of CBI, or, as Bell (2002) put it, managing their risks by distancing themselves from 
high interest rates. Nonetheless, the reforms presented a new opportunity to test CBI theory. 
Studies of the 1970s and 1980s always have some uncertainty about them because CBI 
variables were largely constant. But such a concern is not present for 1990s data. Acemoglu et 
al (2008) examine fifty-two countries from 1972 to 2005 and divide their sample into 
countries with high, medium and low levels of constraints. They found the CBI/inflation 
relationship strongest in countries with a medium level of constraints. The authors suggested 
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this occurs because in countries with high or low constraints, CBI reform “does not alter the 
underlying political economy” (351). A contrasting paper is Crowe and Meade (2008). The 
authors there compare two periods for sixty-six countries: an initial period around the late 
1980s and early 1990s; and a current period around the early 2000s. The analysis took 
account of endogeneity by using the rule of law and accountability as instruments and found 
consistent results supporting an inflation effect from CBI reforms. 
Klomp and de Haan (2010b) analysed the literature through a meta-analysis. In other words, 
the statistical results of regressions in individual studies themselves became observations for 
a study that encompassed multiple papers. The authors examined fifty-nine studies published 
between 1991 and 2006. On average, the meta-regressions in the paper had ninety-one 
observations covering twenty-eight countries. The dependent variable was the t-statistic of 
the CBI coefficient. In the meta-regression, the constant term represented publication bias (if 
statistically significant). The inverse of the standard error of the CBI coefficient in a regression 
was the key variable; if statistically significant, it would represent whether the CBI/inflation 
relationship was robust. 
The authors found strong evidence of publication bias in the literature. They also found that, 
although there was a CBI/inflation relationship, it was conditional on the features of the study 
in question. In particular, it was more likely to occur where the study covered the OECD, in the 
1970s, and included labour market variables (for example corporatism). 
Comment 
This short review of the empirical literature has shown that there is nagging uncertainty about 
the CBI/inflation relationship. Over time, studies have included more countries, longer time 
periods, more variables, and more sophisticated techniques, but uncertainty remains. There is 
also the issue of whether CBI reflects another, underlying variable. In a review article, 
Fernandez-Albertos (2015) has stated that the question of endogeneity “remains ultimately 
unsolved in the empirical literature.” 
One approach would be for the literature to focus on the weaknesses revealed in the theory 
to date. For example, there are more studies on the CBI/inflation relationship than on what 
factors might cause CBI. Better knowledge on what factors cause CBI would progress work on 
endogeneity. Further, by highlighting the OECD in the 1970s, Klomp and de Haan (2010b) have 
indicated that it would be worth going back to the data covered in the early CBI studies to 
determine if there is something that was initially missed. Chapter 6 specifically considers this 
question. 
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Counter theories and counter-perspectives 
There are four main counter-arguments to CBI. Many of these have been made by multiple 
authors. A discussion about CBI in the Australian context is in Chapter 6 of Bell (2004). 
CBI is endogenous 
A commonly made argument about CBI is that it is not they key driver of inflation 
performance. Rather, CBI is endogenous and it is correlated with other variables that are more 
important, such as inflation aversion, but which have not been included in statistical studies. 
This argument has been made in general terms by Hayo (1998), Hayo and Hefeker (2002), 
McNamara (2002), and Pollard (1993). 
There have been some statistical treatments of this theory. Posen (1996) proposed that the 
underlying variable was financial sector opposition to inflation. His study covered seventeen 
OECD countries from 1950 to 1989. His indicator for effective financial opposition to inflation 
(FOI) comprised four parts: universal banking; the central bank not supervising banks; federal 
political structure; and decreasing in the fractionalisation of the legislature. Posen found that 
FOI was positively correlated with CBI and negatively correlated with inflation. CBI was not 
correlated with inflation. 
Scheve (2004) used social survey data to examine the likely determinants of inflation aversion; 
inflation and unemployment history were key variables. He then developed an estimated 
inflation aversion index for twenty OECD countries controlling for economic context. This was 
better correlated than CBI with a country’s inflation performance in the 1990s. 
A counter-paper is Crowe (2008), who argues that taking endogeneity into account makes the 
CBI/inflation correlation more robust. His underlying variable is the diversity of political 
coalitions. The more diverse the coalition, the more likely that the central bank will be goal 
independent. The intuition is that if the political coalition cannot resolve issues around 
monetary policy, then the problems will be left to the central bank. Crowe finds that policy 
correlation is inversely related to CBI and that the CBI/inflation relationship is strong once this 
is taken into account through instrumental variables. His study covers thirty five countries in 
the late 1990s. 
Wider empirics are inconsistent 
A second common counter-argument about CBI is that wider empirical observations are not 
consistent with it, or at least are not explained by it. For example, Daunfeldt and de Luna 
(2008) and Pollard (1993) have observed that countries managed to bring inflation under 
11 
control in the 1980s without a change in CBI. The observation suggests that another factor 
was driving inflation performance. 
Posen (1998) conducted a statistical study of other possible implications of CBI, in addition to 
lower inflation. The study covered seventeen OECD countries from 1950 to 1989. The 
implications were derived from the idea that CBI increases price certainty over the longer 
term, increases credibility about monetary policy, and is a stronger constraint on government. 
The implications tested were that higher CBI is correlated with: a lower sacrifice ratio; greater 
nominal wage rigidity; lower costs of disinflation (holding nominal wages constant); quicker 
disinflations; lower government seigniorage revenue; and a smaller relationship between the 
electoral cycle and fiscal and monetary policy. 
Posen (1998) found no evidence at the 5 per cent level for any of these implications. The one 
possible finding from the study was that higher CBI is correlated with a higher sacrifice ratio. 
This result is consistent with the idea that a more inflation averse country is prepared to 
forego more output than other countries to achieve price stability. The study is indirect 
support for the endogeneity theory. Posen put this in terms of the financial sector, but other 
sources of endogeneity are possible. 
Monetary and fiscal policy should be co-ordinated 
This revives an idea made prior to CBI theory. If monetary and fiscal policy both have effects 
on the economy, then they should work together. Conflict may lead to sub-optimal results. 
Forder (1998) has made this argument in general terms. Andersen and Schneider (1986), 
Pollard (1993) and Blake and Westaway (1993) developed this argument in mathematical 
models. They found that, all else being equal, outcomes were superior when the fiscal and 
monetary authorities co-ordinated. 
If the central bank is not independent, the possibility of extended conflict is reduced. 
However, the chances are greater if the bank is independent. Another issue is whether, in the 
face of possible conflict, an independent central bank decides to follow the government’s 
lead, the government follows the bank’s lead, or conflict is sustained.  
Germany, the US and the UK had varying degrees of policy co-ordination during the Great 
Inflation. Studies of Germany have demonstrated that monetary policy there tended to follow 
fiscal policy (Frey and Schneider 1981; Berger and Schneider 2000). However, during the 
second oil shock, the Bundesbank considered that fiscal policy was too loose. It engaged in the 
public debate and, when the SPD and the Liberal Party could not agree on reducing the deficit, 
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the Liberal Party switched to the CDU. The new government reduced the deficit and policy 
was coordinated (Kennedy 1991). 
In the UK in the 1970s, there were few signs that macroeconomic policy was not co-ordinated. 
This is not unexpected, given that the government had direct influence over the central bank. 
Fiscal policy was sometimes used as stabilisation, for example Denis Healey’s austerity 
budgets of 1975 and 1976. In the 1979 election, however, Thatcher promised to implement 
the Clegg Commission’s recommendations on public sector pay while at the same time 
implementing tight monetary policy and introducing a VAT. In terms of inflation, this was 
contradictory policy. However, the 1981 Budget had significant spending cuts and inflation 
started to drop from this point on (Derbyshire and Derbyshire 1988; Tomlinson 2012). 
In the US, Presidents Nixon and Carter disliked high interest rates and sought to soften 
monetary policy where they could. They were typically interested in price controls, credit 
controls, or “jawboning” to manage inflation. Fiscal policy was soft and monetary policy only 
developed a harder edge with the appointment of Paul Volcker as Chair of the Federal 
Reserve. Under Carter and Volcker, policy was not coordinated, but the conflict was not 
extreme. But after the 1980 election, the Federal Reserve sharply increased interest rates. 
Reagan also obtained Congressional support for very loose fiscal policy. The result in the early 
1980s was high unemployment, high and unstable interest rates, decreasing inflation and a 
high deficit (Hargrove 1988; Neikirk 1987; Walker 2011). 
This brief summary suggests that inflation was best brought under control once monetary and 
fiscal policies were co-ordinated. Monetary policy alone can achieve the result, but at a 
greater cost. 
Time inconsistency does not override common sense 
Some authors have suggested that society is often able to work around the time inconsistency 
problem for some issues (McCallum 1995; 1997). Kydland and Prescott (1977) briefly 
mentioned patent law. Here, there is an incentive for policy makers to renege on their 
commitment; technology is developed on the premise of patent protection and government 
can withdraw the protection, if it wishes, to secure short term advantage. Taylor (1983) and 
Forder (2001) have observed that continuing with patent law appears to be common sense to 
everyone, and so there is no question of it being discontinued.  
Constraints on government are also relevant. The higher they are, the less scope there is for 
cheating. For example, to raise funds, James I sold the hereditary title of baronet for £1,095 
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each and promised that only a fixed number would be sold. By 1614 this generated £90,000. 
But he then reneged on the commitment to only sell a limited number and by 1622 their price 
was £220 (North and Weingast 1989). 
A different example was the abrogation of gold clauses by the United States in 1933 in its long 
term bonds. These clauses gave the bearer the right to demand payment in gold coin of 
certain specification. The US government converted these debts to paper money by law. This 
decision, combined with other legislative changes, survived Supreme Court challenge and with 
little effect on financial markets. In the court cases, much turned on the fact that bondholders 
were still being paid (Green 1986). 
A critique of CBI theory 
Earlier in the chapter, these papers were described and put in the context. Their conceptual 
and analytical problems are now discussed. 
Kydland and Prescott 
In some ways, the paper is very general. It has a breadth of applications beyond the 
relationship between inflation and unemployment. However, it describes a problem which 
depends on certain conditions, namely an incentive to cheat by policy makers and a lack of 
effective punishment by stakeholders or voters. This then affects credibility. Something that 
would override the time inconsistency problem is where there is bipartisan support for the 
optimal policy. Then a policy maker’s statement about future policy would be credible and the 
optimal policy would be consistent. A political process of debate, or shifting interests, might 
result in bipartisanship so that the time inconsistency problem no longer applies. 
Kydland and Prescott (1977) might be better seen as a step in the maturity of a policy problem 
where the technical solution is known, but it does not have wider acceptance. This 
information asymmetry would optimise the scope for government “cheating”. Another factor 
would be a lack of constraints on the government. This decreases the chances that 
stakeholders or the government could punish a cheating government. 
Barro and Gordon (1983a) 
This paper makes the key assumption that k<1, i.e. that policy makers have an unemployment 
goal below the NAIRU. This then leads policy to try to push unemployment below the NAIRU, 
which is futile in the long run (Phelps 1967 and Friedman 1968b). In 1983, the idea of setting 
k<1 was a valid assumption for most countries, including the United States.  
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However, Orphanides (2003) has given an alternative explanation. He has argued that, during 
the 1970s, policy makers in the United States under-estimated the level of the NAIRU. For 
example, unemployment of 6 per cent might have convinced policy makers to continue with 
monetary ease to reduce it to 4 per cent when the NAIRU may have been 6 per cent. Tulip 
(2004) used minimum wages to estimate the NAIRU during the 1970s and found they 
averaged over 6 per cent. The Economic Report of the President had the NAIRU (often termed 
“potential output”) around 4 per cent in the first half of the 1970s and around 5 per cent in 
the second half. It is likely that this caused policy mistakes. 
This author argues that errors around the output gap is a more complete explanation for 
activist policy in the 1970s than the assumption that k<1. The lack of attention in the literature 
to this crucial assumption has been noted previously (Blackburn and Christensen 1989). 
Rogoff (1985) and Lohmann (1992) 
I do not query the idea around a central banker being more conservative than a policy maker 
or the general population. The issue I would like to raise with these papers is the concept of a 
cost for a politician of overriding the more conservative central bank. If the population does 
not value price stability, and the political leadership does not want it, then the question is 
what happens if the central bank dis-inflates. The likely response is that there will be a public 
outcry and political pressure brought to bear. The central bank then has a choice: it can either 
continue with its policy and run the risk of being replaced, or it can soften its policy so that it is 
at the margin of what is politically acceptable. Volcker (1990) himself stated that he was able 
to disinflate due to greater public support for it. 
There are some precedents for unpopular central banks. The second and third central banks in 
the United States did not have their charter renewed partly because they encouraged the 
return of banknotes to the originating banks for redemption (Smith 1936). In the 1920s, the 
membership of the Australian Note Issue Board was replaced because it applied a strict 
quantity of money approach to issuing notes and coins, which worked against the interests of 
farmers and the financial sector (Coleman 2001). An example keeping a close eye on the 
politics is the Federal Reserve in the 1970s, which was subject to intense scrutiny by Congress. 
Although the Fed did respond to inflation, it did not break the back of inflationary 
expectations. This did not occur until the appointment of Paul Volcker in response to a run on 
the dollar and the building of a coalition of support for tight money around 1980 (De Long 
1997). The Fed kept within the margin of political acceptability. 
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In theoretical terms, the cost of overriding an independent central bank will decrease if there 
is less political support for what it is trying to do. Riker (1980) has already made this 
argument. He noted that institutions only slow down the link between preferences and policy 
outcomes. If an institution consistently creates a set of losers from its actions, they will lobby 
to remake that institution. In the long run, institutions will be shaped to support preferences. 
Woolley (1985) said something similar. Flood and Garber (1984) discussed this basic idea using 
a mathematical model of an economy adopting the gold standard. They conclude that shifting 
to gold would only be “a mask obscuring the forces that drive the global dynamic money 
creation process” (104). In 1989, the Treasurer of Australia, Paul Keating, used this argument 
to describe CBI as “straight quackery” (Bell 2004, 138). 
A related idea is that there is a great difference between voters and the political elites. Voters 
are accustomed to a vast, authoritative hierarchy above them. If they do not comply with the 
law, the consequences can be swift and severe. However, political elites create the rules and 
there is scope for them to change the rules to suit their purposes, especially if the political 
opposition is not strong. The concept of the immutable cost of overriding a central bank 
ignores this reality. 
Moore (1995) analysed this problem from the perspective of public sector managers 
generally, using the concept of the authorising environment. He argued that the political 
environment determined what public sector managers could and should do. He also argued 
that they could shape this environment through techniques such as advocacy, policy 
development, negotiation, public deliberation, and marketing. These techniques all had their 
benefits and risks, but they show that public sector managers, such as central bank governors, 
often have multiple ways for engaging with politicians and the public to create their preferred 
environment for monetary policy. Moore’s ideas are powerful because they extend beyond 
the cost of overriding a central bank, but also give the central bank scope to increase the 
political value of stable prices. 
Writers sometimes suggest that a constitutional amendment may be a way of ensuring that 
the cost of overriding a central bank is maintained (e.g. Coleman 2001). Admittedly, this 
would make a legislative override more difficult and negate the threat of one. But a 
substantial process must occur in order to make the constitutional change in the first place. 
This often involves the legislature passing a law, a referendum, the involvement of the 
states/provinces in federal systems, and supermajorities in any or all of these processes. If a 
central bank were given constitutional status in a country, then it would be fair to conclude 
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that its role, and the importance of tight money, had bipartisan support and the policy had 
matured. If this were the case, the problem in Kydland and Prescott (1977) would no longer 
apply because policy makers’ statements about future policy would support tight money and 
be credible. 
Walsh (1995) 
This paper is an elaboration on Rogoff (1985) and Lohmann (1992). The central bank is fully 
independent, but a more sophisticated method is used to drive the central bank’s behaviour 
and produce better economic outcomes. However, it suffers from the same problems as the 
other two papers by assuming that the central bank can be separated from government. 
Having the central bank and the government enter into a contract for monetary policy 
assumes they are equal parties. In most cases when a government purchases supplies or 
services, this assumption is appropriate. But where the procurement has political implications, 
then voters would apply pressure for it to be politically managed. 
The structure of the thesis 
The five core chapters of the thesis and their findings are outlined below. 
Chapter 2 – The Phillips Curve literature 
The key papers in the inflation/unemployment literature are well-known. In 1958, Phillips 
presented his general finding that there appeared to be an inverse relationship between the 
two variables. This idea was reinforced by Samuelson and Solow (1960). However, Phelps 
(1967) and Friedman (1968b) disproved this on a theoretical level using agents’ expectations. 
Although there is still a debate about the short run real effects of policy, it is now a consensus 
that policy cannot have permanent, long run real effects. This basic understanding means that 
the risk of prolonged episodes of inflation, such as in the Great Inflation, are much reduced. 
The problem with focussing on these articles is that it is selective and may not have 
represented the views of the majority of economists. Chapter 2 seeks to objectively measure 
the views of the profession on the long run Phillips Curve from 1947 to 2006. This is assessed 
through examining articles in the top ten economic journals based in the United States. The 
aim is to determine whether the profession either became substantially less conservative 
after Samuelson and Solow (1960), or became substantially more conservative after Friedman 
(1968). By examining what economists actually thought at various points in time, it will be 
possible to obtain greater insight on whether economic thought contributed to the Great 
Inflation. 
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Chapter 2 finds that the economic literature was less conservative during the 1960s and 
became more conservative after Friedman (1968b). By 1975, inflation first policy and the 
vertical long run Phillips Curve became the majority view of economists in the literature, and 
by 2000 it was the consensus view. The data suggests that the economic literature was largely 
influenced by theory. It also suggests that economic ideas did not directly influence economic 
policy, but may have done so indirectly through other channels, such as by influencing 
politicians, advisers and others in the “political game.” 
Chapter 3 – The Federal Reserve’s reaction function 
The activities of the Federal Reserve in monetary policy have been much studied. The early 
papers were Havrilesky (1967) and Christian (1968) and these found that monetary policy was 
correlated with inflation and unemployment. In 1992, Bernanke and Blinder found that the 
Fed responded to the money supply during the Volcker disinflation between October 1979 
and October 1982. Clarida et al (2000) and Sims and Zha (2006) have argued that the Federal 
Reserve placed a higher priority on fighting inflation after this time; that is, it became more 
conservative. Sargent et al (2006) argue in favour of a learning process, with the Fed being 
least responsive to inflation in the mid-1970s. Orphanides (2003) proposed that the Fed 
under-estimated the NAIRU, producing a bias towards expansive monetary policy in the 
1970s. 
The claims about unemployment, inflation and the Volcker disinflation appear irrefutable. 
However, the claims about a shift in priorities and learning operate at the margins and are 
more contestable. 
The chapter examines the reaction functions on four types of data from 1953 to 2012; a 
GARCH model of quarterly data for the federal funds rate; an OLS model of annual data for 
the federal funds rate; and logit models of the ease and tightening decisions of the FOMC. The 
variables that are statistically significant across these models, and are robust, are prices, 
output, the Volcker disinflation, presidential signalling, and the deficit. There was support for 
Orphanides’ (2003) theory; the real time output gap generally fits the data better than the 
unemployment rate. Various conservatism and learning variables were tested, but almost 
none of them behaved as expected. The only conservatism variable to perform in line with 
theory was the real time output gap for the period after 1982. The coefficient for this variable 
tended to be lower in size than before, or operate at a longer lag, suggesting that the Fed was 
less responsive to it. 
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The Fed cannot ignore output. It is legally required to pursue full employment. However, the 
evidence suggests that it has changed the weight it places on it. After all, if the Federal 
Reserve has one policy instrument (interest rates, or versions thereof), it will be most effective 
if it pursues just one policy goal (stable prices). After correcting for errors in measuring the 
real time gap, the Fed appears to have shifted as close as it reasonably can towards this 
approach. This is one of its key findings from the Great Inflation. 
Chapter 4 – Historical case studies of Germany, the US and the UK 
CBI theory says little about political behaviour, apart from predicting a positive correlation 
between inflation and political involvement in monetary policy. This suggests that CBI theory 
is narrow; political behaviour is complex and if CBI theory cannot explain much of it then it is 
vulnerable to other theories. 
This chapter gives a historical narrative of three countries that had different institutional 
arrangements and inflation histories: Germany had a high degree of legal CBI and an inflation 
history; the UK had a low degree of legal CBI and no inflation history; and the United States 
had a high degree of legal CBI and no inflation history. However, all countries had political 
leaders who played an important role in promoting stable prices: Germany had Ludwig Erhard; 
the UK had Margaret Thatcher and the United States had Ronald Reagan.  
There are two competing theories: CBI, which is a legal constraints theory; and the political 
constraints theory of Riker (1980). The aim of Chapter 4 is to conduct process tracing to 
determine which theory can better explain these events. It does find that CBI theory has some 
explanatory power. For example, inflation was lowest in Germany and highest in the UK. 
Consistent with Lohmann (1992), the Bundesbank did not accommodate the first oil price 
shock in 1974. 
But the political constraints theory can explain these events and more. In 1956, Adenauer was 
universally condemned in Germany for criticising the Bank deutscher Lander’s (BdL’s) pursuit 
of sound money (the Gurzenich Affair). This sent an ongoing signal to politicians that the BdL 
and then the Bundesbank had widespread support for their goal of sound money. It can also 
explain why Helmut Schmidt as Finance Minister put out a joint press release with the 
Bundesbank in early 1974, stating that inflation would not reach 10 per cent. This did not 
occur in either of the other two countries. 
In the US, the Federal Reserve received more support from Reagan than Carter; the latter had 
his own version of the Gurzenich Affair in the 1980 election campaign. Reagan’s support may 
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not have been in the quality and quantity that economists were hoping for, but it was 
politically sufficient. Both Burns (1979) and Volcker (1990) stated that public opinion shaped 
their actions. The UK was a strong example of politics influencing economic policy. Thatcher 
came to power on a platform of fighting inflation and curbing union power and she took the 
lead in this. Once fiscal and monetary policy were aligned to this goal, inflation started to 
drop. In summary, the political constraints theory can explain not only the differences in 
inflation levels across the three countries, but also the timing of their disinflations. 
The chapter uses this analysis to propose a new theory about CBI, namely that the higher a 
central bank’s legal independence, the more likely it is to conduct a disinflation. Achieving 
stable prices is not always a vote winner; the direct benefits of stable prices tend to 
concentrate in a share of the population (savers) and the indirect macroeconomic benefits are 
not obvious. Therefore, more political risk is involved and it makes sense for a politician to let 
the central bank disinflate, where appropriate. This is most easily done when there is CBI. It 
may be that the established literature on CBI was observing this process but drawing the 
wrong inference. 
Chapter 5 – Inflation and the economic vote 
Conventional political wisdom in the 1970s was that voters cared more about employment 
than inflation. However, a number of political leaders who oversaw disinflations had long, 
successful careers. Examples are Ronald Reagan, Margaret Thatcher, Francois Mitterand, 
Felipe Gonzalez (Spain), and Aníbal Cavaco Silva (Portugal). A reverse example was the SPD in 
Germany, which lost power in 1982 when it could not deliver a sufficiently conservative fiscal 
policy. This raises the question of whether voters placed substantial weight on inflation 
performance. Early studies on the economic vote suggested this was the case, but later 
studies do not (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2013). 
Chapter 5 further explains the issues in Chapter 4 by examining the link between inflation and 
a political activity (elections). If there were a widespread political reaction to inflation, then it 
would show up in voting behaviour. If not, the political constraints theory can still apply, but it 
would be through other political channels, such as elites or powerful interests such as the 
finance sector (e.g. Posen 1996). It should be noted that economic growth and inflation have 
different patterns of winners and losers. Almost everyone gains from economic growth, but 
the effects of inflation can change, depending on whether someone is a saver or borrower. 
This paper tests the hypothesis that disinflations were related to widespread political 
concerns about inflation. 
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Much of the economic vote literature revolves around conditioning variables relating to clarity 
of responsibility. For example, if a government is in coalition (Powell and Whitten 1993), or 
the domestic economy is driven by international events (Hellwig 2001), then it makes less 
sense to punish or reward the government over the economy. Chapter 5 introduces a new 
conditioning variable, namely the preferences that a country’s voters may have about the 
economy. This is based on “linguistic relativity,” the idea that the characteristics of a person’s 
language can influence their decisions (Wolff and Holmes 2011).  
Inflation is a measure of the stability of a currency over time. Someone who preferred greater 
stability, or who discounted the future less, would be expected to prefer lower inflation. 
Linguistic relativity has been shown to influence individuals’ decisions about the future 
through how a language represents the future tense, or its “future time reference.” For 
example, Japanese, most Germanic, and all Scandinavian languages represent the future 
through context, without a marker such as “will”. Speakers of these languages (which has a 
weak future time reference) literally say “It rains tomorrow.” On the other hand, Romance 
languages and English have the explicit marker “will” and are considered to have a strong 
future time reference. The inference is that, where the majority of voters in a country speak a 
language with weak future time reference, they are more likely to punish the government for 
inflation. The chapter examines whether combining future time reference with clarity of 
responsibility creates useful categories for analysing elections.  
The approach is to determine what variables are correlated with the vote share of the main 
government party of twenty two OECD countries at legislative elections from 1956 to 2009. 
Chapter 5 finds that splitting the elections in four categories (strong/weak future time 
reference, and whether the lead government party is in coalition) generally provides sufficient 
return for the extra variables. For the strong and clear category, the chapter finds that the 
vote is correlated with the real economy, a variable that combines unemployment and 
growth. For the clear and weak category, which occurred most often in Norway, Sweden and 
Japan, the chapter finds that the vote is correlated with benchmarked inflation. This is a 
concept used in Kayser and Peress (2012), who argue that voters compare a country’s 
economic performance against an international benchmark. This chapter uses the median. An 
economic vote was absent in the two categories without clarity of responsibility. The other 
key variable in these categories is whether elections are held six or more months early, which 
could be interpreted as a reflection on the governing coalition. 
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The chapter shows that a simple electoral accountability model can only explain the incentives 
politicians faced in dealing with inflation for a small number of countries. Indeed, the clarity of 
responsibility idea means that only about half of governments in developed democracies face 
a direct political incentive to manage the economy. This may indicate that there are 
alternative ways, such as elites working behind the scenes, by which countries secure 
economic outcomes. It also suggests that lead government parties in coalitions have other 
issues to manage, in particular that very coalition itself. 
Chapter 6 – The correlation between inflation and CBI 
This is the key chapter in the thesis. The validity of CBI theory rests on whether it is reflected 
in the data. Chapter 6 examines the classic case of CBI effectiveness, i.e. developed countries 
in the 1970s. This follows on from Klomp and de Haan (2010b), who found that the statistical 
results for CBI are strongest for papers covering OECD countries in the 1970s. 
Chapter 6 has annual data for twenty one OECD countries from 1973 to 1990, along similar 
lines to Franzese (1999). To address the issue of endogeneity, it also includes an analysis of 
which factors are correlated with CBI, the two main ones being strong bicameralism and a 
hyperinflation history. These are then used as instrumental variables in two-stage least 
squares regressions. The chapter seeks to test the strength of CBI theory by determining if and 
when CBI and inflation are correlated in this important case study. 
The chapter finds that one particular measure of CBI was correlated with inflation and has the 
right sign in some simple models, such as OLS or 2SLS with lagged inflation, or OLS with lagged 
inflation and economic variables. However, adding institutional variables meant the 
correlation was no longer statistically significant. In a 2SLS regression with lagged inflation and 
economic variables, the coefficient for CBI changed its sign from the OLS model. Other 
variables representing CBI did worse. The variables that were consistently correlated with 
inflation were lagged inflation, currency performance, growth, oil inflation, and a time trend 
(with a negative coefficient). These variables are self-explanatory, apart perhaps from the 
time trend, which could be interpreted as policy learning or changing expectations. 
These results place serious doubt on CBI theory. The previous literature has taken a risk by 
often focussing on the period before the 1990s, which meant that CBI measures largely stayed 
constant over time. Without some temporal variation, it was difficult to be sure that CBI 
variables were measuring just that, rather than other features of a country. This placed 
greater reliance on selecting the correct instrument and an effective range of variables. If CBI 
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cannot help explain the Great Inflation, then this raises a question of whether another key 
institutional or cultural variable can instead. 
A new narrative? 
Economists and political scientists have a strong narrative to tell about the development of 
CBI theory. It starts with the Phillips Curve in 1958, which meant there was theoretical support 
for full employment as a legitimate policy outcome. This displaced the traditional focus on 
inflation. But then Phelps (1967) and Friedman (1968b) foresaw the problems behind using 
demand management to increase employment. Stagflation occurred in the 1970s due to the 
oil price shocks and economic agents’ anticipation of easier economic policy. Mainstream CBI 
theory argues that developed countries that had higher levels of CBI withstood these 
problems better because the central banks could resist political and popular demands for 
increased public spending. In the 1990s, many countries learnt from this and implemented 
central bank reforms, producing stable prices. 
The point of this thesis is that this narrative misses the point. A better narrative is that the 
collapse of Bretton Woods, plus the oil shocks, led to an outbreak of inflation that policy 
makers gradually addressed throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Although central banks were 
involved in disinflations, so were politicians. Politicians sometimes gave central banks political 
space in which to operate, but could simultaneously expose them as scapegoats for 
disinflating. Politicians’ decisions were aimed at maximising political returns, which were often 
similar to optimal policy, but not always. Higher CBI did not cause lower inflation, although it 
may have indicated that the central bank was more likely to take a lead role in disinflating 
through monetary policy. 
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2 – Theoretical underpinnings of 
macroeconomic policy in the United 
States, 1947-2006 
Abstract 
This paper examines the conservativeness of the academic economics literature. 
Conservativeness is defined as either arguing that the long run Phillips Curve is vertical, or that 
economic policy should focus on inflation first. Data was collected through articles published in 
the top 10 academic economics journals in the United States.  
The paper finds strong evidence of a shift to a less conservative literature between the 
publication of Phillips (1958) and Phelps (1967) and Friedman (1968b). 
There is only modest evidence that the literature became more conservative after stagflation 
(through demonstrating that the long run Phillips Curve is vertical). Rather, after stagflation, 
papers were likely to be less conservative following an increase in unemployment. This more 
liberal approach may have been affordable once the Fed broke the back of inflation by 1983. 
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Introduction 
To some economists and policy makers, the Phillips Curve suggested there was a long run causal 
relationship between inflation and unemployment. During the 1960s and 1970s, it was used in 
support of economic policies that tolerated higher inflation on the basis that lower 
unemployment would result. After all, economic policies are meant to ultimately produce 
beneficial real outcomes.  
Phelps (1967) and Friedman (1968b) launched a major theoretical attack on the Phillips Curve. 
Their argument was that levels of output and employment could not be shifted from their 
natural, or steady state, levels in the long run. If governments consistently attempted to 
decrease unemployment through increased inflation, then actors in the economy would look 
backwards. Based on historical evidence, actors would eventually expect higher inflation, which 
would of itself raise prices. In other words, the Phillips Curve only existed in the short run. 
Although Phelps and Friedman were not the first to endogenise inflation expectations (e.g. 
Cagan 1956 and Lutz 1952), they were the first to do so in the context of the long run Phillips 
Curve. 
The Phillips Curve has since undergone further development. The rational expectations ideas in 
the papers of Lucas (1972) and Sargent and Wallace (1975) argue that economic actors do not 
need to look backwards to form inflation expectations. Actors can also use information 
currently available to look forward to set their expectations, implying there is no short run 
Phillips Curve. Further, the ‘forcing variable’ in the Phillips Curve is now usually defined on a 
cyclical basis, such as the output gap or the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment 
(NAIRU). Other forcing variables, such as marginal cost and labour income share, are also being 
proposed. 
The relative effect size of forward looking and backward looking expectations, and how to 
define the forcing variable, are current debates in macroeconomics. Resolving these issues will 
improve economic policy in many countries. However, it is the claim of this paper that 
recognising that a Phillips Curve does not exist in the long run is sufficient to prevent another 
episode such as the “Great Inflation,” or stagflation of the 1970s. In other words, if a policy 
maker accepts the concepts in Phelps (1967) and Friedman (1968b), then this would greatly 
reduce the chances of a major outbreak of inflation and the associated negative effects in their 
economy. 
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The “Great Inflation” was the greatest economic problem in developed economies in the second 
half of the twentieth century and economists have acknowledged that the long run Phillips 
Curve contributed to it (Sargent 1999; Meltzer 2006; Orphanides 2006). There have been 
studies that have analysed the importance that the Federal Reserve placed on fighting inflation, 
including an appreciation that the long run Phillips Curve affected Federal Reserve actions 
(Sargent 1999; Orphanides 2006). A range of explanations have been proposed, including that 
Federal Reserve policy underwent a fundamental change in the mid-1970s to be more inflation 
averse (Primiceri 2006 and Sargent et al 2006). 
However, what these papers lack is being able to provide a robust explanation as to why these 
actions occurred. This paper attempts to provide the basis for such an explanation by directly 
measuring, in the academic literature, the extent of conservatism. This is defined as either 
support for inflation-first policies or opposition to the long run Phillips Curve. This type of 
analysis has not been conducted before. The longer term aim is to identify whether there is a 
direct link between academic ideas and economic policy. 
The paper focusses on the United States literature because this is where the most highly 
regarded economics journals have been published (Laband and Piette 1994) and have had a 
majority of American authors. These publications were the academic battle ground for much of 
the debate over the long run Phillips Curve and economic policy. Further, by concentrating on 
one country, it is possible to determine the extent to which local economic factors such as 
inflation and unemployment influenced the literature. 
Literature review 
Economists have made historical observations about support for the long run Phillips Curve. 
The matter about which there is the most consensus is that it was no longer credible by the 
mid-1970s. For example, Gordon (1990) stated that economists abandoned the Phillips Curve 
within five years of Friedman’s famous 1968 speech, and Blinder (1986) took a similar view. 
Weintraub (1978) quoted a Congressional committee report in 1975 that argued that there was 
no meaningful trade-off between inflation and unemployment. Clarida et al (2000) observed 
that, by the mid to late 1970s, economics textbooks were more conservative. Hasbrouck (1984) 
found, from 1945 to 1973, that forecasters’ predictions of inflation and growth in the Industrial 
Production Index were almost always positively correlated, whereas from 1974 to 1983 there 
was no correlation. 
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In 1979, Kearl et al published a paper that specially focussed on the views of economists and 
the extent to which they had formed a consensus on particular parts of economics. Their 
questionnaire implicitly adopted the views of Phelps and Friedman by asking economists’ 
support for the statement, “In the short run, unemployment can be reduced by increasing the 
rate of inflation.” The implication is that the authors would have expected a unanimous 
response if they framed the question in terms of the long run. 
The majority view about how economists came to reject the Phillips Curve is that it was on 
theoretical grounds. Blinder (1988) makes this assertion, as does Prescott (1995), who states 
that theory predicted stagflation. Blanchard (1990) argued that the debates in the 1970s, 
including whether there was a long run trade-off between unemployment and inflation, were 
“partly triggered by events” but were also a response to previous research that had been 
strongly empirical, but atheoretical. These views suggest that the work of Friedman and Phelps 
in the late 1960s would be central to the rejection of the Phillips Curve, especially since Blaug 
(1997) referred to Friedman’s 1968 paper as “easily the most influential paper on 
macroeconomics published in the post-war era”. 
Interestingly, Friedman himself did not support this view. Rather, in his Nobel Prize speech, he 
stated that, “experience contradicted tentatively held hypotheses” (1977). In other words, 
stagflation disproved the long run Phillips Curve. 
Hypotheses 
The paper tests the question of what convinced economists to reject the long run Phillips Curve 
and to support inflation first policies. The two leading theories are: the papers of Phelps and 
Friedman in the late 1960s; and stagflation in the US economy. Was it theory, or was it empirics? 
They are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but it should be possible to isolate their individual 
effects. A change in academic attitudes to the Phillips Curve during or shortly after 1968 would 
be consistent with a change in theory, whereas a change related to the misery index, for 
example, would be more consistent with empirics. Some papers have argued that the long run 
Phillips Curve was disproved simply by noting that both unemployment and inflation increased, 
contrary to the theory’s predictions (Wallich 1978; Bental and Eckstein 1997) or that it at least 
presented a puzzle (Abel et al 2008; Kettl 1986). Other authors have noted that Friedman and 
Phelps predicted the stagflation of the 1970s (Blanchard and Sheen 2004; Prescott 1995). 
A link with stagflation would be consistent with the work of Karl Popper, an eminent 
philosopher of science. One of his key arguments was that scientists improve their theories by 
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attempting to disprove or falsify them. In his words, “we can learn from our mistakes” (Popper 
1972, vii). Where there are two competing theories A and B, and B matches the results from a 
range of experiments better than A, then B can be regarded as more likely to be correct and A 
regarded as more likely to be falsified. Developing a theory that can explain a wider range of 
phenomena will be more general and preferred over its predecessor (Popper 1972). Economists 
often note that they cannot subject their theories to empirical testing (e.g. Sims 1996; Friedman 
1984). The Phillips Curve was a special case because it was a politically attractive idea, which 
meant that it influenced policy in the 1960s and 1970s and generated real-life data. Before this 
time, economists had real-life data on inflation-first policies, or at least policies that placed a 
greater weight on inflation. This means that economists had the opportunity to compare the 
two theories in the Popperian tradition. 
In testing this hypothesis, it is worth bearing in mind the work of Thomas Kuhn (1970), who 
sought to explain the human interactions that occur when a major dispute develops in a field. 
He argued that experts, like the general population, take time to adjust to new ideas, and that 
often some never make this “paradigm shift”. Therefore, adopting a new theory can be a slow 
and complicated process. New major theories tend to be introduced by researchers who are 
young or new to a field and less wedded to familiar ideas.  
Further, new theories that in future will be superior to current theories can be rejected at the 
time if there is not sufficient empirical data or other techniques to support them. For example, 
this occurred after the publication of Newton’s laws of motion, which were criticised on 
relativistic grounds. However, there was not sufficient empirical evidence to support these 
criticisms and Newton’s laws remained the accepted theory until the late nineteenth century 
(Kuhn 1970). At this point, improved instruments measuring light generated anomalies that 
could not be explained by Newtonian mechanics, leading to a crisis and Einstein publishing his 
theory of relativity in 1905. Kuhn’s basic point is that experts such as scientists behave much 
like ordinary people; it is more natural and efficient for them to continue with established ideas 
until extreme events push them to do something new (Kuhn 1970).  
This provides an explanation as to why the long run Phillips Curve gained some acceptance, 
despite previous research that was inconsistent with it. Cagan (1956) used data on 
hyperinflations and Lutz (1952) used models to argue that a history of high inflation could 
change expectations or make economic actors “inflation conscious” and change the effect of 
economic policies. Another example is Felix (1956), who used long run historical data for Britain 
and France to show that profit inflation was not an industrial stimulus and that there was no 
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correlation between inflation and economic growth. This paper was a particularly strong 
rejection of the vertical long run Phillips Curve. 
Data 
Scope 
The data for this paper are collected from ten of the top ranked journals published in the United 
States between 1947 and 2006. Journal rankings were sourced from Laband and Piette (1994) 
and Kalaitzidakis et al (2003). The start date of 1947 is designed to give some comparative years 
before Phillips’ paper, which was published in 1958. The 2006 end date captures the period 
where researchers started to have sufficient distance and perspective to consider stagflation in 
the 1970s and the Volcker deflation. This self-reflection commenced around 2000 with the 
publication of Sargent (1999) and Clarida et al (2000). 
United States journals were selected because most of the top ranked journals were published 
there, especially as time progressed. Further, selecting one country means it is possible to 
compare the literature with domestic economic events of the time to determine if they were 
correlated with the literature. Some articles in these journals covered other countries or were 
written by overseas authors. These were retained in the analysis because the act of publishing 
them in an American journal is a signal that they were relevant to an American audience. 
The selected journals were: the American Economic Review (AER); the Journal of Political 
Economy (JPE); the Quarterly Journal of Economics (QJE); the Journal of Economic Theory (JET); 
the Journal of Monetary Economics (JME); the Journal of Economic Literature (JEL); the Journal 
of Economic Perspectives (JEP); Papers and Proceedings (P&P) of the annual meetings of the 
American Economic Association, which are published as a special issue of the American 
Economic Review; the Journal of Finance (JOF) and the Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 
(MCB). One criterion for selection were that the journals needed to maintain a reasonably high 
rating over time. For example, this requirement excluded the Brookings Papers on Economic 
Activity, the rating of which has declined markedly. A journal also needed to have at least eight 
articles to be included in the dataset, which excluded highly ranked publications including 
Econometrica. The Papers and Proceedings and the Journal of Finance were partly selected to 
improve the coverage of earlier years. 
Database searches of the journals were conducted to select potential articles, which were 
included if they met one of several criteria. The first was whether an article had the word 
“Phillips” in the title. Also included were articles that had the word “inflation” in the text and 
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either “Keynesian” or “unemployment” in the title. The last group was all articles that had 
“unemployment” in the text and either “monetary” or “inflation” in the title. An article’s title 
included the title of the conference session where the article was a conference paper, which 
mainly applied to the Papers and Proceedings. This search produced 919 articles. Of these, 255 
did not express any opinion on the relationship between inflation and unemployment and were 
excluded. This left 664 articles. A small number of these were conference discussions where 
several individuals discussed papers presented under a single conference topic. These were 
separated and only those that expressed an inflation/unemployment relationship were 
retained. This process added another ten papers, meaning the dataset comprised 674 articles 
in the first instance. A breakdown of the papers by journal is given in Table 1. 
Table 1: Contribution of articles by the journals used in the study 
Journal Total search Rejected Split extras Dataset Start year 
AER 148 42 0 106 1947 
P&P 181 37 7 151 1947 
JPE 98 37 0 61 1947 
QJE 51 19 0 32 1947 
JEL 18 8 0 10 1969 
JOF 57 24 2 35 1947 
JEP 26 6 0 20 1987 
JME 137 35 0 102 1975 
JET 14 5 0 9 1969 
MCB 189 42 1 148 1969 
Total 919 255 10 674 NA 
 
One of the features of the table is that five of the journals were established during the study 
period. It would be possible to select only journals that operated during the whole period. 
However, this would only be valid if it were assumed that the release of new journals did not 
affect how established journals operated and that established journals did not of themselves 
change over time. This assumption does not appear to apply because the Journal of Finance 
published almost no articles on the inflation/unemployment relationship in the later part of the 
study period. This drop coincided with the start of the Journal of Monetary Economics and, to a 
lesser extent, the Journal of Money, Credit and Banking. As Table 1 shows, these became high 
volume journals in the field. The reality is that new journals were established during the period 
30 
that published extensively on the topic and that including them will present a fuller picture of 
the literature. 
Figure 1: Occurrence of papers commenting on the relationship between unemployment and 
inflation or their relative policy priority, 10 top economic journals, 1947-2006 
 
The figure shows the occurrence of articles in the dataset. It divides articles into two types; 
“analysis” articles are those that use some analysis or reasoning in order to come to a view 
about the long run Phillips Curve. The “other” category express a view simply through assertions 
or assumptions. As might be expected, there is a growth in the number of articles around 1970, 
reflecting the deteriorating economy in the United States and the increased number of journals 
from this time. The number of articles tapered off in the 1990s, probably reflecting improved 
economic conditions.  
In addition to the absolute number of articles that expressed a view on the long run Phillips 
Curve and economic policy, Figure 2 on the next page shows the volume of analysis articles in 
the literature as a proportion of total literature in the ten journals. These articles analysed the 
issues, rather than simply expressing a view. The number of typed characters for each analysis 
article for each year was calculated using the method in Laband and Piette (1994). This was 
divided by the total number of characters in each journal for the year. A three year centred 
average of this statistic is shown below. 
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Figure 2: Proportion of economic literature that focusses on the relationship between 
unemployment and inflation or their policy priority, 10 top economic journals, 1948-2005 (%) 
  
Note: Each yearly score is a three-year centred average, weighted by year. 
This figure shows the proportion of literature focussing on the Phillips Curve, whereas Figure 1 
shows absolute numbers. One of the main features of Figure 2 is that there was a spike in the 
literature in the late 1940s, when annual inflation peaked at 14 per cent. The other was a peak 
from the late 1960s to the mid-1980s, which covered the stagflation and disinflation periods, 
and the gradual consensus among economists that inflation was under control (e.g. Blanchard 
1984; Brimmer 1983). This is corroborated by Goodfriend (2007, 51), who states that the costs 
of disinflation was an academic controversy up until this time and which was resolved by the 
actions of the Federal Reserve. 
Dependent variable – relationship between inflation and unemployment 
The articles were coded on a binary scale to determine whether they were conservative or not. 
Articles that prioritised unemployment, thought that inflation and unemployment were equal 
economic goals, or supported a long run Phillips Curve, were rated a “zero”. Those that 
prioritised fighting inflation or did not support a long run Phillips Curve were rated a “one”. This 
included articles that supported the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU), 
as well as those that supported the expectations-augmented Phillips Curve (EAPC). Articles that 
used the concepts of prices and output, instead of inflation and unemployment, were also 
included. 
The approach in coding the dependent variable was to differentiate between economic theory 
and policies that either do or do not represent a significant inflation risk. The coding does not 
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relate to current economic debates, but seeks to measure when cutting edge economic theory 
and research could prevent a major policy mistake such as the stagflation of the 1970s.  
In a small number of cases, articles had disconnected parts that expressed inconsistent views 
on the Phillips Curve and economic policy priorities. These articles were coded by taking the 
view represented in the most substantial part of the article. How this was determined is 
discussed in the article methodology section below. 
Figure 3 gives a time series summary of the dependent variable, titled “conservativeness,” using 
a three-year centred average, based on the number of articles, rather than by year. This 
approach was used to reduce the variation caused by years that had a small number of articles 
(generally up to 1970). Figure 3 shows the time series for the full dataset.  
Figure 3: Conservativeness of the economic literature in relation to unemployment and inflation, 
10 top economic journals, 1948-2005 
 
Note: Articles are rated a 1 if they reject the long run Phillips Curve or advocate inflation first policies, 
and rated 0 otherwise. Each yearly score is a three-year centred average, weighted by article. 
The figure shows three periods. The first runs up until the late 1950s and shows that economists 
generally took an inflation first approach, but not universally so. The second period is from the 
late 1950s to the early 1970s and covers the time when the average rating was generally below 
0.5. The third period covers the early 1970s to 2006, showing a trend to almost universal 
rejection of the long run Phillips Curve and support for inflation first policies. 
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Operationalised twice 
The dependent variable of conservativeness will be operationalised as an aggregated, time 
series variable, and as individual articles. For the time series, this dataset has some earlier years 
with a low number of articles, leading to increased variance compared with later years. This is 
addressed by converting the data to biennial (one observation every two years) and weighting 
by article. With the dataset covering sixty years, this produces thirty observations in the first 
instance. 
For the individual articles, each paper has a 0/1 rating for conservativeness, prompting the use 
of a logit or probit model. One of the assumptions for these models is that observations are 
independent. However, many of the papers have the same authors and the conservativeness 
of papers by the same author is almost always the same. To address this, the first author of 
each paper was noted, and only their first paper was retained in the dataset. This meant that 
214 observations were dropped from the dataset in these regressions. 
Publication lags 
The time lag between an author submitting a paper and it being published needs to be managed 
because it is substantial and has increased over time. In 1967, Coe and Weinstock reported that 
the average submit-accept and publication lead times for economic journals in the United States 
(including the American Economic Review and the Journal of Finance) were two and a half 
months and six months respectively. This is the lag for a researcher who has thought of an 
avenue of research and written one or more drafts before submitting for publication. Therefore, 
a lag time of one year could be suitable for the initial period of the study in assessing the effects 
of the real life economy on the academic literature. 
In 2002, Ellison studied the submit-accept period for a number of leading economic journals, 
including the American Economic Review, the Journal of Political Economy and the Quarterly 
Journal of Economics. He found that the submit-accept period for these journals was twelve 
months in 1979, eight months in 1979 and eight months in 1970 respectively. This had increased 
to twenty four months, eighteen months, and twelve months respectively in 2000. This implies 
that the one-year lag may not be sufficient for some papers, although it may be appropriate for 
conference papers, which are shorter term projects. Another factor is that research is often 
ongoing, so that the parts of the real economy that spark a researcher’s interest can change 
over time and a research project can change with it. 
This means that lags could be quite long and there is little value in using monthly or quarterly 
data. The academic literature in economics evolves at a much slower process than real 
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economies. Therefore, this study uses annual data with two years averaged to provide a lag. A 
simple average is used for macroeconomic data. For the lag of the conservativeness of the 
literature, a weighted average by article is used to manage some of the early years that have a 
small number of papers. 
Macroeconomic data 
Annual CPI inflation and unemployment data were collected from the United States Bureau of 
Labor Statistics. The lags applied to these variables imply that any causal effect will run from 
them to the independent variable. It is highly unlikely that the content of economic papers will 
be contemporaneously affecting the economy. Summary data for these variables are in the 
Appendix. 
The long run Phillips Curve implies that a country can have either high inflation or high 
unemployment, but not both. This paper uses a learning index, representing simultaneous high 
inflation and high unemployment, to measure the extent to which the long run Phillips Curve is 
falsified by the economy. The first step in generating this index was to multiply the 
unemployment and inflation rates together for the period between 1944 and 2006. For 1944, 
the index was this multiple. For 1945 and each successive year, the index was the higher of two 
numbers: the index for the previous year; and the multiple for the current year. This produced 
a statistic that increased over time to reflect the historical maximum of the multiple of inflation 
and unemployment for any year since 1944. The index started at fifty six in 1947 and then 
stepped up to sixty two in 1974, seventy eight in 1975 and then ninety seven in 1980. It 
remained at this level to 2006. The non-declining feature of the index represents learning by 
economists. 
Change points 
The idea that theory prompted economists to conclude that the long run Phillips Curve was 
vertical suggests that there will be a break point shortly after Phelps (1967) and Friedman 
(1968b). It is recognised that Friedman (1968b) has been widely regarded as a very influential 
paper. However, Phelps (1967) was potentially the stimulus for Friedman’s work. Friedman had 
always pursued a stabilising approach to monetary policy (e.g. Friedman 1961; Friedman 1948), 
but this author’s contention is that Phelps gave Friedman the theoretical basis for his deep-
seated views. Therefore, in the time series and article regressions, 1969 will be used as a 
possible change point. 
It is also possible to apply Bayesian change point analysis to the dependent variables. The higher 
values are located particularly towards the end of the study period. A Bayesian analysis was 
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conducted of the placement of a single change point, and calculating the preceding and 
following average values. Uninformative priors were used, with mid-point initial values. The 
analysis produced large standard deviations for the change points; the average values were 
better defined. Nonetheless, the diagnostics were acceptable, including the cusum graphs. The 
break point in the time series analysis was 1977 and the break point for the articles was 1980. 
Article methodology 
Using individual papers as the unit of analysis allows an examination of whether methodology 
or other specific matters were influencing economic thought. In relation to methodology, 
economics has been criticised for focussing too much on theory at the expense of empirical 
work that could demonstrate whether the theory applies in practice. An example is Leontief 
(1982), who noted that over 50 per cent of articles in the American Economic Review in the 
1970s were mathematical models without data. Blaug has argued that increased empirical work 
helped resolve the debate between Keynesians and monetarists (1992). 
The testing of this hypothesis is complicated by criticisms of economists’ empirical work. For 
example, Blaug (1992) argues that economists fall short of the Popperian ideal of attempting to 
falsify theories. In particular, he suggests that economists only validate them. Validation is akin 
to replicating the work that originally developed a theory. Falsifying is using data to make 
comparisons between theories, such as through different experiments than those that 
originated them, but where the theories can make predictions about the results.  
McCloskey (1998) has also criticised empirical work in economics, but from a different 
perspective. In particular, she argues that economists take a formulaic approach to statistics 
that focusses on statistical procedures at the expense of interpreting the results. In regressions, 
for example, McCloskey would like to see greater emphasis on the size of effect and less 
emphasis on the t-statistic. One way of achieving this would be more reporting of confidence 
intervals, for example. Another would be more use of simulations of models to better 
understand them and to draw better conclusions from them. 
Blaug and McCloskey argued that better methods, in particular better statistical methods, 
would produce better economic research. In effect, they are arguing that better methods have 
a causal effect on the final product. Assuming that the long run Phillips Curve is invalid, then 
their argument is that better statistical methods would cause an article to have a higher article 
rating. 
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Each paper was coded for the methodology it used in coming to a conclusion about the 
inflation/unemployment relationship. Since an article can include several layers of reasoning, 
an article was coded for the highest form of reasoning that it used in coming to its view. 
Consistent with the critics of analytical work, the highest category was empirical work (215 
occurrences), which included simulations (seventy), tests of statistical inference (ninety five), 
and other data (fifty), such as simple comparisons. The next highest category was the use of 
argument (206), which comprised mathematical models (sixty three), simulations based on 
mathematical models, rather than estimated parameters (eighteen), and logic (125). The last 
group comprised traditional qualitative work, such as analysing how a change in one economic 
variable leads to a change in another. 
The empirical and argument categories comprised the articles where an author used some 
reasoning or analysis in order to make a comment on the inflation/unemployment relationship. 
Of these analytical articles, it is possible to determine the proportion which were empirically 
based. Commencing with the 1940s, the proportions by decade of empirical articles were 10 
per cent between 1947 and 1949; 22 per cent in the 1950s; 35 per cent in the 1960s; 34 per 
cent in the 1970s; 63 per cent in the 1980s; 69 per cent in the 1990s; and 84 per cent between 
2000 and 2006. This corroborates Blaug’s comments that there has been greater use of empirics 
in this field of economics. 
There were also articles where an author did not use reasoning or analysis, and were simply 
statements (253) of the author’s views on the long run Phillips Curve or inflation first policies. 
These form the lowest level on the hierarchy. The assumption category (177) applied where an 
article made an assumption about the relationship, or a statement at the beginning of an article. 
This also included the cases where an author made a comment and cited a reference for it. The 
assertion category (seventy six) applied where an article simply asserted a relationship without 
any reasoning or explanation. 
A number of decision rules were used to support the coding. For example, assumptions in 
papers were often followed by later reasoning that also had implications for the author’s view 
on the inflation/unemployment relationship. A decision rule was applied that mathematical 
papers that did not have any simulations were entirely driven by their assumptions where the 
assumption and the final result were consistent in terms of the long run Phillips Curve and policy 
priorities. Therefore, if a paper assumed a relevant concept, such as the EAPC, and then 
developed mathematical arguments supporting inflation first policies, it was coded as its 
method being a statement. An example was the time inconsistency paper by Barro and Gordon 
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(1983a). This contrasts with Rogoff’s successor paper (1985) that made micro foundation 
assumptions to develop a mathematical model supporting central bank independence, and 
which was coded as an argument paper. 
For the small number of papers where different parts were logically isolated from each other 
and expressed different views on the long run Phillips Curve, this hierarchy was used to 
determine which part of the paper was the most substantial. This then helped determine the 
dependent variable and the methodology coding. The methodology was coded on an exclusive 
basis and so this variable is a factor, with the reference level being statements. 
Article title 
In his discussion of the debate between Keynesians and monetarists, Blaug (1992) comments 
that it reflected deep-seated disagreements. This is to be expected, given that the area of public 
policy to which this field contributes has strong political divisions. This implies that some 
researchers had preconceptions, or policy priorities, that caused their research to deliver a 
certain result. An example in the dataset is Milton Friedman’s six papers, five of which had the 
word “monetary” in their title. To control for this, articles were coded for the words that 
appeared in their title. A dummy variable was created for the words “inflation”, “monetary”, 
“Phillips”, “unemployment” and “Keynesian”. The expectation would be that the first two words 
would be associated with a higher rating and the latter two would be associated with a lower 
rating. 
These variables were not mutually exclusive. For example, an article could be titled, “A 
Monetary Analysis of the Phillips Curve.” This meant that article titles were represented through 
five dummy variables. Further, the variable was adjusted for whether an article was a 
conference discussion or a comment on a previously published article. For the former, the views 
of discussants could not be expected to have any particular relationship to the title of the 
conference topic, which would have been drafted by the conference organisers. Therefore, the 
codings for the titles were all zero for these articles. Similarly, comments on articles by other 
authors use the title of the original paper. They would often be rebuttals of the original article, 
but this may or may not imply that they would take an opposite view on the long run Phillips 
Curve or economic policy. In these cases, the coding was also changed to 0. 
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Results 
Time series 
The sixty annual observations were combined into thirty biennial observations. For the 
economic variables, a simple average was used. For the conservativeness variable, a weighted 
average (by article) was used to cater for some of the years earlier in the dataset that had a 
small number of articles. Visual inspection of some of the time series suggested that they had 
a unit root. This was confirmed by augmented Dickey-Fuller tests, but removed through first 
differencing. With lags, this resulted in twenty eight observations. 
Diagnostic tests were also conducted for autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity, normality of 
residuals, autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH), specification (the RESET test), 
and structural break (CUSUM and CUSUMSQ). The tests are reported in the table where they 
fail at the 5 per cent level of significance. A nested likelihood ratio test was conducted for the 
second and later regressions to check whether the extra variables were statistically significant 
overall compared with the first regression. The p-values are reported for this test. Table 2 on 
the next page shows the results. 
The first regression is a simple time series regression without a break point. The only statistically 
significant variable is the lag of conservativeness. The regression has the problem that its 
coefficients are not consistent over time; it breaches the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ tests in the 
mid-1970s. The next two regressions include break points, namely after Friedman (1968b) and 
from 1977, the break point in levels selected by the Bayesian analysis. However, neither of them 
have stable coefficients because they breach the CUSUMSQ tests after their respective break 
points.  
The fourth regression uses two break points to carve out the period from 1959 to 1967 as an 
exception to the usual literature. This corresponds to the period between Phillips (1958) and 
Phelps (1967) and Friedman (1968b). This regression has stable coefficients, many of the new 
coefficients are statistically significant, and the likelihood ratio test has a very low p-value, 
indicating that 1959 to 1966 is a valid sub-period. The fifth regression adds an additional 
variable, namely the cross-product between unemployment and the learning variable. This 
cross-product was suggested by diagnostics for the articles regressions, discussed below. 
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Table 2: OLS regressions of differenced, two-year data of conservativeness of economic literature, 
1947-2006, N=28 
Variable No break Break in 
1969 
Break in 
1977 
Break, 
1959 to 
1966 
Break, 
1959 to 
1966 
Conservativeness (-1) -0.67** 
(0.15) 
-0.86** 
(0.21) 
-0.66** 
(0.18) 
-0.71** 
(0.16) 
-0.60** 
(0.17) 
Inflation (-1) -0.027 
(0.015) 
-0.050* 
(0.20) 
-0.050* 
(0.019) 
-0.017 
(0.015) 
-0.008 
(0.013) 
Unemployment (-1) -0.068 
(0.043) 
-0.14 
(0.076) 
-0.079 
(0.068) 
-0.026 
(0.041) 
  0.27** 
(0.086) 
Learning (-1)   0.010 
(0.011) 
  0.078 
(0.011) 
  0.12 
(0.077) 
  0.002 
(0.008) 
  0.023 
(0.013) 
Unemp (-1)*Learning (-1)     -0.0035* 
(0.0014) 
Break  -0.005 
(0.27) 
  0.068 
(0.34) 
-0.39** 
(0.069) 
-0.54** 
(0.080) 
Break*Conservativeness (-
1) 
   0.38 
(0.36) 
  0.015 
(0.40) 
  1.58** 
(0.42) 
  1.15* 
(0.47) 
Break*Inflation (-1)    0.054 
(0.028) 
  0.057 
(0.032) 
-0.02 
(0.037) 
  0.005 
(0.036) 
Break*Unemployment (-1)  0.084 
(0.089) 
  0.012 
(0.089) 
  0.51** 
(0.12) 
  0.36** 
(0.11) 
Break*Learning (-1)  NA -0.11 
(0.078) 
NA NA 
Break*Unemp (-1)*Learn (-
1) 
    NA 
Constant   0.005 
(0.04) 
-0.011 
(0.041) 
  0.001 
(0.043) 
  0.030 
(0.034) 
  0.02 
(0.033) 
R-square 0.55 0.66 0.65 0.78 0.83 
P-value for LR test NA 0.10 0.19 6e-4 3e-5 
Diagnostics 1975-78 1977-88 1981-84, 
1991-92 
Auto Auto 
Standard errors Normal Normal Normal Robust Robust 
Note: The dependent variable is a two year average (weighted by article) of the conservativeness of 
journal articles in relation to their views about the long run Phillips Curve (0 supports, 1 opposes) or 
economic policy (1 is inflation first and 0 is others). Standard errors are in brackets. Robust errors used if 
an individual regression demonstrated heteroscedasticity or autocorrelation at the 5 per cent level. * 
indicates significant at the 5 per cent level and ** significant at 1 per cent. A diagnostic test is listed for 
the respective model where it is significant at the 5 per cent level. A year refers to a breach of the CUSUM 
or CUSUMSQ tests at the 5 per cent level. The p-value for the likelihood ratio test compares the statistical 
significance of the extra variables against the regression in the “no break” column. 
Effect sizes were investigated through multiplying variables’ standard deviation and their 
coefficient. The two largest effect sizes were for the cross product between learning and 
unemployment, and the cross product between the break from 1977 and the learning variable. 
Other large effect sizes were for the lag of conservativeness, the cross product between the 
break in 1969 and inflation, the break between 1959 and 1966, and its cross products with 
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lagged conservativeness and unemployment. In two cases, the coefficients are not statistically 
significant, namely for the cross product between the break from 1977 and the learning 
variable, and between the break in 1969 and inflation. 
There are two main findings from the time series regressions. The first is that the period 
between Phillips (1958), and Phelps (1967) and Friedman (1968b), was a time of a less 
conservative literature in economics. The second is that the correlations involving 
unemployment worked in a complex way. During the 1950s, the literature became more 
conservative after an increase in unemployment, and this increased in the 1960s. However, 
after the oil price shocks, the literature would become less conservative after an increase in 
unemployment. 
Articles 
Table 3 shows the results for logit regressions of individual articles. A similar approach was 
taken as for the time series models, namely testing various break points and applying diagnostic 
tests. The three tests were Pregibon’s link test (1980), the auxiliary regression in Davidson and 
MacKinnon (1993) to test for heteroscedasticity, and a likelihood ratio test for the stability of 
the coefficients for a notional break point from 1977, the approximate mid-point of the period 
covered by the dataset. The results are on the next page. 
The first column is a straightforward regression without a break point. It shows that, on average, 
the literature was less conservative after an increase in unemployment and that it became more 
conservative after stagflation. Without a break point, this regression fails the stability test at 
the 5 per cent level. The second column has a break from 1969 and is a somewhat better fit. 
Although none of the break variables are statistically significant, it does not breach the stability 
test. The third column has a break in 1980, which was suggested by the Bayesian analysis. This 
has some statistically significant break variables and it passes the stability test, but this would 
be expected given that the break point of 1980 is close to the test’s break point of 1977. 
The fourth column has the break between 1959 and 1966, consistent with the findings of the 
time series analysis. This is the best fit overall of the three breaks, but it does not have any 
statistically significant break variables and breaches the stability test at the five per cent level. 
However, the break dummy has a large coefficient at -9.75. Given that the break between 1959 
and 1966 had the best overall fit, and that it performed the best in the time series regressions, 
its dummy will be used in the remainder of the analysis.  
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Table 3: Logit regressions of the conservativeness of economic papers, 1948-2006, N=451 
Variable No break Break, 
1969 
Break, 
1980 
Break, 
1959-66 
Break, 
1959-66 
Break, 
1959-66 
Conservativeness (-1) -0.71 
(0.79) 
-0.27 
(1.04) 
  0.30 
(0.89) 
-1.59 
(0.90) 
-1.16 
(0.89) 
-1.04 
(0.89) 
Inflation (-1)   0.018 
(0.038) 
-0.10 
(0.95) 
  0.013 
(0.057) 
-0.019 
(0.040) 
-0.029 
(0.043) 
-0.036 
(0.044) 
Unemployment (-1) -0.30** 
(0.099) 
-0.36 
(0.30) 
-0.095 
(0.19) 
-0.28* 
(0.11) 
-0.23 
(0.12) 
  0.85 
(0.48) 
Learning (-1)   0.056** 
(0.01) 
  0.084** 
(0.017) 
  0.029 
(0.034) 
  0.057** 
(0.011) 
  0.057** 
(0.013) 
  0.11** 
(0.034) 
Unemp (-1)*Learning 
(-1) 
     -0.013* 
(0.0057) 
Break    1.40 
(2.14) 
  4.32 
(5.37) 
-9.75 
(6.15) 
-1.37** 
(0.51) 
-1.57** 
(0.53) 
Break* 
Conservativeness (-1) 
 -3.32 
(1.75) 
-6.94** 
(2.69) 
  0.97 
(4.73) 
  
Break*Inflation (-1)    0.18 
(0.11) 
-0.012 
(0.095) 
  0.43 
(0.95) 
  
Break*Unemployment 
(-1) 
 -0.081 
(0.33) 
-0.52* 
(0.27) 
  1.34 
(1.05) 
  
Break*Learning (-1)  NA   0.057 
(0.068) 
NA   
“Inflation”       0.77** 
(0.30) 
  1.20** 
(0.36) 
“Unemployment”     -1.19** 
(0.32) 
-0.62 
(0.41) 
“Inf”*”Unemp”      -1.58* 
(0.68) 
“Phillips”       0.36 
(0.46) 
  0.59 
(0.47) 
“Keynesian”     -0.71 
(0.47) 
-0.59 
(0.47) 
“Monetary”       0.50 
(0.30) 
-2.30* 
(1.06) 
“Monetary”* 
Learning (-1) 
     0.042** 
(0.015) 
Method, empirical     -0.27 
(0.31) 
-0.39 
(0.32) 
Method, statement       0.59* 
(0.29) 
  0.53 
(0.30) 
Constant -1.28* 
(0.54) 
-2.78 
(2.05) 
-1.30 
(1.14) 
-0.67 
(0.59) 
-1.51* 
(0.66) 
-6.18* 
(2.53) 
Pseudo R-square 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.18 0.22 
Diagnostics Stability Hetero ? Stability Spec’n & 
Stability 
? 
Note: The dependent variable is the rating of journal articles for their views about the long run Phillips 
Curve (0 supports, 1 opposes) or economic policy (1 is inflation first and 0 is others). Robust errors used 
if a regression demonstrated heteroscedasticity at the 5 per cent level. Standard errors in brackets. * 
indicates significant at the 5 per cent level and ** significant at 1 per cent. A diagnostic test is listed for 
each model where it is significant at the 5 per cent level. 
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The fifth column uses a dummy for 1959 to 1966, and then adds dummies for the keywords in 
the title of each article. This controls for the possibility that changes in the use of different 
concepts is driving the overall results. The fifth column also includes the factor variable for the 
methodology used in each article. This controls for the possibility that better data and better 
quantitative techniques produced a shift in economic thinking. This regression produced some 
indicative results, however, it breached both the linktest and stability tests at the 5 per cent 
level. To address this, three cross-products were added in column 6. 
The first of the cross-products was between the lags of unemployment and learning. The 
negative coefficient indicates that the economic literature became more sensitive to 
unemployment after stagflation. This result is unexpected, but needs to be considered in the 
context of a generally conservative literature. The next cross-product was between articles with 
both “inflation” and “unemployment” in the title. The negative sign meant that articles that had 
“inflation” in their title would only be conservative if they did not also have “unemployment”. 
In other words, papers that headlined the relationship between the two concepts were less 
likely to be conservative. The final cross-product was between papers that had “monetary” in 
the title and the learning variable. The positive sign indicates that these papers became more 
conservative after stagflation. Monetarism is reputed to have a conservative philosophy, largely 
due to one of its most effective advocates, Milton Friedman. However, it is important to note 
that, although he had conservative views, he was not the only monetarist. 
There are other findings from the table. It appears that the learning variable is positively 
correlated with a more conservative literature, at least for this dataset. However, neither lagged 
inflation nor lagged unemployment appear to bear any such relationship. The correlation 
between the statement method and conservatism in the fifth column is not replicated in the 
sixth column, so it is fair to conclude that methods were not driving the literature. Finally, the 
idea that there was a uniformly less conservative literature between Phillips (1958) and Phelps 
(1967) and Friedman (1968b) is supported. 
An analysis of effect size was conducted by multiplying the coefficients by the variables’ 
standard deviation. The largest effect sizes were for the cross product between learning and 
unemployment, the break from 1980, and its cross products with lagged conservativeness and 
learning. The first and last of these four variables also had the largest effect size for the time 
series regressions. The next largest effect sizes were for the learning variable and the cross 
products between lagged conservativeness and the break from 1969, the break from 1980 and 
unemployment, and the break from 1959 to 1966 and unemployment. The two variables 
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relating to articles that had “monetary” in the title also had large effect sizes. Once again, some 
of these are not statistically significant, such as the cross product between the break from 1959 
to 1966 and unemployment. 
Conclusions 
This paper has shown that the academic literature on the long run Phillips Curve and inflation 
first policies has gone through a number of phases. Examination of a time series graph suggests 
that the literature in the 1950s was generally anti-inflationary, but not comprehensively so. This 
position switched following the publication of Phillips (1958), but over time the literature has 
become more conservative to the extent that by 1975 it was the majority view and after 2000 
it became the consensus view in the leading academic papers. 
Two types of quantitative analysis were conducted to help understand the patterns in the 
literature. Firstly, articles were aggregated to produce time series data, which were first 
differenced and subject to OLS regressions. Secondly, logit analyses were conducted of 
individual articles.  
There were two results that were consistent across both analyses. For example, papers had a 
uniformly lower rating between 1959 and 1966, which corresponds to the period between 
Phillips (1958) and Phelps (1967) and Friedman (1968b). This finding is a refinement of the 
theory raised earlier in the paper that the literature was more conservative after Phelps and 
Friedman. It instead states that the literature was less conservative between Phillips (1958) and 
these two papers. Some commentators have suggested that the influence of Phelps and 
Friedman took some time to spread through the economics profession, but the results of this 
study suggest that the effect was abrupt. 
The other robust finding was that the cross product between learning and unemployment is 
correlated with a less conservative literature. In other words, after stagflation, higher 
unemployment was correlated with less conservative papers. This finding is not consistent with 
the initial expectation that, after stagflation, the literature would be more conservative. 
However, this pattern occurred within the context of a more conservative literature generally 
and the scale of the effect did not jeopardise the general thrust of the literature. It also occurred 
once inflation started to drop from high levels. In other words, once inflation was no longer a 
problem, then economists could express concern about employment. Therefore, it could be 
interpreted as conditional concern over unemployment, rather than absolute. 
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So we come back to our initial question, namely “What led economists to decide that the long 
run Phillips Curve was vertical? Was it a battle between theories that reflected fundamental 
values, or was it empirical evidence that falsified the sloping long run Phillips Curve?” There is 
strong evidence that theory played a major role in the literature, leading to less conservative 
papers between Phillips (1958) and Phelps (1967) and Friedman (1968b). The Popperian 
falsification process did not occur, although Felix (1956) demonstrated there was data available 
to do this. However, empirics did play a role in other ways. Once inflation was beaten, 
economists felt they had room to respond in a liberal manner to unemployment. This case study 
suggests that the development of theories in the social sciences at a macro level can be a 
complex process. Data is historical and experiments are rare. But it is possible that a theory can 
be accepted by experts before it is supported by events. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Summary data for time series regressions, N=28 
Variable Mean Std. deviation Minimum Maximum 
Conservativeness 0.014654 0.274394 -0.48889 0.65 
Conservativeness (-1) 0.011905 0.276329 -0.48889 0.65 
Inflation (-1) -0.31353 3.245287 -11.2198 5.37746 
Unemployment (-1) 0.067857 1.265439 -2.45 2.85 
Learning (-1) 1.46536 4.243282 0 18.60531 
Unemp*Learning (-1) 12.23668 113.041 -140.926 318.7985 
Break, 1969 0.035714 0.188982 0 1 
Conservativeness (-1) 0.032143 0.177616 -0.30556 0.65 
Inflation (-1) 0.008429 2.012788 -4.47322 5.37746 
Unemployment (-1) 0.057143 1.033935 -1.5 2.85 
Learning (-1) 1.46536 4.243282 0 118.60531 
Unemp*Learning (-1) 11.63496 105.4034 -140.926 318.7985 
Break, 1977 0.035714 0.188982 0 1 
Conservativeness (-1) 0.012755 0.109667 -0.28571 0.233333 
Inflation (-1) -0.21989 1.674176 -4.47322 5.37746 
Unemployment (-1) 0.017857 0.976313 -1.5 2.85 
Learning (-1) 1.364614 4.243394 0 18.60531 
Unemp*Learning (-1) 8.899759 104.014 -140.926 318.7985 
Break, 1959-66 0 0.272166 -1 1 
Conservativeness (-1) -0.02143 0.096111 -0.42857 0.15 
Inflation (-1) 0.02698 0.607299 -1.87277 2.517504 
Unemployment (-1) 0.041071 0.312118 -.75 1.3 
Learning (-1) 0 0 0 0 
Unemp*Learning (-1) 2.306571 17.52852 -42.12 73.008 
Note: All data is first differenced. Variables listed under a break only have non-zero values 
during the period in question. 
  
46 
Table A2: Summary data for the individual article regressions, N=451 
Variable Mean Std. deviation Minimum Maximum 
Conservativeness 0.689579 0.46318 0 1 
Conservativeness (lag) 0.7105 0.202882 0.1 1 
Inflation (lag) 4.699245 3.099734 0.030252 12.42416 
Unemployment (lag) 5.819956 1.400306 2.95 9.65 
Learning (lag) 78.96534 18.69604 56.16 97.19008 
Unemp*Learning (lag) 471.4911 186.4222 165.672 937.8843 
Break, 1969 0.807095 0.395017 0 1 
Conservativeness (lag) 0.606348 0.334104 0 1 
Inflation (lag) 4.250698 3.369123 0 12.42416 
Unemployment (lag) 4.900443 2.701709 0 9.65 
Learning (lag) 68.13182 36.56366 0 97.19008 
Unemp. (lag)*Learning (lag) 419.8513 257.9961 0 937.8843 
Break, 1980 0.518847 0.5002 0 1 
Conservativeness (lag) 0.438966 0.429859 0 1 
Inflation (lag) 2.484854 3.391515 0 12.42416 
Unemployment (lag) 3.244568 3.279393 0 9.65 
Learning (lag) 49.70957 48.01723 0 97.19008 
Unemp.*Learning (lag) 310.8094 315.0116 0 937.8843 
Break, 1959-66 0.070953 0.257032 0 1 
Conservativeness (lag) 0.027198 0.104335 0 0.6 
Inflation (lag) 0.107914 0.425532 0 3.077899 
Unemployment (lag) 0.402439 1.462268 0 6.15 
Learning (lag) 3.984745 14.43493 0 56.16 
Unemp. (lag)*Learning (lag) 22.60098 82.12096 0 345.384 
“Inflation” 0.337029 0.47322 0 1 
“Unemployment” 0.148559 0.356048 0 1 
“Inflation”*”Unemp.” 0.046563 0.210935 0 1 
“Phillips” 0.08204 0.27473 0 1 
“Keynesian” 0.064302 0.245562 0 1 
“Monetary” 0.394679 0.489324 0 1 
“Monetary”*Learning (lag) 31.33056 40.68842 0 97.19008 
Method     
Empirical  0.321508 0.467574 0 1 
Statement 0.374723 0.484589 0 1 
Note: Variables listed under a break only have non-zero values during the period in question. A lagged 
variable is the average value for the previous two years. 
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3 – Monetary policy during the Great 
Inflation in the United States 
Abstract 
This paper compares the performance of two theories of monetary policy in the United States 
during the Great Inflation. The first of these is Orphanides’ (2003) theory that policy mistakes 
were caused by under-estimating the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment and the 
real time output gap, especially during the 1970s. The second is the conservatism theory, 
namely that monetary policy became more inflation averse after the Volcker disinflation, as 
proposed by Clarida et al (2000). 
The test is to compare performance of the theories across four sets of dependent variables: 
quarterly interest rates, annual interest rates, decisions by the Federal Reserve to ease policy, 
and decisions to tighten policy. The first step was to test the real time gap theory by comparing 
the performance of unemployment against the real time gap. In decisions to tighten policy the 
unemployment rate was better, but in the other three cases the real time gap was superior. 
Twelve interpretations of the conservatism theory were tested across the four dependent 
variables. Performance was generally poor. The conservatism theory, when expressed in terms 
of increased inflation aversion, performed much better if the data were limited to 1996, or if 
time series analysis was conducted with variables that had unit roots. The conservatism theory 
is better expressed in as a reduced aversion to the output gap, rather than a heightened 
aversion to inflation.  
This new approach by the Fed can be seen as a compromise between technical 
recommendations that the Fed focus on inflation rather than output, and its legal duty to 
maximise employment. 
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Introduction 
The actions of the United States Federal Reserve, and in particular its main monetary policy 
body, the Federal Open Markets Committee (FOMC), have important economic outcomes. 
Before the 1970s, the literature on U.S. monetary policy was straightforward, with a focus on 
standard variables such as inflation and unemployment. However, the stagflation of the 1970s 
and its resolution led to a more diverse literature. Many subsequent papers have sought to 
explain the stagflation (Clarida et al 2000; Orphanides 2003; Sargent et al. 2006; Sims and Zha 
2006). Wider political dimensions have also been brought into the literature, including Senate 
influence (Grier 1991; Havrilesky 1995), presidential signalling (Havrilesky 1995), presidential 
appointments (Chappell et al 1993), and public opinion (Tootell 1999). The research has also 
found that the Fed behaved in a substantively different way during the Volcker disinflation by 
attempting to control the money supply (Bernanke and Mihov 1998; Sims and Zha 2006). 
The purpose of this paper is to compare two key theories about monetary policy. The first is 
Orphanides’ (2003) argument that the FOMC, and most other policy makers, under-estimated 
the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (the NAIRU), particularly during the 1970s. 
Real time estimates of the NAIRU were approximately 4 per cent, whereas it was usually closer 
to 6 per cent. This meant that the FOMC would continue with loose monetary policy at 6 per 
cent unemployment when the labour market was already tight. This would put pressure on 
wages and then general prices. 
The second argument is that there was a fundamental misunderstanding by the FOMC and 
other policy makers about the problems associated with inflation and what a “safe” level of 
inflation might be. This relative acceptance of inflation led to its outbreak in the 1970s. After 
the Volcker disinflation between 1979 and 1982, the FOMC and policy makers had learnt from 
the experience and more inflation-averse policy, or at least more conservative policy, resulted. 
This argument has been made by Clarida et al (2000); Sargent et al (2006); and Sims and Zha 
(2006). 
This paper acknowledges Leamer (1985), who noted that much economic literature comprises 
a decentralised sensitivity analysis. In other words, if a theory is proposed that attracts interest, 
then over time a series of papers subject it to scrutiny, and a literature develops on whether 
the theory is robust. Leamer’s point was that this testing of robustness should be more 
systematic and coordinated. 
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Leamer’s comments are applicable here. The papers listed above assume there was a policy 
mistake by the FOMC and attempt to explain its cause. The two explanations are different, but 
lead to the same policy result. A small number of economic variables have been repeatedly 
shown to influence the FOMC, in particular output, prices, and the Volcker disinflation. But the 
status of the competing theories is unclear because they do not reference each other. In other 
words, researchers have validated their respective theories, rather than trying to falsify them 
by comparing them against each other. 
Science, including social science, can only progress through searching for the weaknesses in 
theories, which helps produce better ones. Karl Popper (1963; 1972), one of the pre-eminent 
philosophers of science in the 20th century, developed much of the ideas behind falsifiability. 
He argued that evidence alone does not falsify or corroborate a theory. Rather, theories are 
falsified by comparing competing theories against each other to see how they fit or explain the 
evidence (for a recent discussion of Popper in relation to confirmation theory, see Dowding 2106, 
ch. 5). Mark Blaug (1992) adopted these ideas and criticised mainstream economics for 
focussing on validation, rather than attempting falsification. Indeed, it is much more difficult for 
a theory to survive the blowtorch of falsifiability, and those that do represent a real advance in 
knowledge. 
This paper is an exercise in falsifiability. Often, papers checking the robustness of a literature 
have used one dependent variable and then conducted a large number of comparative 
regressions on it (e.g. Sala-i-Martin 1997). This paper takes a broader approach for two reasons. 
Firstly, Van Evera (1997) suggests that as many implications of a theory as possible should be 
tested. In particular, the effect of economic and political variables can be revealed in at least 
two ways, such as through interest rates and FOMC decisions to either tighten or ease policy. 
The most robust independent variables will be those that are correlated with as many of these 
expressions of monetary policy as possible. This method is likely to reveal fragile inferences 
where variables are correlated with monetary policy through some artefact in the data, rather 
than an underlying relationship. Secondly, including a dependent variable such as meeting 
decisions will show what the FOMC was trying to do, compared with interest rate data, which 
shows what it actually did after interacting with the market. A robust independent variable 
should be correlated with both. 
Leamer (1983) discussed the fragility of inferences from a further perspective, namely that 
regression results for a variable of interest can depend on which other variables are included. 
He suggested that some sensitivity analysis, through removing various variables, would help 
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reveal fragile inferences. The analysis is justified by his statement, “If we are to make effective 
use of our scarce data resource” (43). In other words, since researchers are using just one 
dependent variable, some variation in the independent variables is required. Implicit in this is 
that, if a researcher can find more than one dependent variable (effectively conducting more 
than one experiment), then this will be another way of detecting fragility, or increasing the 
evidence of robustness. 
Literature review 
The reaction function literature commenced in the 1960s. Papers such as Havrilesky (1967) and 
Christian (1968) found that the FOMC reacted to both the inflation rate and the unemployment 
rate, with more responsiveness to unemployment. In general, this result is to be expected, since 
both phenomena are detrimental. Much of the movement in monetary policy would be 
explained by employment and prices. 
The research later examined the Federal Reserve’s political dimension. An early result (for 
example, Belden 1989) was that bank Presidents are more inflation averse than Governors 
because they are considered to reflect the financial sector’s preference for low inflation. 
Chappell et al (1993) looked at the dissent records of Governors from 1960 to 1987 to generate 
their most likely preferred interest rate, given the economic circumstances at the time. They 
found that Republican appointees were on average the most conservative, except for those 
appointed by Reagan (“supply-siders”), who were the least conservative. Democrat appointees 
came in the middle. Keech and Morris (1997) presented an alternative view, arguing that it was 
too impractical for Presidents to influence monetary policy through appointments. Another 
political variable which may be correlated with monetary policy is Presidential signalling, that 
is, public statements by the President or their administration about their monetary policy 
preferences (Chappell et al 1993; Havrilesky 1988 and 1995). Finally, there is evidence that 
monetary policy is correlated with the Presidential election cycle (Grier 1989 and Williams 1990, 
in relation to the money supply). 
Around 2000, the reaction function literature moved to a new phase of attempting to explain 
how the Great Inflation occurred. Clarida et al (2000) developed a model for the FOMC’s 
interest rate rule from 1960 to 1996, splitting between the tenures of Martin, Burns and Miller 
on the one hand, and Volcker and Greenspan on the other. Their model incorporated the 
inflation target, a coefficient for the inflation gap, a coefficient for the output gap, and a lag 
operator. They found that the inflation target was approximately three quarters of a per cent 
higher in the earlier period, and that the coefficient for the inflation gap more than doubled in 
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the later period. They concluded that a more accommodating monetary policy led to increased 
variation in prices and output. 
Later papers made similar findings. Sims and Zha (2006) developed a regime switching model 
from 1959 to 2003 with simultaneous equations featuring commodity prices, M2, the federal 
funds rate, real GDP, personal consumption, a price index, and unemployment. Allowing for 
varying coefficients in the monetary policy model, the best fit was obtained with four states, 
one of which occurred rarely. Of the remaining three, the most conservative state covered the 
Volcker disinflation, a relatively conservative “Greenspan” state covered most of 1983 to 2003 
and half of 1959 to 1979, and the least conservative “Burns” state covered half of 1959 to 1979 
and parts of 1983 to 2003.  
The authors ran historic counterfactuals with each of the three states applying solely 
throughout. The Greenspan and Burns rules would have delivered similar outcomes to actual 
events. The Volcker rule, however, would have delivered half the rate of growth in the money 
supply, lower inflation (by up to 2 per cent) and lower output (by 1 per cent). However, there 
would still have been two inflation spikes of over 6 per cent. 
Sargent et al (2006) took a different approach by modelling the beliefs of the FOMC between 
1960 and 2003, as revealed by inflation and unemployment outcomes. They assumed a Phillips 
Curve, whereby the gap between the unemployment rate and the NAIRU is explained by the 
current inflation surprise, the inflation surprise in the previous period, and the unemployment 
gap in the previous period. They then estimated how this equation changed over time. 
The authors used this changing equation to generate two key variables. The first was the sum 
in inflation coefficients. This variable gives a measure of the extent to which a policy maker 
believed it could reduce unemployment through an inflation surprise. This is produced in 
Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: Evolution of US government beliefs about the Phillips Curve, 1960 to 2003, Sargent et al 
(2006) 
 
If a policymaker believed that an inflation surprise would not decrease unemployment, then 
the sum of inflation coefficients would be around or above zero. The graph suggests that the 
FOMC expected that an inflation surprise would have a real effect between the mid-1960s and 
1990. 
The second variable in the paper was a perceived sacrifice ratio, calculated by feeding into the 
equation the actual past unemployment rate and 2 per cent past inflation, to generate a 
theoretical unemployment rate. In other words, this was the unemployment rate that policy 
makers revealed, as a matter of inference, that they would have to endure to reduce inflation 
to 2 per cent. This is shown in Figure 2. This second variable identifies a shorter period of less 
conservative beliefs, this time from the early 1970s to the early 1980s. 
-2.0
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
19
60
19
61
19
63
19
64
19
66
19
67
19
69
19
70
19
72
19
73
19
75
19
76
19
78
19
79
19
81
19
82
19
84
19
85
19
87
19
88
19
90
19
91
19
93
19
94
19
96
19
97
19
99
20
00
20
02
20
03
53 
Figure 2: Evolution of US government beliefs about the level of unemployment required to secure 
2 per cent inflation, 1960 to 2003, Sargent et al (2006) 
 
Carboni and Ellison (2009) extended this paper to include unemployment forecasts published 
in the Greenbook. They noted there had been criticisms of Sargent et al (2006), in particular 
that some of the beliefs are excessively volatile, which is inconsistent with the FOMC’s aims of 
stabilisation. Therefore, they re-estimated the results of the paper with the additional 
restriction of the Greenbook data. This produced similar, but much less volatile, results. 
These papers make an ambitious claim, namely that there were fundamental shifts in policy 
making connected with beliefs (Sargent et al 2006) or economic theory (Clarida et al 2000). 
Orphanides (2003) instead suspected human error. He argued that many of the problems in the 
1970s arose from a mismeasurement of the NAIRU. Therefore, past monetary policy should be 
interpreted from the understanding of policy makers in real time, rather than from our 
statistical knowledge now. He argued that, in the mid-1970s, perceptions of the output gap 
approached an error of 10 per cent, contributing to looser monetary policy and inflation. 
Orphanides concluded that central banks should avoid activist policies because they heavily 
depended on the output gap, which is difficult to measure accurately. This is similar to Volcker’s 
advice in 1990 that the FOMC should only focus on the inflation rate, although he did so on the 
basis that it would prevent inflation getting out of control in the first place. 
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While such an approach may be technically superior, it may not be legal, at least for the Federal 
Reserve. Since 1977, its Act has required monetary policy “to promote effectively the goals of 
maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates” (section 2A). 
Method 
The general approach was to run regressions across four sets of dependent variables: quarterly 
interest rates; annual interest rates; FOMC decisions to ease policy; and FOMC decisions to 
tighten policy. If a result was consistent across the first two dependent variables, and one of 
the FOMC variables, then that result was regarded as robust. The regressions were all related, 
but different techniques were involved. For example, the variance of the error terms in the 
quarterly interest rate regressions changed at various points, leading to a GARCH method. 
However, the changes in the variance of the error terms was absent in the annual interest rate 
regressions, so ordinary least squares (OLS) could be used. Logit regressions were used for the 
FOMC decisions. 
Data 
Scope 
Many papers developing a reaction function for the FOMC have the start point for their data 
around 1960. This reflects the fact that U.S. economic conditions worsened in the late 1960s, 
so 1960 gives sufficient data for a baseline for papers focussing on stagflation. However, 1960 
is not the only possible start point. For example, the academic Phillips Curve literature 
commenced at this time, in particular with Lipsey (1960) and Samuelson and Solow (1960). A 
start date some time before 1960 would reveal whether there was any evidence for a Phillips 
Curve effect. Another possible start date would reflect the signing of the Accord between the 
U.S. Department of the Treasury and the Federal Reserve in 1951. The Accord resolved a conflict 
between the President and the Federal Reserve over the Administration’s pressure on the Fed 
for it to accommodate Government borrowing after World War II. It provided the Federal 
Reserve with a greater degree of independence. 
Where possible, the scope of this paper will be from 1953 to 2012. It provides a longer baseline 
to determine whether there were any changes in the models caused by the Phillips Curve 
literature in the early 1960s. A longer period means that the results in the paper are more 
general. In some cases, the scope of the paper will be from 1960 to 2003. This corresponds to 
the period in Sargent et al (2006), and Carboni and Ellison (2009). Martin Ellison has kindly 
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provided some of the results from both papers. Where these are used, the shorter time period 
applies. 
The federal funds rate as an independent variable 
This rate is the weighted average of transactions between banks at the Federal Reserve, 
typically overnight. Bernanke and Blinder (1992) confirmed that the federal funds rate is a good 
indicator of monetary policy. The Board of Governors publishes federal funds rate data back to 
July 1954. Prior to this period, they published data on various interest rates, including three-
month Treasury bills (Board of Governors 1976). Using monthly data from July 1954 to February 
1957, the rate on new issues of three-month Treasury bills was regressed on the federal funds 
rate, generating the equation FFR = 0.165 + 0.935*Billrate with an R-square of 0.96. This 
equation was then used to generate data for the federal funds rate from 1951. Romer and 
Romer (2002) give implicit support to this approach by demonstrating that the members of the 
FOMC in the 1950s were considering interest rate conditions in markets generally. Annualised 
data are shown in Figure 3. It shows a series of peaks and troughs, as well as an upward trend 
to 1981, a downward trend thereafter, and zero rates at the end of the study period. 
Figure 3: Annual federal funds rate, 1953 to 2012 (%) 
 
During the Volcker disinflation, the FOMC primarily targeted money supply growth, rather than 
interest rates (Bernanke and Mihov 1998). This period started in October 1979 and concluded 
in October 1982. This resulted in policy becoming much less stable. However, there are two 
reasons why the federal funds rate can be used as the independent variable in regressions 
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during this period. Firstly, the decisions of the FOMC in the Annual Reports of the Board of 
Governors indicate that, although the FOMC was formally focussing on the money supply at this 
time, it was also monitoring interest rates. At each meeting, not only did it give a money supply 
growth target, but it also gave a likely range of interest rates. If actual interest rates were 
outside this range, then the FOMC would reconvene to reconsider policy. 
Secondly, interest rates usually matched the FOMC’s projected ranges. To demonstrate this, an 
interest rate target variable was developed by taking the midpoint of the FOMC’s projected 
range at each of its regularly scheduled meetings from October 1979 to August 1982. The 
irregular meetings were not used in this instance because they were held in response to 
changing economic conditions and so would reflect actual economic conditions, rather than 
forecasts. Figure 4 shows quarterly data for the interest rate target and actual interest rates, 
with some comparative periods on either side. Although the two variables are not identical, it 
shows that they track closely. 
Figure 4: Targeted and actual federal funds rate (%), quarterly data, 1978-1984 
 
FOMC decisions as an independent variable 
Information on FOMC meetings was sourced from the Board of Governors’ Annual Reports. The 
decisions were analysed to determine whether its decision at each meeting fell into one of three 
categories: easier policy; maintaining the status quo; or tighter policy. Mostly this coding was a 
simple matter, such as when the FOMC decided to cut interest rates (easier policy), maintain 
current conditions (status quo), or increase reserve pressures (tighter policy). The most difficult 
aspect to this coding was during Volcker’s period as Chair because the FOMC usually referred 
to money supply targets and a range for the federal funds rate, rather than making current 
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policy a reference point or setting an interest rate target. For this period, the midpoint of the 
interest rate range was taken as the target, with the interest rate prior to the meeting taken as 
current policy. Comparing the two produced the coding. Due to the instability of the period, 
current policy and the target had to differ by more than half a percentage point to be regarded 
as a change in policy. 
The FOMC decision was taken as the unit of analysis. There were 708 meetings during the period 
where the FOMC considered whether to change monetary policy. At these meetings, the FOMC 
agreed to ease policy 103 times and tighten policy 131 times. It would be possible to develop a 
dataset of the votes of individual members, with each member that supported the FOMC’s 
decision being coded on that basis, and then adjusting these scores according to whether 
individual members dissented for easier or tighter policy. However, FOMC members are well 
known for seeking to come to a consensus at their meetings. Therefore, individual member 
votes cannot be regarded as being independent within a particular meeting, which breaches 
the independence assumption made for many statistical methods. 
It would be possible to model the dataset as three ordered discrete outcomes: decisions to 
ease, decisions to hold, and decisions to tighten. However, this assumes uniform behaviour 
across these categories. This often occurred, but not always. It would also be possible to model 
the dataset as multinomial outcomes to incorporate variation between them. However, this 
assumes the independence of irrelevant alternatives, which did not always apply. Therefore, 
two binary logit models were used: one for the decision to ease and one for the decision to 
tighten policy. Decisions at the prior meeting were included in the regressions and these were 
coded as a three-way factor variable, rather than a continuous variable, to allow for variation 
in their effect. 
Figure 5 summarises the data. It shows the proportion of meetings each year where the FOMC 
decided to tighten policy (the line above the origin) or ease policy (the line below the origin). If 
the FOMC kept policy steady for a whole year, then that year would show a single line along the 
x-axis. If it tightened (or eased) policy every meeting in a year, then the line above (below) the 
x-axis would extend to a value of 1 (-1). The Figure reflects many of the cyclical aspects of 
interest rates, with sustained tightenings in the mid-1950s, the mid 1960s, the late 1970s, the 
mid 1990s and the mid-2000s. There were sustained easings around the early 1970s, the early 
1980s, the early 1990s, and early and late 2000s. 
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Figure 5: Proportion of tight and ease decisions each year 
 
Presidential signalling 
Studies such as Chappell et al (1993) have found that signalling by Presidents is correlated with 
monetary policy. That study used the index developed by Thomas Havrilesky, who examined 
Presidential statements reported in the Wall Street Journal. The index was time-consuming to 
prepare (Havrilesky 1988, 89; Mixon and Sawyer 2007, 1098). This paper instead uses State of 
the Union speeches, which are given each January. The reasons for using this index are that it 
is simple to generate, it is the most serious and well considered statement that the President 
makes about public policy, it is made regularly, and it is widely reported. Wahlbeck used State 
of the Union speeches to code Presidential attributes for a study into Presidential influence on 
the Supreme Court (1997). 
Speeches were coded for the number of times they referred to words using the core letters 
“employ” and “job” in the context of the employment market, such as “unemployment” or 
“unemployed.” The same was done with the core letters “inflat” and “pric” in the context of 
macroeconomic price stability. These two numbers were multiplied by 10,000 and divided by 
the total number of words in the speech to produce employment and inflation signalling indices. 
The employment index was then subtracted from the inflation index to produce a general 
signalling index. A higher value of this index would be expected to be correlated with tighter 
policy. 
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The speeches occur in January. Quarterly data was generated by treating them as occurring in 
quarter I of each year, and then interpolating. 1969 and 1977 were special years in that the 
incoming President did not give an oral speech. Rather, the written speech of the outgoing 
President was used instead. The annualised index is reproduced in Figure 6 below. President 
Carter was the last to deliver an unambiguously anti-inflationary State of the Union speech. The 
most conservative President on these issues was Eisenhower. Until recently, Johnson was the 
least conservative President on this measure, but he was overtaken by Obama after the Global 
Financial Crisis. 
Figure 6: Annual Presidential signalling in support of either output (-) or prices (+), 1950 to 2014 
 
The real time unemployment gap 
This statistic is the difference between the unemployment rate and what was generally 
regarded as the full employment unemployment rate at each point in time. The gap is 
constructed from a number of sources. In the 1950s and into the early 1960s, there were no 
formal estimates published by economics agencies of full employment output or the equivalent 
unemployment rate. For this period, this paper uses estimates of the full employment 
unemployment rate that were published in the academic literature at the time. A search was 
conducted on JSTOR of papers published that included the terms “full employment” and 
“unemployment rate.” An examination of these papers indicated that the full employment rate 
of unemployment was considered to be approximately 4 per cent during the 1950s and early 
1960s (e.g. Hildebrand 1954, Long 1960, Weinberg 1953). 
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From 1962 into the 1970s, the full employment unemployment rate was taken from the 
Economic Report of the President, which was published each January. Until the mid-1970s, the 
report set the unemployment benchmark around 4 per cent. In the mid-1970s, there was some 
oscillation around 4 and 5 per cent and the benchmark permanently increased to 5 per cent in 
1977. If a Report did not give a value for full employment, then it was assumed to be the same 
as the previous year. Quarterly data was generated by treating the Report as being published 
in quarter 1 and then interpolating. 
From 1980, the Board of Governors generated its own estimates. In the 1980s, the estimate is 
the “high employment unemployment rate,” which the Fed used to generate the federal 
government high employment budget surplus or deficit. This was 5.1 per cent at the start of the 
decade and then shifted to 6.1 per cent in 1983. Estimates for the 1990s are drawn from Blue 
Book information published on the website of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. 
Estimates from 1997 onwards are from the Green Book spreadsheets on the same website. 
These were publicly available in the Green Book up to 2010. The Board of Governors has a policy 
of keeping its forecasts or estimates of the economy confidential for approximately five years. 
Values for this variable after 2010 were assumed to have not changed since then. 
A graph of the real time NAIRU is in Figure 7 below. Also included is a graph using data from 
Tulip (2004) showing an estimate of the actual NAIRU based on minimum wage data. 
Figure 7: Real time and subsequent estimates of the NAIRU, 1953 to 2012 
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The graph shows that the NAIRU was consistently under-estimated in the 1960s and 1970s, 
sometimes extending to 3 per cent. From the mid-1980s to the late 1990s, the NAIRU was 
generally over-estimated, although the errors much smaller, reaching only 1 per cent. The time 
period of policy error is similar to that in Sargent et al (2006) in relation to Phillips Curve beliefs. 
Presidential electoral cycle  
A simple variable was used. This was coded as a 1 in Presidential election years, -1 in 
Congressional election years, and 0 otherwise. This approximates the results in Grier (1989). 
Beck (1987) has argued that such a variable would really reflect accommodation of the deficit. 
Therefore, the deficit was also used and is discussed below.  
Economic data 
Monthly unemployment data were taken from the Bureau of Labor Statistics website. Inflation 
expectations data was taken from the biannual Livingston Survey at the Federal Reserve Bank 
of Philadelphia website. These biannual figures were interpolated to provide a quarterly time 
series. Monthly oil price data was for West Texas Intermediate sourced from the FRED database 
maintained by the St Louis Federal Reserve. Deficit data as a percentage of GDP for all three 
tiers of government was obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis website. Whether to 
respond to the deficit is an important question for all central banks; a higher deficit could be 
correlated with easier monetary policy. On the other hand, Evans (1987) has disputed the 
influence of the expected deficit on the FOMC. 
Money supply is represented by growth in M1. Monthly data for M1 was first published by the 
Fed in 1960. In order to generate money supply data for the 1950s, money stock data (currency 
outside banks and demand deposits) were regressed on the Board of Governors’ M1 data 
between 1959:1 and 1961:8. This produced the equation M1 = 5.314 + 0.941*Stock with an R-
square of 0.97. This equation was used to generate M1 data for the 1950s. M2 data will not be 
used because it was not published until 1970. A dummy variable will be applied to a “Volcker 
disinflation” period, from October 1979 until October 1982 (Q4 1979 to Q3 1982), and a cross 
product was created for money supply growth during the Volcker disinflation. 
Monetary policy tends to move in cycles, so lags of the federal funds rate and differences in this 
rate were used to represent this. In the equations for meeting decisions, the decision at the last 
meeting and the direction of previous decisions (0 or 1 for an easing cycle or tightening cycle 
respectively) were also used. 
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Results 
Testing Orphanides’ theory 
The first set of regressions included both the real time gap and the unemployment rate to 
compare how strongly they were correlated with monetary policy. Regressions were conducted 
with key economic and political variables, discussed above. The output gap was typically not 
measured with a great deal of rigour by relevant parties at the time. Therefore, the regressions 
were conducted largely in levels and the results revolved not around the standard errors of the 
coefficents, but the sign and size of the coefficients.  
In two regressions, the dependent variables were interest rates. In one, the dependent variable 
was FOMC decisions to ease policy (0=ease, 1=not ease) and in the last the dependent variable 
was FOMC decisions to tighten policy (0=not tighten, 1=tighten). The expectation is that the 
output gap would be correlated with looser monetary policy, so the preferred variable would 
have a greater negative effect. A summary table is below and full results are in the Appendices.  
Table 1: Excerpts of regression results comparing the real time gap and unemployment, 1953 to 
2012 
Variable and regression Coefficient Std error of variable 
Quarterly interest rates (ARCH)   
Real time gap -0.19 1.50 
Unemployment  0.16 1.63 
Annual interest rates (OLS)   
Real time gap -0.45 1.47 
Unemployment -0.05 1.61 
Real time gap (from Q4 1982)  0.38 1.14 
Unemployment (from Q4 1982)  0.16 3.33 
FOMC decisions to ease (logit)   
Real time gap -1.73 1.42 
Unemployment  1.70 1.59 
FOMC decisions to tighten (logit)   
Real time gap  0.17 1.47 
Unemployment -0.63 1.53 
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In the regressions on quarterly interest rates and FOMC decisions to ease, the real time gap has 
a negative sign, and the unemployment rate has a positive sign. In the regressions on annual 
interest rates, both have a negative sign, but the real time gap has a much larger coefficient. 
These three results support Orphanides’ theory. The results are reversed for the regression on 
FOMC decisions to tighten policy; the unemployment coefficient is large and negative and the 
coefficient for the real time gap is small and positive. 
Overall, then, the results favour Orphanides’ theory, but not comprehensively so. But it would 
certainly be advisable, to use a real time gap measure, rather than the unemployment rate. 
Testing the conservatism theory 
Base regressions were created for the four dependent variables: quarterly interest rates, annual 
interest rates, FOMC decisions to ease policy, and FOMC decisions to tighten policy. The 
regressions used the following dependent variables as a starting point: lags of the interest rate, 
inflation expectations, the real time output gap, oil price inflation, the deficit as a proportion of 
GDP, the lag of the interest rate (or the previous FOMC decision), growth in the money supply, 
the Volcker disinflation and its cross product with the money supply, presidential signalling, and 
the presidential electoral cycle. In the regressions on FOMC decisions, the previous decision was 
also used, as was a 0/1 variable for the general direction of decisions. If the previous decision 
was an easing or tightening of policy, then it was a 0 or 1. If the previous decision was to 
maintain policy, then it was determined by the most recent non-maintaining decision. 
The base regressions are reproduced in the Appendix. The first equation, with quarterly interest 
rates as the dependent variable, demonstrated a unit root and auto-regressive conditional 
heteroscedasticity (ARCH), volatility from 1979 to 1982, and some large outliers. To correct for 
these, the data was first differenced, and a (1, 2) GARCH model used. The diagnostics applied 
for this model were a Q-Q plot and a correlogram of the adjusted residuals (for the main model), 
and a correlogram of the adjusted residuals squared (for the model’s variance). The second 
equation uses OLS and has annual interest rates as the dependent variable. Once again a unit 
root was present, so the data were first differenced. The results were tested against the 
following diagnostics: heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation, normal residuals, the RESET test, and 
tests for CUSUM, CUSUMSQ, and ARCH. The equation breached the RESET test at the 5 per cent 
level of significance, so cross products were added for the real time output gap against the 
disinflation and post-disinflation periods. 
The two meeting equations have 0/1 binary dependent variables. In the first, a 0 indicates easier 
policy, and in the second, a 1 indicates tighter policy. A logit technique was used, and the 
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diagnostic tests were for specification (Pregibon’s linktest) and heteroscedasticity (Davidson 
and Mackinnon 1993), as well as a likelihood ratio test for parameter stability. The sixty year 
study period was divided into two sub-periods, with the second period commencing in Q4 1982 
(after the Volcker disinflation). For k independent variables and a constant, the test statistic had 
a chi-squared distribution with 2*(k+1) degrees of freedom. Some cross products were added 
to address diagnostic issues and are listed in the Appendix. In both equations, a cross-product 
was generated between the Volcker disinflation and the monetary policy cycle. The large 
negative coefficient reflected the fact that policy cycles were much shorter during this period. 
Overall, the base equations are consistent with the research on reaction functions. The FOMC 
is more likely to tighten policy when prices rise and unemployment drops. The Volcker 
disinflation also has an impact in all of the equations, although not always connected to money 
supply growth. This is consistent with the view that the operational change to targeting the 
money supply during this time was simply a means to the end of higher interest rates and tighter 
money more generally (Kettl 1986; Neikirk 1987). Presidential signalling and the deficit are also 
statistically significant in most of the equations. 
A common issue in time series studies of monetary policy is identification. That is, the effects 
of a central bank by tightening or easing policy can be moderated or exacerbated by market 
reactions (Zha 1997). However, this issue is minimised for this analysis. In particular, the study 
is examining just monetary policy itself, rather than its effects. The lag in effect of monetary 
policy is well known, so contemporaneous variables are generally appropriate. The exception is 
the money supply. However, the reactions of the FOMC to changes in the money supply during 
the Volcker disinflation were so prompt that no lags were applied in this instance. 
With the base regressions settled, the next step was to insert the different variables that 
interpret the conservatism theory into each of the four equations. The results are in Table 2. 
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Table 2: Excerpts of regression results testing the conservatism theory, 1953 to 2012 
Variable Quarterly 
rates 
Annual 
rates 
Ease 
decisions 
Tighten 
decisions 
Post*Expected inflation -0.18 
(0.10) 
 0.2 
(0.45) 
 0.55** 
(0.16) 
-0.15 
(0.21) 
Post*Real time gap  0.20* 
(0.10) 
 0.58* 
(0.22) 
 0.39 
(0.22) 
 0.15 
(0.25) 
Post*Deficit  0.085 
(0.076) 
 0.16 
(0.32) 
-0.21 
(0.37) 
-1.87** 
(0.68) 
Post*Oil inflation  0.0058 
(0.0047) 
 00013 
(0.0068) 
 0.008 
(0.26) 
 0.037 
(0.035) 
Learning  5.28** 
(1.96) 
-0.76 
(4.63) 
-3.19 
(3.58) 
-6.63* 
(2.80)* 
Learning*Expected inflation -0.38 
(0.20) 
 0.53 
(0.29) 
-0.077 
(0.46) 
-0.040 
(0.31) 
Learning*Real time gap  0.24 
(0.17) 
 0.81 
(1.49) 
 0.37 
(0.47) 
-0.19 
(0.50) 
Phillips Curve beliefs (Sargent) -0.072 
(0.24) 
-0.78 
(1.04) 
-0.21 
(0.68) 
-0.62 
(0.61) 
Phillips Curve*Expected inflation -0.034 
(0.092) 
-0.21 
(0.29) 
-0.20 
(0.22) 
 0.35 
(0.19) 
Sacrifice ratio belief (Sargent) -0.018 
(0.012) 
 0.035 
(0.072) 
 0.017 
(0.036) 
 0.054 
(0.033) 
Sacrifice*Expected inflation  0.0058 
(0.0052) 
-0.023 
(0.016) 
 0.0043 
(0.019) 
 0.002 
(0.011) 
Sacrifice*Real time gap -0.003 
(0.01) 
-0.05 
(0.047) 
-0.019 
(0.032) 
-0.001 
(0.031) 
Phillips Curve beliefs (Carboni) -8.47** 
(2.47) 
-21.7 
(11.1) 
 0.26 
(7.88) 
-6.74 
(6.67) 
Phillips Curve*Expected inflation -1.85 
(1.16) 
-0.44 
(2.44) 
-1.82 
(1.46) 
 0.61 
(1.38) 
Sacrifice ratio belief (Carboni)  0.05** 
(0.016) 
 0.12 
(0.065) 
-0.018 
(0.036) 
-0.004 
(0.041) 
Sacrifice*Expected inflation  0.0005 
(0.0056) 
-0.034* 
(0.016) 
 0.0003 
(0.011) 
-0.001 
(0.01) 
Sacrifice*Real time gap  0.0014 
(0.0087) 
 0.028 
(0.033) 
-0.062** 
(0.023) 
-0.001 
(0.031) 
Notes: Variables for the interest rate equations are first differenced. * indicates significant at the 5 per 
cent level and ** at the 1 per cent level. * indicates significant at the 5 per cent level and ** at the 1 per 
cent level. Data for variables from Sargent et al (2006) and Carboni and Ellison (2009) run from 1960 to 
2003. 
Which variables are robust? This paper adopts the standard of accepting that a variable is truly 
robust when it is statistically significant and has the same direction of effect across both the 
interest rate equations and one of the meeting equations. However, none of the conservatism 
variables meet this standard and most of them are not statistically significant in any of the 
equations. The inflation aversion theory proposed in Clarida et al (2000) is represented by the 
cross product between the post-Volcker disinflation dummy and expected inflation. However, 
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this is statistically significant and positive only in the equation for FOMC decisions to ease. In 
two cases, the coefficient’s sign is negative. Instead, the best candidate for the conservatism 
theory is the cross product between the post-Volcker disinflation dummy and the real time gap. 
It is statistically significant and positive in both the interest rate equations. For FOMC decisions 
to ease, it has a positive sign, but its p-value is 0.08, marginally above the stipulated 5 per cent 
level. The results are approaching the recommendation in Orphanides (2003) that central banks 
should not attempt to use the output gap as a guide for stabilisation policy. 
Explaining the inflation aversion results 
Clarida et al (2000) is a heavily cited paper, yet the results in this study provide little support for 
the conservatism theory, especially when expressed as increased inflation aversion. Therefore, 
further regressions were conducted to explore whether there was some basis for the theory. 
These were conducted on quarterly interest rates, annual interest rates, and FOMC decisions 
to tighten policy, none of which showed correlations consistent with increased inflation 
aversion. Earlier, the regressions on FOMC decisions to ease showed a correlation consistent 
with the theory. 
Rigour on the regressions was relaxed in three ways: the time period was shortened to 1996, 
similar to that in Clarida et al (2000); the time series regressions were conducted in levels, rather 
than differences; and some of the variables were omitted, particularly the political ones. 
However, tests were still conducted for the same diagnostics as before. Results are in Table 3 
on the next page. 
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Table 3: Results of regression relaxing rigour to explain support for the inflation aversion theory, 1953-1996 and 1953-2012 
Variable Quarterly rates (GARCH 1,1)  Annual rates (OLS) Tight decisions (Logit) 
Interest rates  
(-1) 
 1.11** 
(0.068) 
 0.33** 
(0.085) 
 1.31** 
(0.074) 
 0.55** 
(0.086) 
 0.41** 
(0.11) 
-0.30** 
(0.10) 
-0.25* 
(0.10) 
Interest rates  
(-2) 
-0.35** 
(0.060) 
-0.026 
(0.087) 
-0.49** 
(0.066) 
    
Maintain policy 
at last decision 
      1.96 
(1.05) 
 2.25* 
(1.03) 
Tighten policy at 
last decision 
      3.43** 
(1.09) 
4.03** 
(1.07) 
Expected 
inflation 
 0.24** 
(0.021) 
 0.17 
(0.11) 
 0.18** 
(0.019) 
 0.58** 
(0.073) 
 0.44* 
(0.16) 
 0.26** 
(0.091) 
 0.29** 
(0.087) 
Post disinflation -0.40 
(0.34) 
-0.084 
(2897) 
-0.12 
(0.11) 
-2.52 
(1.56) 
-0.86 
(4.05) 
-4.49* 
(1.96) 
-0.46 
(0.79) 
Post*Expected 
inflation 
 0.15* 
(0.068) 
 0.20 
(0.19) 
0.015 
(0.027) 
 0.65* 
(0.31) 
 0.57 
(0.57) 
 0.75* 
(0.38) 
 0.066 
(0.19) 
Real time gap -0.12** 
(0.034) 
-0.28** 
(0.088) 
-0.062 
(0.033) 
-0.53** 
(0.15) 
-0.65** 
(0.24) 
-0.48** 
(0.18) 
-0.33 
(0.18) 
Deficit -0.16** 
(0.030) 
-0.13* 
(0.53) 
-0.037* 
(0.014) 
-0.39* 
(0.16) 
-0.44 
(0.22) 
 0.14 
(0.14) 
-0.068 
(0.094) 
M1 growth -0.020 
(0.033) 
-0.12** 
(0.047) 
-0.038 
(0.029) 
-0.0075 
(0.044) 
-0.025 
(0.065) 
 0.38 
(0.34) 
 0.064 
(0.21) 
Volcker 
disinflation 
 0.17 
(0.25) 
 1.67** 
(0.33) 
 0.013 
(0.26) 
-14.9* 
(6.26) 
-12.0** 
(4.22) 
-0.0004 
(0.97) 
-0.071 
(0.98) 
Disinflation* 
M1 growth 
 0.68** 
(0.10) 
-0.68** 
(0.21) 
 0.70** 
(0.14) 
2.59** 
(0.93) 
2.40** 
(0.67) 
 0.22 
(1.02) 
 0.67 
(1.03) 
Constant  0.67** 
(0.092) 
-0.007 
(0.024) 
 0.41** 
(0.086) 
1.57** 
(0.34) 
 0.0058 
(0.16) 
-3.10** 
(1.07) 
-3.61** 
(1.05) 
Data type Levels Differenced Levels Levels Differenced Levels Levels 
End year 1996 1996 2012 1996 1996 1996 2012 
N 176 176 240 44 44 571 708 
 
Notes: * indicates statistically significant at the 5 per cent level and ** at 1 per cent. A variable, for the lag in the quarterly difference in interest rates, is omitted from the regressions for tightening policy. The results are: 0.77* (0.35); and 0.75* (0.36). 
The logit regressions use robust standard errors. 
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Using this approach in the regression on quarterly interest rates, the coefficient for expected 
inflation after Q3 1982 is positive, statistically significant at the 5 per cent level, and over half 
the size of the coefficient for expected inflation generally. However, this result is lost when the 
data is differenced, or when the time period is extended to 2012. The results are similar for 
annual interest rates; differencing the data produces a similar coefficient but a much higher 
standard deviation, meaning that it is not statistically significant. 
The results for FOMC decisions to tighten also show a marked effect on the coefficient for 
expected inflation after the Volcker disinflation, in this case in response to extending the time 
period. However, what is also interesting is the large coefficient for the post-disinflation dummy 
in the 1996 equation of -4.5. Combining this with the post-disinflation coefficient for inflation 
of 0.75 produces tighter policy in times of higher inflation (above 6 per cent) and easier policy 
in times of lower inflation (below six per cent). Since annual inflation generally stayed below 6 
per cent, the results are consistent with easier policy overall, which may be justified because 
due attention is paid to inflation. However, this result only extends to 1996, and not the full set 
of observations. 
The presented equations all passed the diagnostic tests at the 5 per cent level, except the last 
one, which failed the stability test (for the same coefficients before and after Q4 1982). This 
indicates that, with these variables, the cross-product between the post-disinflation period and 
expected inflation is not sufficient to explain the differences before and after Q4 1982. 
One main conclusion from these results is that a paper based on data up to 1996, like Clarida et 
al (2000), is more likely to find inflation aversion than a paper based on a longer time series, 
such as to 2012. With hindsight, Clarida et al was published too early; its results may reflect 
residual anti-inflation aversion after the Volcker disinflation, which dissipated over time. At the 
least, it should be viewed as only applying to a limited period. The other main conclusion is that 
there was a change in monetary policy after 1982 that was similar to increased inflation 
aversion. However, this correlation was not robust to more rigorous methods and other 
explanations must be sought. 
The change in the correlations with the real time gap 
The results in relation to the real time gap after the Volcker disinflation are worth further 
scrutiny. Therefore, reaction function regressions were run for the twenty six year period from 
1953 to 1978 and the thirty year period from 1983 to 2012. By excluding the volatile Volcker 
disinflation, it may be possible to discern other patterns. 
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The results are in Table 4. The first two columns show results for first differenced quarterly 
interest rate data. The variance in the residuals for 1953 to 1978 became much greater from 
the late 1960s, so a (1,1) GARCH model was used. For 1983 to 2012, the variance in the residuals 
was sufficiently random to permit the use of OLS, rather than a GARCH technique. The usual 
OLS diagnostics were investigated: normality of the residuals; heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation; the RESET test; and the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ tests. Autocorrelation was 
evident, leading to the use of robust standard errors. The CUSUMSQ test was breached at the 
5 per cent level, leading to the use of a lag of the presidential election cycle and replacing the 
current series of the real time gap with its lag. This equation shows a greater responsiveness by 
the Fed to oil inflation, but no appreciable change in responsiveness to the real time gap, except 
for the fact that it is a one-period lag in 1983 to 2012. 
OLS equations were used for both periods for first differenced annual interest rate data. The 
same OLS diagnostics were used and there were no issues. Responsiveness to inflation 
increased and responsiveness to the real time gap decreased across the periods. The coefficient 
for the real time gap in 1953 to 1978 has a t-value of -2.10. However, it is not statistically 
significant (p-value of 0.051) due to the small sample size.  
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Table 4: Second test of conservatism theory – FOMC reaction functions of interest rates, 
difference data, before and after the Volcker disinflation (1953-78 and 1983-2012) 
Variable Quarterly rates Annual rates 
 GARCH OLS OLS OLS 
Period 1953-1978 1983-2012 1953-1978 1983-2012 
Interest rates (-1) -0.038 (level) 
(0.023) 
-0.028 (level) 
(0.018) 
  
Change in int. rates (-1)  0.33** (diff’d) 
(0.11) 
 0.39** (diff’d) 
(0.12) 
0.32* (diff’d) 
(0.15) 
0.16 (diff’d) 
(0.21) 
Expected inflation  0.032 
(0.12) 
 0.064 
(0.068) 
 0.72 
(0.35) 
 1.49** 
(0.42) 
Oil inflation -0.0075 
(0.0088) 
 0.0054* 
(0.0022) 
-0.0037 
(0.0058) 
 0.0053 
(0.0054) 
Real time gap -0.31* 
(0.12) 
-0.26*(-1) 
(0.12) 
-0.56 
(0.26) 
 0.50 
(0.46) 
M1 growth (-1) -0.069 
(0.085) 
 0.015 
(0.027) 
 0.081 
(0.14) 
-0.0075 
(0.062) 
Deficit -0.14 
(0.085) 
-0.12 
(0.061) 
-0.55* 
(0.25) 
-0.21 
(0.23) 
Presidential signalling  0.0052 
(0.0064) 
 0.030* 
(0.015) 
 0.0020 
(0.014) 
 0.083** 
(0.021) 
Election cycle -0.070 
(0.065) 
-0.16* 
(0.064) 
-0.40 
(0.19) 
-0.45* 
(0.17) 
Election cycle (-1)   0.088 
(0.061) 
  
Quarter 1 -0.11 
(0.064) 
-0.0040 
(0.053) 
  
Quarter 2 -0.064 
(0.069) 
 0.077 
(0.063) 
  
Quarter 3 -0.0018 
(0.062) 
 0.17* 
(0.068) 
  
Constant  0.15 
(0.088) 
 0.10 
(0.069) 
-0.011 
(0.20) 
-0.021 
(0.17) 
ARCH (-1)  0.64** 
(0.24) 
   
GARCH (-1)  0.50** 
(0.14) 
   
Constant  
(error equation) 
 0.0094 
(0.012) 
   
Standard errors OPG Robust Standard Robust 
R-square NA 0.54 0.87 0.73 
N 104 120 26 30 
Note: * indicates statistically significant at the 5 per cent level and ** at 1 per cent. 
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Table 4: Second test of conservatism theory – FOMC reaction functions, 1953-78 and 1983-2012 
Variable Ease decisions Tighten decisions 
 Logit (levels) Logit (levels) Logit (levels) Logit (levels) 
Period 1953-1978 1983-2012 1953-1978 1983-2012 
Interest rates (-1) -0.84** 
(0.24) 
-0.80** 
(0.24) 
-0.32* 
(0.15) 
-0.47 
(0.33) 
Change in int. rates (-1)  2.09** 
(0.75) 
4.70**(diff’d) 
(1.37) 
 1.38** 
(0.51) 
 0.98 (diff’d) 
(1.99) 
Ease policy at last decision Reference Reference Reference Predictor 
Maintain policy at last 
decision 
 1.34** 
(0.52) 
 0.63 
(0.58) 
 0.95 
(1.11) 
 3.90 
(2.72) 
Tighten policy at last 
decision 
Predictor Predictor   2.41* 
(1.17) 
Reference 
Trend  -0.13* 
(0.061) 
  0.17 
(0.10) 
Maintain policy*trend    -0.32* 
(0.14) 
Policy cycle  1.95 
(1.08) 
 1.00 
(0.69) 
-0.017 
(0.46) 
1.75 
(1.02) 
2nd half of period  1.36 
(1.48) 
   
Policy cycle*2nd half -2.72* 
(1.29) 
   
Expected inflation  0.88** 
(0.32) 
 0.81** 
(0.29) 
 0.24* 
(0.12) 
 0.036 
(0.47) 
Oil inflation -0.0052 
(0.011) 
 0.024 
(0.027) 
-0.014 
(0.028) 
 0.051 
(0.038) 
Real time gap  0.66 
(0.49) 
 0.25 
(0.15) 
-0.53** 
(0.18) 
-0.22 
(0.39) 
Real time gap*2nd half -1.42** 
(0.45) 
   
M1 growth (-1) -0.96 
(0.69) 
 0.062 
(0.17) 
 1.43** 
(0.53) 
 0.010 
(0.41) 
Deficit -0.15 (diff’d) 
(0.25) 
-0.44 (diff’d) 
(0.30) 
-0.10 
(0.29) 
-1.79** (diff’d 
(0.59) 
Presidential signalling  0.073*(diff’d) 
(0.037) 
 0.14 (diff’d) 
(0.095) 
 0.044 (diff’d) 
(0.027) 
 0.26** (diff’d) 
(0.073) 
Election cycle -0.22 
(0.34) 
 0.23 
(0.30) 
-0.48 
(0.22) 
 0.050 
(0.40) 
Constant  1.86 
(1.31) 
 4.72* 
(2.24) 
-2.33 
(1.21) 
-3.38 
(2.78) 
Standard errors Robust Robust Standard Robust 
Pseudo R-square 0.40 0.38 0.26 0.44 
N 324 216 404 212 
Notes: * indicates statistically significant at the 5 per cent level and ** at 1 per cent. In three of the 
regressions, a type of previous FOMC decision was a perfect predictor of the decision at the next meeting. 
In these cases, the observations with these variables were dropped. 
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For the FOMC decisions, decisions to ease were never followed by decisions to tighten and vice 
versa for 1983 to 2012. In other words, they were usually perfect (non-)predictors of each other. 
Therefore, prior decisions to ease were dropped from observations where the FOMC decision 
was to tighten, and vice versa for 1983 to 2012. Where these variables occurred, the 
observations were dropped. This meant that the regressions were often determining the 
chance of an easing or tightening of policy following a decision to maintain policy. The 
diagnostics were for heteroscedasticity, the linktest for specification, and the likelihood ratio 
test for a split in stability from the mid-point. 
The main diagnostic problem was the stability test, which was breached for three of the 
equations; the exception was for decisions to tighten policy in 1953-1978. The stability problem 
was addressed in the later tightening equation by adding an annual trend and its cross-product 
with the variable for maintaining policy at the previous meeting. The new variables indicate that 
a decision to tighten became less likely over time where the FOMC had previously decided to 
maintain policy. Instability in the earlier ease equation was addressed by including a dummy for 
the second half of the period (1966 to 1978) and multiplying it by the real time gap and the 
policy cycle. The statistically significant variables that result indicate that monetary policy had 
shorter cycles and that the FOMC strongly focussed on the real time gap during this time. In the 
later ease equation, instability was addressed by adding an annual trend. The negative trend 
here, and the negative trend cross-product in the later tighten equation, suggests that 
monetary policy became looser over time. 
In the equations for 1953 to 1978, lags of the changes in interest rates were positively correlated 
with monetary policy. The other variable that was typically correlated with monetary policy was 
the real time gap. The two qualifications to this are that it only occurred for decisions to ease 
in the second half of the period (1966 to 1978) and accepting this occurred for annual interest 
rates, where the p-value was 0.051 but the number of observations was low at twenty six. 
Correlations between prices and monetary policy did not occur for the quarterly interest rates, 
but did for the other equations (accepting the p-value of 0.056 in the annual interest rates 
equation). 
In the later equations, only two variables meet the benchmark of being statistically significant 
and the same sign in the interest rate regressions and one of the FOMC decisions. These are 
inflation (if oil price inflation included) and presidential signalling. The real time gap is 
statistically significant in just the regression for quarterly interest rates, in particular its one-
month lag. The real time gap’s political cousin is the deficit. This indicator broadly responds to 
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unemployment, adjusted for fiscal policy settings. The deficit was statistically significant in the 
equation for FOMC decisions to tighten. If the deficit is regarded as a proxy for the real time 
output gap, then there is more evidence that the FOMC has been responding to employment 
since 1983, although there is better evidence that it responds to inflation. 
In its charter, the Fed is required to pursue stable prices, full employment and moderate 
interest rates. These results suggest that the FOMC has changed the weights it applies to these 
goals, by having less focus on full employment. The results also suggest that the FOMC has been 
influenced by recommendations in Orphanides (2003), that the Fed not focus on the output 
gap, and in Volcker (1990), that the Federal Reserve focus on controlling inflation. From the 
perspective of general price stability, this approach has been successful. 
Conclusions 
This paper has tested some of the more popular theories about monetary policy in the United 
States in the context of the Great Inflation. Although the theories are well-known, the methods 
in this paper are new. Instead of focussing on a single equation or a single dependent variable, 
this paper has established four dependent variables: quarterly interest rates, annual interest 
rates, FOMC decisions to tighten, and FOMC decisions to ease. Determining robustness from a 
single dependent variable, no matter how much effort is involved, involves the risk that a 
correlation can be by chance or from a hidden weakness of method. This then raises the 
question of publication bias. If twenty researchers examine the correlation between two 
variables, it is probable that one of them will find a correlation by chance. It is possible they will 
proceed to publication, whereas the remainder will not.  
The approach here prevents this occurring by using four related dependent variables, where 
the independent variables should have the same effect across the different equations, and then 
assessing their performance overall. The benchmark is that a variable must be statistically 
significant at the 5 per cent level across both interest rate equations and one of the FOMC 
decision equations. This is exacting, but not unduly so; the usual variables in relation to prices, 
output, and the Volcker disinflation meet this standard, as do the deficit and Presidential 
signalling. 
Firstly, the paper tested Orphanides’ (2003) theory that the FOMC consistently over-estimated 
the output gap, resulting in looser monetary policy than conditions truly required. Data 
presented in this paper suggest that the FOMC over-estimated the output gap for over twenty 
years and that the errors were sometimes of the order of 3 per cent. In both the interest rate 
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equations, and FOMC decisions to ease, the variable for the real time output gap had a much 
larger effect size than the unemployment variable. Orphanides’ theory passed this initial test. 
Secondly, the paper tested Orphanides’ (2003) theory against the conservatism theory by 
putting both types of variables in the four reaction function equations. Surprisingly, only the 
equation for FOMC decisions to ease was consistent with the argument that the FOMC became 
more inflation averse after 1982. The best result for the conservatism theory was that the 
correlation between the real time gap and quarterly and annual interest rates was lower after 
1982 at the 5 per cent level of significance, and the correlation between the real time gap and 
FOMC decisions to ease was lower after 1982 at the 8 per cent level of significance. 
These results were further investigated. Support for the theory that the FOMC became more 
inflation averse was present if the regressions were less rigorous, for example limiting the range 
of the data to 1996 (as in Clarida et al 2000) or using time series data in levels, rather than in 
differences. One interpretation is that something similar to, but fundamentally different from, 
increased inflation aversion did occur.  
The correlations between the real time gap and monetary policy were further explored by 
conducting regressions for the four equations between 1953 and 1978, and then between 1983 
and 2012. In each case, the correlations with the real time gap reduced or changed in nature. 
For quarterly interest rates, the variable for the real time gap changed to a lag in the second 
period. In all other cases, the coefficient for the real time gap was no longer statistically 
significant and sometimes had a positive sign. This provided further evidence that the FOMC 
has been less averse to the output gap since 1983. This result is consistent with Sims and Zha 
(2006), who found that the FOMC has become more conservative after the disinflation period, 
but not markedly so. They argued that the truly conservative period was 1979 to 1982, and the 
results in this paper are consistent with this finding. 
Reduced aversion to the output gap is consistent with advice by Orphanides (2003) and Volcker 
(1990). Orphanides made this statement on the basis that the gap was hard to measure. Volcker 
said so because he thought the Fed would be more effective if it focussed on one policy 
outcome, in particular prices. But what the reaction function literature often overlooks is that 
the FOMC needs to comply with its legal mandate. It is required to pursue full employment, 
stable prices, and moderate interest rates. It would be illegal for the Fed to focus only on prices, 
or to neglect output altogether. What the FOMC appears to have done is compromised. In 
microeconomic terms, it has chosen a point in the decision set that maximises its utility by 
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focussing less on output within the legal constraint of applying a minimum weight to each of its 
three policy goals.  
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Appendix 
Table A1: GARCH (1,1) FOMC reaction function of quarterly interest rates to compare coefficients 
for the real time gap and unemployment, data in levels, 1953-2012, N=240 
Variable Coefficient Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Interest rates NA  5.16  3.48  0.07  17.78 
Interest rates (-1)  1.29**  
(0.071) 
 5.16  3.48  0.07  17.78 
Interest rates (-2) -0.43**  
(0.064) 
 5.17  3.47  0.07  17.78 
Expected inflation  0.14** 
(0.022) 
 3.95  2.96 -1.77  13.98 
Oil inflation  0.0068** 
(0.0022) 
 2.26  13.63 -50.53  134.57 
Real time gap -0.19* 
(0.080) 
 1.05  1.5 -1.43  5.57 
Unemployment  0.16* 
(0.075) 
 5.93  1.63  2.57  10.67 
M1 growth -0.024 
(0.027) 
 1.25  1.29 -1.79  7.58 
Volcker disinflation  0.018 
(0.28) 
 0.05  0.22  0  1 
M1 growth*Volcker  0.70** 
(0.13) 
 0.07  0.41 -0.57  3.48 
Deficit -0.044** 
(0.014) 
 2.77  2.7 -1.95  11.31 
Presidential 
signalling (diff’d) 
 0.012* 
(0.005) 
-0.32  5.12 -13.73  15.59 
Post disinflation -0.25* 
(0.11) 
 0.5  0.5  0  1 
Election cycle -0.049 
(0.031) 
 0  0.71 -1  1 
Constant -0.030 
(0.31) 
    
ARCH (-1)  0.52** 
(0.12) 
    
GARCH (-1)  0.50** 
(0.077) 
    
Constant  
(error equation) 
0.019** 
(0.0068) 
    
Note: * indicates statistically significant at the 5 per cent level and ** at 1 per cent. 
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Table A2: OLS FOMC reaction function of annual interest rates to compare coefficients for the real 
time gap and unemployment, data in levels, 1953-2012, N=60 
Variable Coefficient Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
Interest rates NA  5.16  3.43  0.1  16.39 
Interest rates (-1)  0.59**  
(0.13) 
 5.19  3.39  0.1  16.39 
Expected inflation  0.54** 
(0.13) 
 3.72  2.58 -1.48  11.98 
Post disinflation -3.73 
(3.60) 
 0.5  0.5  0  1 
Expected inflation*Post  0.68* 
(0.26) 
 1.79  1.96  0  6.04 
Oil inflation  0.0045 
(0.0043) 
 9.11  28.85 -46.23  167.85 
Real time gap -0.45 
(0.77) 
 1.05  1.47 -1.1  4.61 
Unemployment  -0.047 
(0.74) 
 5.93  1.61  2.93  9.71 
Real time gap*Post  0.38 
(0.84) 
 0.39  1.14 -1.1  4.28 
Unemployment*Post  0.16 
(0.89) 
 3.17  3.33  0  9.63 
M1 growth -0.089* 
(0.042) 
 5.09  4.19 -3.31  15.36 
Volcker disinflation -14.0* 
(6.31) 
 0.05  0.21  0  1 
M1 growth*Volcker  2.63** 
(0.94) 
 0.34  1.39  0  7.4 
Deficit -0.059 
(0.14) 
 2.77  2.67 -1.61  10.55 
Deficit*Interest rates  
(-1) 
-0.037 
(0.022) 
 14.88  18.17 -8.02  82.97 
Presidential signalling 
(differenced) 
 0.027* 
(0.010) 
-1.19  11.95 -26.42  39.64 
Election cycle -0.16 
(0.16) 
 0  0.71 -1  1 
Constant  1.86 
(3.02) 
    
R-square  0.96     
Notes: * indicates statistically significant at the 5 per cent level and ** at 1 per cent. Usual standard errors 
applied. 
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Table A3: Logit FOMC reaction function of ease decisions to compare coefficients for the real time 
gap and unemployment, 1953-2012, N=577 
Variable Coefficient Mean  Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Ease decision NA  0.82  0.38  0  1 
Interest rates (-1) -0.60** 
(0.11) 
 5.13  3.43  0.07  19.1 
Change in int. rates 
(-1) 
 0.86 
(0.52) 
-0.04  0.45 -3.15  3.06 
Post disinflation -3.65** 
(0.90) 
 0.38  0.49  0  1 
Change in int. rates  
(-1)*Post disinflation 
 2.27* 
(1.07) 
-0.03  0.15 -1.31  0.74 
Ease policy at last 
decision 
Reference     
Maintain policy at 
last decision 
 1.13** 
(0.36) 
 0.82  0.38  0  1 
Tighten policy at last 
decision 
Predictor     
Policy cycle  0.81 
(0.44) 
 0.45  0.5  0  1 
Volcker disinflation  2.36 
(1.21) 
 0.04  0.2  0  1 
Policy cycle*Volcker -5.05** 
(1.56) 
 0.01  0.12  0  1 
Expected inflation  0.25* 
(0.11) 
 3.9  3.06 -1.77  13.98 
Expected inflation* 
Post disinflation 
 0.52** 
(0.18) 
 1.4  2 -1.38  6.78 
Oil inflation  0.0038 
(0.011) 
 0.95  11.29 -32.7  134.57 
Real time gap -1.73** 
(0.53) 
 1.21  1.46 -1.5  5.7 
Unemployment  1.70** 
(0.50) 
 5.91  1.59  2.5  10.8 
M1 growth  1.23* 
(0.59) 
 0.43  0.67 -3.2  6.11 
M1 growth*Volcker  1.08 
(1.45) 
 0.02  0.15 -1.18  1.26 
M1 growth*Post -1.43* 
(0.61) 
 0.21  0.65 -3.2  6.11 
Deficit (differenced) -0.22 
(0.18) 
 0.09  0.72 -2.85  3.25 
Presidential signalling 
(differenced) 
 0.087** 
(0.026) 
-0.68  5.73 -13.73  15.59 
Election cycle -0.056 
(0.21) 
 0.02  0.71 -1  1 
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Table A3 (cont’d) 
Variable Coefficient Mean  Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Constant -4.15* 
(2.01) 
    
Pseudo R-square 0.35     
Notes: * indicates statistically significant at the 5 per cent level and ** at 1 per cent. A tighten decision 
at the previous FOMC meeting was a perfect predictor of not easing at the next meeting. The 
131 observations with these variables were dropped. Standard errors are robust.  
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Table A4: Logit FOMC reaction function of tighten decisions to compare coefficients for the real 
time gap and unemployment, 1953-2012, N=664 
Variable Coefficient Mean  Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Tighten decision NA  0.20  0.40  0  1 
Interest rates (-1) -0.33** 
(0.095) 
 5.30  3.47  0.07  19.10 
Change in int. rates 
(-1) 
 0.73* 
(0.34) 
 0.06  0.48 -3.15  3.06 
Ease policy at last 
dec’n  
Reference     
Maintain policy at last 
decision 
 2.44 
(1.25) 
 0.71  0.45  0  1 
Tighten policy at last 
decision 
 4.13** 
(1.29) 
 0.20  0.40  0  1 
Post disinflation -1.64 
(1.02) 
 0.32  0.47  0  1 
Maintain policy*Post  0.60 
(0.61) 
 0.26  0.44  0  1 
Tighten policy*Post Predictor      
Policy cycle -0.066 
(0.43) 
 0.59  0.49  0  1 
Volcker disinflation  2.94* 
(1.20) 
 0.05  0.22  0  1 
Policy cycle*Volcker -3.43** 
(1.24) 
 0.03  0.16  0  1 
Policy cycle*Post  1.46* 
(0.73) 
 0.14  0.35  0  1 
Expected inflation  0.38** 
(0.10) 
 4.11  3.28 -1.77  13.98 
Oil inflation  0.011 
(0.012) 
 1.31  10.32 -26.23  134.57 
Real time gap  0.17 
(0.42) 
 1.13  1.41 -1.50  5.30 
Unemployment -0.63 
(0.42) 
 5.79  1.53  2.5  10.4 
M1 growth  0.23 
(0.29) 
 0.38  0.55 -1.20  5.69 
M1 growth*Volcker  0.089 
(0.83) 
 0.02  0.17 -1.18  1.40 
Deficit (differenced) -0.21 
(0.25) 
 0.01  0.66 -2.85  3.25 
Deficit*Post -2.00** 
(0.68) 
-0.017  0.30 -1.43  2.75 
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Table A4 (cont’d) 
Variable Coefficient Mean  Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Presidential signalling 
(differenced) 
 0.041 
(0.025) 
-0.04  5.71 -13.73  15.59 
Signalling*Post  0.19* 
(0.086) 
 0.042  1.93 -9.14  7.46 
Election cycle -0.21 
(0.17) 
 0.01  0.71 -1  1 
Constant -1.13 
(2.02) 
    
Pseudo R-square 0.27     
Notes: * indicates statistically significant at the 5 per cent level and ** at 1 per cent. From Q4 1982, an 
ease decision at the previous FOMC meeting was a perfect predictor of not tightening at the next 
meeting. The 44 observations with these variables were dropped. Usual standard errors used.  
83 
Table A5: GARCH (1,2) FOMC reaction function of quarterly interest rates, differenced data, 1953-
2012, N=240 
Variable Coefficient Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Interest rates  
(level, -1) 
-0.030  
(0.0073) 
5.16 3.48 0.07 17.78 
Interest rates 
(differenced, -1) 
 0.49**  
(0.049) 
-0.01 0.90 -3.99 6.02 
Expected inflation  0.057 
(0.044) 
0.02 0.54 -1.92 2.65 
Oil inflation  0.0045** 
(0.0011) 
-0.02 17.80 -134.57 128.41 
Real time gap -0.31* 
(0.12) 
0.01 0.41 -1.73 1.82 
M1 growth -0.088** 
(0.024) 
0.01 1.04 -4.09 4.82 
M1 growth (-1) -0.0005 
(0.029) 
0.01 1.04 -4.09 4.82 
Volcker disinflation -2.00** 
(0.56) 
0.00 0.09 -1.00 1.00 
M1 growth*Volcker  1.52** 
(0.24) 
0.00 0.40 -2.39 4.05 
M1 growth (-1) 
*Volcker 
 2.00** 
(0.15) 
0.00 0.43 -2.39 4.05 
Deficit -0.10* 
(0.048) 
0.03 0.68 -2.85 3.25 
Presidential 
signalling 
 0.0055 
(0.0042) 
-0.32 5.12 -13.73 15.59 
Post disinflation  3.02 
(4.53e+7) 
0.00 0.06 0.00 1.00 
Signalling*Post  0.020* 
(0.0086) 
-0.25 2.87 -18.22 7.46 
Election cycle -0.080* 
(0.034) 
0.00 0.50 -1.00 1.00 
Quarter 1 -0.057 
(0.033) 
0.00 0.71 -1.00 1.00 
Quarter 2 -0.029 
(0.035) 
0.00 0.71 -1.00 1.00 
Quarter 3 -0.0048 
(0.031) 
0.00 0.71 -1.00 1.00 
Constant  0.11** 
(0.035) 
    
ARCH (-1)  0.51** 
(0.14) 
 GARCH (-
1) 
0.20 
(0.10) 
 
ARCH (-2)  0.44* 
(0.18) 
 Constant  
(error 
equation) 
0.020 
(0.011) 
 
Note: * indicates statistically significant at the 5 per cent level and ** at 1 per cent.  
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Table A6: OLS FOMC reaction function of annual interest rates, differenced data, 1953-2012, 
N=60 
Variable Coefficient Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Interest rates NA -0.03 1.79 -4.69 4.30 
Interest rates (-1)  0.079  
(0.081) 
-0.03 1.79 -4.69 4.30 
Expected inflation  0.81** 
(0.18) 
0.07 0.91 -2.94 2.64 
Oil inflation -0.0085 
(0.0033) 
-0.02 40.14 -160.26 159.07 
Real time gap -0.51* 
(0.21) 
0.05 1.16 -2.77 3.32 
Volcker disinflation -22.4** 
(5.11) 
0.00 0.15 -0.76 0.76 
Real time gap*Volcker  1.72** 
(0.61) 
0.00 0.54 -3.51 1.90 
Post disinflation  4.82* 
(2.15) 
0.02 0.10 0.00 0.76 
Real time gap*Post  0.58* 
(0.22) 
0.03 0.84 -2.77 3.26 
M1 growth -0.11 
(0.040) 
0.17 3.33 -7.78 9.65 
M1 growth*Volcker  3.67** 
(0.67) 
0.00 0.97 -5.02 4.41 
Deficit -0.38* 
(0.14) 
0.14 1.49 -1.98 5.12 
Presidential signalling  0.023* 
(0.011) 
-1.19 11.95 -26.42 39.64 
Election cycle -0.25* 
(0.11) 
0.00 1.01 -1.00 1.00 
Constant -0.063 
(0.11) 
    
R-square 0.84     
Notes: * indicates statistically significant at the 5 per cent level and ** at 1 per cent. Usual standard errors 
applied. 
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Table A7: Logit FOMC reaction function of ease decisions, 1953-2012, N=577 
Variable Coefficient Mean  Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Ease decision NA 0.82 0.38 0.00 1.00 
Interest rates (-1) -0.52** 
(0.11) 
5.13 3.43 0.07 19.10 
Change in int. rates 
(-1) 
 0.85** 
(0.52) 
-0.04 0.45 -3.15 3.06 
Post disinflation -1.54* 
(0.70) 
0.38 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Change in int. rates  
(-1)*Post disinflation 
 2.16* 
(1.01) 
-0.03 0.15 -1.31 0.74 
Ease policy at last 
decision 
Reference     
Maintain policy at 
last decision 
 1.37** 
(0.36) 
0.82 0.38 0.00 1.00 
Tighten policy at last 
decision 
Predictor     
Policy cycle  0.56 
(0.42) 
0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Volcker disinflation  3.29** 
(1.13) 
0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00 
Policy cycle*Volcker -4.97** 
(1.57) 
0.01 0.12 0.00 1.00 
Expected inflation  0.25* 
(0.11) 
3.90 3.06 -1.77 13.98 
Expected inflation* 
Post disinflation 
 0.55** 
(0.16) 
1.40 2.00 -1.38 6.78 
Oil inflation  0.011 
(0.010) 
0.95 11.29 -32.70 134.57 
Real time gap  0.032 
(0.12) 
1.21 1.46 -1.50 5.70 
M1 growth  1.23* 
(0.61) 
0.43 0.67 -3.20 6.11 
M1 growth*Volcker  1.11 
(1.52) 
0.02 0.15 -1.18 1.26 
M1 growth*Post -1.38* 
(0.64) 
0.21 0.65 -3.20 6.11 
Deficit (differenced) -0.43* 
(0.19) 
0.09 0.72 -2.85 3.25 
Presidential signalling 
(differenced) 
 0.08** 
(0.025) 
-0.68 5.73 -13.73 15.59 
Election cycle -0.088 
(0.21) 
0.02 0.71 -1.00 1.00 
Constant  2.28** 
(0.54) 
    
Pseudo R-square 0.33     
Notes: * indicates statistically significant at the 5 per cent level and ** at 1 per cent. A tighten decision 
at the previous FOMC meeting was a perfect predictor of not easing at the next meeting. The 131 
observations with these variables were dropped. Standard errors are robust.  
86 
Table A8: Logit FOMC reaction function of tighten decisions, 1953-2012, N=664 
Variable Coefficient Mean  Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Tighten decision NA 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 
Interest rates (-1) -0.31** 
(0.094) 
5.30 3.47 0.07 19.10 
Change in int. rates 
(-1) 
 0.72* 
(0.34) 
0.06 0.48 -3.15 3.06 
Ease policy at last 
decision 
Reference     
Maintain policy at 
last decision 
 2.34 
(1.23) 
0.71 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Tighten policy at last 
decision 
 4.03** 
(1.27) 
0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 
Post disinflation -2.40** 
(0.88) 
0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00 
Maintain policy*Post  0.53 
(0.61) 
0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 
Tighten policy*Post Predictor  0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00 
Policy cycle -0.094 
(0.43) 
0.59 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Volcker disinflation  2.70* 
(1.17) 
0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 
Policy cycle*Volcker -3.20** 
(1.21) 
0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00 
Policy cycle*Post  1.53* 
(0.73) 
0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 
Expected inflation  0.30** 
(0.084) 
4.11 3.28 -1.77 13.98 
Oil inflation  0.010 
(0.012) 
1.31 10.32 -26.23 134.57 
Real time gap -0.44** 
(0.12) 
1.13 1.41 -1.50 5.30 
M1 growth  0.19 
(0.29) 
0.38 0.55 -1.20 5.69 
M1 growth*Volcker  0.18 
(0.82) 
0.02 0.17 -1.18 1.40 
Deficit (differenced) -0.19 
(0.26) 
0.01 0.66 -2.85 3.25 
Deficit*Post -1.87** 
(0.68) 
-0.014 0.30 -1.43 2.75 
Presidential signalling 
(differenced) 
 0.037 
(0.025) 
-0.04 5.71 -13.73 15.59 
Signalling*Post  0.18* 
(0.087) 
0.042 1.93 -9.14 7.46 
Election cycle -0.17 
(0.17) 
0.01 0.71 -1.00 1.00 
  
87 
Table A8 (cont’d) 
Variable Coefficient Mean  Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Constant -3.45** 
(1.27) 
    
Pseudo R-square 0.27     
Notes: * indicates statistically significant at the 5 per cent level and ** at 1 per cent. From Q4 1982, an 
ease decision at the previous FOMC meeting was a perfect predictor of not tightening at the next 
meeting. The 44 observations with these variables were dropped. Usual standard errors used. 
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4 – Central banks in the UK, Germany 
and the United States: Do politics 
explain the Great Inflation better than 
central bank independence? 
Abstract 
This paper compares two competing theories in terms of how they explain the inflation 
outbreak of the 1970s. The first theory is that higher central bank independence (CBI) addresses 
the time inconsistency problem and produces lower inflation through constraining politicians. 
The second theory is that politics is central to the inflation problem; central banks were 
constrained by politicians and the public, and inflation dropped after a policy learning process 
and a decline in inflationary expectations. 
The paper tracks events in Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States to determine 
which theory is better reflected in the data. The UK had low CBI and no inflation history, 
Germany had high CBI and experience with hyperinflation, and the US had high CBI but no 
inflation history. The politics theory has more explanatory power than CBI, because it can also 
explain how the UK launched its inflation response in 1979, and the US maintained its response 
under Reagan, whereas CBI theories cannot.  
The paper proposes a new theory that is the reverse of current CBI theories, namely that 
governments are more likely to delegate a disinflation to a central bank when it has more legal 
independence. Further, the militant behaviour of UK unions suggests that class division may 
also have affected how countries responded to the Great Inflation. 
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Introduction 
The Great Inflation in the 1970s led to the central bank independence (CBI) literature. This 
started with the concept that governments needed a way to demonstrate their credibility in a 
range of policy fields, including price stability. Then mathematical models were developed 
suggesting that an independent central bank would be a way of securing this. Next came 
bivariate quantitative studies that showed that CBI was inversely correlated with inflation, 
followed by studies that showed that the relationship still applied if other variables were added, 
such as the conservatism of the government or levels of union membership (for example, 
Franzese 1999). Making central banks independent from politicians and giving them an inflation 
goal is now the orthodox view. The purpose of this paper is to show that CBI theories are poor 
at explaining the behaviour of politicians who were key players in the Great Inflation. Politically 
oriented theories may well be superior to CBI theories and we may need to reconsider the 
relationship between central banks and politicians. 
An important part of the quantitative literature that covered the OECD nations is the experience 
of Germany, Austria and Switzerland because they are the outliers that have a large influence 
on the results; in the 1970s and 1980s they had the most independent central banks and the 
lowest inflation. But these countries had other features that made them outliers as well. For 
example, Germany and Austria suffered hyperinflation in the 1920s and Germany had a 
currency crisis after World War II. The German people’s dislike of inflation is commonly 
mentioned (Kennedy 1991, 9; Kloten 1985, 365). Switzerland is synonymous with its 
international banking industry. While a country’s financial sector has received some coverage 
in the quantitative literature (for example Posen 1995 and Franzese 1999), inflation aversion in 
Germany and Austria has received little attention.  
The remainder of the OECD nations followed a different path to Germany, Austria and 
Switzerland, experiencing much higher inflation. However, from 1980, many of them disinflated 
through fiscal and wages policies and by the 1990s, inflation had been resolved. Taking the G7, 
monetary policy was used in four countries, fiscal policy in four, and wage policies in three. 
Theories of CBI are well suited to explaining why Germany, Austria and Switzerland had lower 
inflation compared with other countries, but not why the other countries had politically-led 
disinflations after the 1970s. In other words, CBI can explain cross sectional variation in 
inflation, but is less able to explain variation over time. 
The legal independence of central banks is relatively straightforward to measure, and this has 
assisted the growth in this literature. But variables that reflect social attitudes are more difficult 
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to develop and often require interviewing samples of the population. Without precise 
questionnaires on this issue, it is difficult to develop meaningful data. The closest is the “most 
important problem” questionnaire undertaken by Gallup in the United States and a few other 
countries. However, there is little consistent data for developed nations going back to the 
1970s. This paper takes a different approach. Instead, it will conduct process tracing (e.g. 
George and Bennett 2005; Van Evera 1997) for three nations that had different levels of legal 
CBI and different inflation histories. The first country is Germany, which had the legally 
independent Bundesbank and a history of hyperinflation in the 1920s. The second two are the 
United Kingdom and the United States, where neither had an inflation history. Both were 
subject to political influence; the Bank of England was subject to government direction, whereas 
the Federal Reserve was subject to various forms of persuasion. 
CBI is indicated in several ways. For example, a central bank is politically more independent if 
the government cannot dictate policy through quickly and costlessly changing the senior staff 
of the bank, or through changing the bank’s goals. A central bank is more economically 
independent if the government cannot borrow from it at rates significantly below those in the 
market. The differences between the central banks of Germany, the United Kingdom and the 
United States during the stagflation period were outlined in a number of articles. This paper 
uses Grilli et al (1991), part of which is reproduced in Table 1. Central banks in the Grilli et al 
study could have a total score of sixteen, where the last criterion could contribute two points if 
the central bank had no responsibility for bank supervision.  
Of the eighteen countries in that study, Germany had the most independent central bank at 
thirteen points, ahead of the United States and Switzerland with twelve. The least independent 
central banks were those in New Zealand and Portugal, with three points each. 
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Table 1: Features of central bank independence in Germany, the UK and the US, 1970s 
Independence criterion Germany UK US 
Political independence    
Governor not appointed by government    
Governor appointed for more than 5 years *   
All the board not appointed by government   * 
Board appointed for more than 5 years *  * 
No mandatory government participation on board * * * 
No government approval of monetary policy required *  * 
Bank has statutory requirement for monetary stability  *  * 
Legislative process if bank disagrees with government *   
Economic independence    
Government’s direct credit facility is not automatic * * * 
Direct credit facility is at market rates * * * 
Direct credit facility is temporary * * * 
Direct credit facility is for a limited amount * * * 
Bank does not participate in primary bond market *  * 
Discount rate set by bank * * * 
Bank supervision not entrusted to central bank alone *  * 
Total 13 6 12 
Note: Source is Grilli et al (1991, 368-9). 
The process tracing method in this paper examines the CBI literature to determine what it 
predicts in terms of economic outcomes and the actions of political leaders and central banks. 
The same is done with the politics theory. Next, events in Germany, the United Kingdom and 
the United States are sketched out. The final step is to compare the two theories to determine 
which one’s predictions more closely match the data. This approach is similar to that proposed 
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by Karl Popper (1972), who argues that the best way of improving our knowledge is to compare 
theories’ explanatory power against each other. The theory that is the better match is 
preferred. 
The time inconsistency literature 
The initial paper was Kydland and Prescott (1977). It examined optimal control theory in the 
context of economic policy and used examples such as planning approvals in flood plains and 
managing aggregate demand. Optimal control theory is where a decision made at each point in 
time is best, based on current information and similar decisions in future. The paper concluded 
that optimal control theory is not suitable in economic systems because expectations change 
over time, such as through changes in governments. It states, “suboptimality arises because 
there is no mechanism to induce future policymakers to take into consideration the effect of 
their policy, via the expectations mechanism, upon current decisions of agents.” In other words, 
we cannot bind future policy makers. The paper recommended adopting rules-based economic 
policy as a way of addressing the problem, with these rules being protected through 
institutional arrangements. 
The next paper was Barro and Gordon (1983a), which applied a mathematical model to the 
aggregate demand problem posed in Kydland and Prescott (1977). The model assumed that 
unemployment depended on the natural unemployment rate (below which inflation would 
increase) and inflation surprises. It also used a loss function, where society would be worse off 
if inflation and unemployment deviated from their targets, being zero and the natural rate. The 
loss function includes the relative weighting policymakers place on inflation and 
unemployment. In order to generate activist policy, the loss function made the key assumption 
that the loss to society would be greater if unemployment was above the natural rate, rather 
than below it. The model produced the equilibrium results that policymakers are tempted to 
produce inflation surprises to reduce inflation, but in the long run employment stays at the 
natural rate and inflation is above zero. Ireland (1999) found that the performance of the United 
States economy from 1960 to 1999 is consistent with some of the predictions in Barro and 
Gordon’s model. 
The central bank independence literature 
The first main paper to propose CBI as the answer to the commitment problem was Rogoff 
(1985). It used an economic model, but, apart from a social loss function, it used a different 
approach to Barro and Gordon (1983a). This involved a micro-foundations model, omitting the 
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non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU). It concluded that the best way to 
reduce society’s loss was to remove all labour market distortions such as income tax and 
unemployment benefits. The next best approach would be to delegate monetary policy to the 
central bank with the instruction that it target zero inflation and then specify how it is to react 
to disturbances such as supply shocks. The difficulty with this, however, is that it is not possible 
to anticipate all possible contingencies. The third best solution, and the most practical, is to 
delegate monetary policy to a central bank that takes a more conservative approach to inflation 
than the rest of society, provided it also places some weight on employment outcomes. This 
will produce lower equilibrium inflation and reduce society’s losses. 
This paper has an easily testable prediction, namely that inflation is lower where a country more 
fully delegates monetary policy to a conservative central bank. A substantial quantitative 
literature resulted. Early papers, such as Grilli et al (1991) showed a bivariate negative 
correlation between CBI and inflation in developed economies. Cukierman et al (1992) showed 
that the correlation did not extend to developing countries. Alesina and Summers (1993) 
confirmed the bivariate relationship, but found that CBI was not correlated with unemployment 
or output. The rest of the 1990s saw a flurry of articles examining whether other variables 
affected the relationship between inflation and CBI. For example, Franzese (1999) showed that 
the correlation was robust to the addition of employment share of the financial sector, union 
membership, and the political orientation of the government of the day, among others. In 2001, 
Berger et al. concluded that the relationship was robust. 
Lohmann (1992) generalised Rogoff (1985). This paper uses a model of the economy that 
included the NAIRU, but then added another institutional variable to the policy maker’s loss 
function, namely the cost that the policy maker will incur if they override the central bank. This 
produces two types of policy outcomes: where output shocks are moderate, then the 
conservative central bank is free to manage the economy and zero (or very low) inflation results. 
This is because the cost to the policy maker of overriding the central bank is large, compared 
with the possible output benefits. Where an output shock is sufficiently large, then the output 
benefits of overriding the more conservative central bank exceed the cost of overriding. 
Anticipating this, the central bank is more accommodating and inflation is high for a large, 
negative output shock and deflation can technically occur for a large, positive output shock. The 
exact shape of the policy response depends on the conservativeness of the central bank and 
the cost of overriding. The most efficient policy setting is to have a higher cost of overriding, 
rather than a more conservative central bank. In Rogoff, the overriding cost is very high, which 
implies no outbreaks of inflation. Considering that there were inflation outbreaks in the United 
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States in the twentieth century, Lohmann considered that the Rogoff model did not represent 
the situation in the United States. 
Walsh (1995) proposed a way to improve on the outcomes in Lohmann (1992). He suggested 
that a government and its central bank could establish a contractual relationship with transfer 
payments made from the government to the central bank. If the transfers were appropriately 
designed, then it would be possible to eliminate the inflation bias of discretionary policy and to 
produce optimal economic outcomes regardless of the size or type of a supply shock. The design 
of the transfer payment depended on the assumptions of the model, but in all cases the central 
bank would be penalised for inflation above or below the theoretical target of zero. In some 
cases, the central bank would be penalised where output did not equal society’s target level, 
which could be different to equilibrium output (broadly similar to the output achieved at the 
NAIRU). Although the paper defines the transfer narrowly as a payment, it recognises that there 
are other ways of representing it, such as dismissal. 
Given these foundation papers, what are the implications of the central bank theory? In other 
words, what sort of events, political, economic or otherwise, could be expected to happen as a 
result of the theory? The broad implication from Rogoff (1985) is that an independent central 
bank is correlated with lower inflation. Lohmann (1992) takes this further in that, where the 
costs of overriding an independent central bank are higher (which is similar to saying that the 
central bank is more independent), the bank is less likely to accommodate a supply shock in the 
interests of controlling inflation. Larger supply shocks are also less likely to be accommodated. 
Walsh (1995) suggests that suitably designed incentive payments will produce low inflation and 
steady output, irrespective of the size of supply shocks. 
One observation about the central bank theory is that it has little to say about politicians. Its 
main implications revolve around economic concepts: inflation, output and the accommodation 
of shocks. This leaves other matters unexplained. For example, do politicians support the 
central bank when it tightens money? If society’s loss function includes inflation, then a 
politician might do this. However, it is important to remember that, while central bank theory 
relies on the loss function and the time inconsistency problem, these two concepts can stand 
on their own and support other, competing theories. 
The politics literature 
The idea of the politicians or the political process playing a positive, or partly positive, role in 
addressing inflation has had less coverage in the literature. The most comprehensive treatment 
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is De Long (1997), which describes the economic and political developments in the United States 
in the 1970s and early 1980s. He argues that, due to the influence of the Depression, the 
consensus in the 1970s was for employment-first policies. This came from both the Democrats 
in Congress, as well as President Nixon. Arthur Burns, as Chairman of the Federal Reserve, could 
not fully respond to inflation because Congress would have been fundamentally changed the 
Fed as an institution. As the 1970s progressed, fears about inflation grew so that a political 
mandate developed to fight inflation despite the risk of a significant recession. De Long states 
that this mandate was fully formed by 1979, although its development was slow and informal. 
The idea that policy makers learnt a lesson from the 1970s has occurred in different ways in the 
economic literature, typically with a focus on learning by economists, rather than politicians. 
One example is the idea that the Federal Reserve did not properly understand the relationship 
between inflation and unemployment (Sargent 1999 and Sargent et al 2006). Another is that 
the Federal Reserve and most other parties did not understand that the non-accelerating 
inflation rate of unemployment had risen from approximately 4 per cent in the early 1950s to 
be close to 6 per cent in the 1970s (Orphanides 2003), or occasionally higher (Tulip 2004). 
De Long’s theory is supported by two of the central figures in the United States in the history of 
the Great Inflation. Arthur Burns (1979), Chair of the Fed from 1970 to 1978, argued that there 
was little political or community appetite to address inflation during his tenure. But by 1990, 
Paul Volcker, Chairman from 1979 to 1987, was able to conclude that, “at a certain point in the 
inflationary process, public opinion will support strong policies to restore stability even though 
those policies seem to entail a harsh short term cost” (14). 
Simplifying further to a theory, the argument is that a developed country’s inflation experience 
is inversely correlated with its inflation performance. Or to put it another way, once a developed 
country experienced high inflation, it was no longer prepared to tolerate it. This produces the 
testable prediction that inflation is inversely correlated to inflation history. However, it also 
produces other testable predictions. For example, it predicts that leaders in developed 
countries will eventually support reducing inflation and that this leadership matters, even 
where a central bank has a large degree of independence. The corollary is that central banks 
will not conduct disinflations, or at least will not be successful at it, if they do not have political 
support to do so. 
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The United States 
Establishment of the Federal Reserve 
The United States had a high degree of turnover in its early central banks until the creation of 
the Federal Reserve in 1913. Initially, the Bank of North America was established to help fund 
the War of Independence, but its charter was later repealed in line with the general dislike of 
centralisation at the time. In 1791, the Federal Government established the First Bank of the 
United States. It established branches, which put offside the many note-issuing banks created 
under State laws. Its charter was not renewed in 1811. The Second Bank of the United States 
was created in 1816 and met a similar end in 1833.1  
Both these banks contributed to financial stability by encouraging the clearing of the notes of 
rival banks. In other words, they increased the rate at which banks would return the notes of 
other banks to the original banks for payment. This is an important constraint against the excess 
issue of notes. The lack of regular, prompt clearing was a continual problem in the United States 
in the eighteenth century. The national banks also had the potential to offer support to State 
banks during financial crises, which the State banks did recognise in the case of the Second 
Bank. The opposition of the State banks to the nascent central banks was only in their short run 
interests. 
There were two general suspensions of cash payments in the 1830s. But from the 1840s the 
situation improved as regulation was tightened. For example, the shareholders of banks were 
now required to pay up their capital. There were also some voluntary systems developed to 
improve the clearing of banknotes. 
In 1838, New York passed the Free-banking Law. This allowed anyone to issue notes, provided 
they had lodged an equivalent amount in certain securities with the Comptroller. One of the 
main type of securities was State or Federal bonds. Although they facilitated the issue of notes, 
it also meant that the amount of notes in circulation depended on the price of the bonds. If a 
bank wished to reduce the value of its notes in circulation, it faced a Catch-22 because it could 
not sell the bonds to raise the cash to redeem the notes, because then it would have more notes 
in circulation than securities lodged with the Comptroller. This inflexibility became an ongoing 
                                                          
1 Material for the early history of the central banks in all three countries is drawn from Smith (1936), 
unless otherwise indicated. 
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issue in American banking. The alternative would have been to give banks discretion in the mix 
and value of commercial assets they would use to back their notes. 
The Civil War created the next big change. The administration had difficulty borrowing from the 
public due to the poor financial management of the previous President, James Buchanan. The 
New York, Philadelphia and Boston banks were persuaded to assist with a $50 million loan, with 
it being paid in specie. The administration also started to issue notes, and if banks accepted 
them, they were required to redeem them in specie as well. This placed considerable pressure 
on the banks and, at the end of 1861, they suspended payments. Treasury also ceased 
redeeming the notes. Bills were passed to allow the issue of three sets of legal tender of $150 
million apiece, which were valid for almost all payments, but could not be redeemed for coin. 
The administration refined its monetary approach in 1864 with the passage of an Act to 
implement a national banking system so that groups of individuals could establish banks and 
issue notes, providing they held a certain amount of federal bonds to back the notes; in other 
words, a bond deposit system. The main aim was to create a demand for federal bonds, but the 
benefits of a uniform currency were also promoted. The new banks were not permitted to 
establish branches. Such a reform would have beneficial because it would have made it easier 
for the public to redeem the banks’ notes and prevent the excess issue of notes. 
From 1860, the federal government reduced its debt, which also reduced the quantity of bonds 
available to support the issue of notes. Banks tried to avoid issuing notes to their borrowing 
customers. It was much simpler to increase the customers’ deposits with the bank instead. 
Different interest rates applied on loans, depending on whether they involved notes or deposit 
credits. The inflexibility in the currency was compounded by a limit on the value of notes that 
could be retired in any one month. Banks tended to use their notes to their full extent, meaning 
that reserves were limited.  
The inflexibility in the currency showed up in various ways. Interest rates tended to spike in 
autumn due to foreigners borrowing and purchasing US dollars to purchase crops (Meltzer 
2003). Between 1873 and 1907 there were five financial crises, where interest rates jumped 
markedly. Banks suspended cash payments in three of these cases. Instability was increased by 
the practice of country banks placing deposits with the major New York banks. The country 
banks regarded these deposits as a form of insurance, but the practical effect was mass 
withdrawals during a drop in confidence. 
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Some policies were implemented to address this but they were not effective. In 1900, the 
amount of notes able to be issued increased from 90 per cent of the value of bonds held to 100 
per cent. The tax rate was dropped from 1 per cent to 0.5 per cent of the note issue. Further, 
the Treasury interpreted the law more widely and accepted municipal and other bonds as 
suitable backing for notes. However, these changes only allowed the expansion of the note issue 
without giving it the flexibility to contract. The changes fuelled an inflationary boom in the 
1900s. 
The 1907 crisis prompted further reform. The consensus at the time was that a co-operative 
system of emergency financing between banks would be sufficient. This led to the Aldrich-
Vreeland Act of 1908 which allowed banks to form voluntary associations. The idea was that 
member banks could deposit securities, both government and commercial, with an association 
and issue notes against them. The banking membership would then be liable for redeeming the 
notes. More importantly, the Act established the National Banking Commission to investigate 
other possible reforms. The Commission ran for four years and published comprehensive 
research on the US and European banking systems. It shifted the US consensus towards a 
permanent central bank. 
The Commission led to the establishment of the Federal Reserve System in 1913. It was different 
to other central banks. The System comprised twelve banks that were owned by the member 
banks. The twelve banks operated individually, but under the guidance of the Federal Reserve 
Board which comprised presidential appointees and two ex-officio members, the Secretary of 
the Treasury and the Comptroller-General. The System resembled the voluntary associations 
enabled by the Aldrich-Vreeland Act.  
During the 1920s, it became apparent that the Federal Reserve System had considerable power 
over the economy through trading government securities on the open market. US government 
securities typically have a fixed value at maturity. The Federal Reserve found that it could buy 
or sell these securities on the open market and change their price. The gap between their price 
and redemption value, adjusted for time, was their interest rate. If these open market 
operations were conducted on sufficient scale, it was possible to change market interest rates. 
It is also became apparent that these actions could affect the flow of gold. However, decisions 
on open market operations were not undertaken by the Board, but instead by a specially 
appointed committee comprising the Federal Reserve banks of New York, Boston, Philadelphia, 
and later Cleveland (Kettl 1986). 
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The System was designed for managing the money supply and providing liquidity during crises, 
not macroeconomic management. There were no lines of control or accountability between the 
Board, the open markets committee, and the twelve reserve banks. Conflicts occasionally arose 
between them. Further, it mismanaged its response to the Depression and politicians came to 
the view that there should be political control or influence over such a powerful body. Congress 
amended the Federal Reserve legislation in the 1930s. The reforms included removing the ex-
officio members of the Board and having a specially designated Chair. The Federal Open 
Markets Committee was also formalised as a twelve-member body comprising a seven-member 
Board appointed by the President and five of the twelve bank presidents, selected on a rotating 
basis. Therefore, Presidential appointees had a majority (Kettl 1986). 
The modern era of the Federal Reserve commenced with the appointment of William 
McChesney Martin in 1951 to help resolve the dispute between the Administration and the Fed 
over the extent to which the Fed would ease policy when the Administration sought to sell 
Treasuries.  
The Great Inflation 
Under President Eisenhower, the FOMC’s job was straightforward. Eisenhower did not have an 
aggressive economic policy and he often stressed the importance of price stability (see, for 
example, his State of the Union addresses and the Economic Report of the President, 1961). 
However, full employment and avoiding recessions were the primary economic goals for 
Presidents Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon. Further, President Johnson preferred to fund the 
Vietnam War through budget deficits and the NAIRU was believed to be 4 per cent, when it was 
closer to 6 per cent (Orphanides 2003). 
The first Presidential action against inflation occurred in August 1971, when Nixon announced 
a ninety day freeze on all wages and prices. He did not philosophically support such a policy, 
but adopted it as a tactic against the Democratic controlled Congress, which passed the 
Economic Stabilization Act in 1970 over his objections. The Act allowed the President to impose 
controls and the Democrats assumed that Nixon would not use it, which could then become a 
way of embarrassing him. However, Nixon’s use of the Act was politically popular and it became 
an electoral asset in the 1972 elections. The problem was that, the longer the price controls 
continued, the economic tensions they created grew as well, especially when supply shocks 
occurred in agriculture and oil. The Administration allowed the program to expire in April 1974 
(Walker 2011). 
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President Ford conducted the second Presidential action against inflation. He was an economic 
conservative and believed that inflation was the domestic priority when he commenced his 
term. However, the Democrat controlled Congress ensured that he was unable to progress his 
economic agenda. He initially proposed a tight fiscal policy with higher taxes and reduced 
spending, along with a volunteer organisation titled “Whip Inflation Now.” The Democrats 
attacked the fiscal proposal and it resulted in a number of Republicans losing their seats in the 
1974 Congressional elections. At the end of 1974, the economy moved into recession and Ford 
started to change policy, proposing a tax cut. However, Congress outflanked him and he was 
forced to accept the Democrats’ larger cut. Congress also passed many spending Bills and Ford’s 
veto was overridden twelve times. At the end of 1975, Ford proposed smaller government 
through a tax cut and reduced spending. Again Congress outflanked him and passed the tax cut, 
while only promising to cut spending (Greene 1995).  
In 1970, Nixon had appointed Arthur Burns, an economist with strong Republican links, as Chair 
of the Fed. During Burns’ tenure, the Federal Reserve steered a course between fighting 
inflation and not permitting unemployment to rise too high. Ford’s Council of Economic 
Advisers supported the Fed’s tight money in their advice to the President. However, Congress 
took a different view and conflicts between it and the Fed escalated in the 1970s as interest 
rates increased. A number of proposals were made to increase Congressional oversight of the 
Federal Reserve, which Burns opposed because he believed that the Fed required flexibility to 
adapt monetary policy to the changing needs of the economy. The Federal Reserve proved 
adept at fighting off most of these proposals, or creating loopholes so that they were of limited 
effect. The most effective proposal was that the Fed is now required to meet with both the 
House and Senate banking committees twice a year (Kettl 1986). 
Arthur Burns was Chairman of the Fed until 1978. In 1979, he argued that the inflation problem 
reflected a number of new features about the economy, which he outlined in his speech, The 
Anguish of Central Banking. These were that: the economy had an inflation bias because 
expectations about employment and output had risen; fiscal policy had become less responsive 
due to legislative deadlock, which placed more responsibility on monetary policy; and the 
disappearance of the traditional inverse relationship between inflation and unemployment 
meant that it became harder to control inflation. Burns also pointed out that there was no social 
consensus for fighting inflation. What was needed was “new currents of thought [to] create a 
political environment in which the difficult adjustments required to end inflation can be 
undertaken” (Burns 1979, 22). 
102 
Early in his Presidency, Carter decided that the economy was recovering and he came to the 
view that inflation was the real problem. Despite being a fiscal conservative, there were two 
reasons why Carter did not confront inflation head-on. Firstly, the Democratic Congress and the 
great majority of his advisers were not were not supportive of restraint. The other reason was 
that he was never prepared to accept austerity as the cost of fighting inflation. The third 
Presidential attempt at controlling inflation was wage and price guidelines that would permit 
wages and inflation to increase, but at reduced rates compared with 1976-77. The plan was that 
management would maintain a 7 per cent cap in its negotiations with organised labour, which 
would minimise confrontation between the Administration and the unions. However, 
businesses started giving wage settlements above the 7 per cent limit. Therefore, Vice-
President Mondale negotiated an “Accord” with the unions that allowed annual wage increases 
of up to 9.5 per cent. Business was not enthusiastic about the program because wages were 
generally permitted to rise, whereas prices were not. By February 1980, inflation had risen to 
18 per cent and the Administration attempted to enforce the guidelines through “jawboning” 
meetings between the President and industry sectors. However, little came of them (Hargrove 
1988). 
At the Federal Reserve, Arthur Burns and President Carter did not develop a good working 
relationship. In 1978, Burns was replaced by Bill Miller, a business CEO who had close links with 
Democrats. As inflation worsened in early 1979, Treasury Secretary Blumenthal and Chairman 
of the Council of Economic Advisers, Charles Schultze, started leaking to encourage the Fed to 
increase rates. Miller stated that he wasn’t going to be pressured by the Administration and 
that the President valued an independent Federal Reserve. Carter disliked high interest rates 
and wrote to Blumenthal and Miller, demanding that they desist (Hargrove 1988). 
In July 1979, Carter delivered his crisis of confidence speech and, as part of his action plan, fired 
Blumenthal and replaced him with Miller, leaving the Chairman’s seat at the Fed vacant. 
Although convenient, this led to a loss of confidence in the markets and there was an 
international run on the dollar. Carter needed to quickly appoint someone who would gain the 
confidence of the markets or, in other words, he needed to make an appointment that would 
satisfy a key interest group. This was a key political turning point. Carter first discussed the 
Chairman’s job with David Rockefeller and Alden W. Clausen, who were CEO of Chase National 
Bank and President/Chairman of the Bank of America, respectively. However, both rejected the 
offer. Paul Volcker had been a senior official at Treasury and the Federal Reserve for many years, 
as well as having private sector experience. He had been considered as a possible Chairman of 
the Fed in 1965, when the Johnson administration thought that it might replace Chairman 
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Martin. Volcker was also suggested by many of those whom the White House discussed the 
appointment with, and so the President interviewed Volcker as the third choice. Volcker advised 
Carter that he would pursue a tighter monetary policy than Miller. Carter, having few options, 
gave him the job (Neikirk 1987; Kettl 1986; Greider 1987). This became the fourth Presidential 
attempt at controlling inflation. 
Volcker started his term in August 1979 and increased interest rates at his first meeting. 
However, the seven Governors were split on whether to increase rates further. The other 
monetary policy instrument the Fed has is the discount rate, at which banks borrow funds 
directly from the Fed. This rate is set just by the Governors. On 31 August, it refused to increase 
rates from 10.5 per cent, and then on September 18 it split four-three in agreeing to increase 
the rate to 11 per cent. The markets interpreted this as a signal that the Fed was at the top of 
the interest rate cycle, or as Volcker put it, “they’re at the end of their string”. The value of the 
dollar dropped in international markets and Volcker began exploring the idea of targeting the 
money supply as a way of restoring credibility (Feldstein 2013; Neikirk 1987). The 
Administration did not initially support the policy switch, but Volcker persisted. After all, the 
President appointed him to settle the markets and there was a political imperative to keep him 
on side. Opposition among the Governors to tight money was also dissipating as the economic 
situation deteriorated. After a special meeting on 6 October, Volcker announced the new policy 
to the press and that interest rates would increase from 11 per cent to 12 per cent. The White 
House, again short on options, issued a statement in support (Neikirk 1987). 
By the end of February 1980, rates had reached 16.5 per cent. The Carter Administration 
disliked high interest rates and developed an economic program that comprised the fifth 
Presidential attempt at controlling inflation. The aim was to stabilise the economy without high 
interest rates. Carter announced the new program in March 1980 and it included an oil import 
fee and credit controls. The latter part was to be implemented under the Credit Control Act of 
1969, where the Federal Reserve could act under the President’s authorisation. Volcker and the 
Federal Reserve were unenthusiastic about the controls because they could harm the economy 
and be administratively difficult. In negotiations with the Administration, Volcker would only 
support a weak system of credit controls and wanted a more conservative fiscal policy. 
Therefore, the economic program included fiscal reforms designed to put the budget in surplus. 
Consumer spending had already started to soften so the effect of credit controls on consumer 
confidence was immediate. In the second quarter, real GNP dropped 2.5 per cent, or 10 per 
cent at an annualised rate. Mid-year, the Federal Reserve discontinued credit controls and 
eased monetary policy. This did restore economic growth, but at the cost of rebuilding 
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inflationary pressures, so the FOMC returned to tighter policies in the second half of 1980 as 
the election approached. Carter’s advisers encouraged him to criticise the Federal Reserve’s 
policies, which he did in Philadelphia in early October. However, it backfired and Carter was 
widely criticised (Neikirk 1987). Ronald Reagan noted that Carter could not credibly criticise the 
Fed when he had appointed the Chairman and most of the Governors (Greider 1987). During 
the disinflation, there was a political cost to criticising the Fed. 
Unlike his predecessors, Reagan commenced his four-year term advocating that inflation should 
be reduced. Further, he did not state that this needed to be balanced against other policy goals, 
such as employment, and often stressed the need to stay the course and avoid quick fixes (Poole 
1988). Behind the scenes, his staff believed that inflationary expectations had to be brought 
under control quickly before interest groups sought special treatment or financial assistance 
(Mumper and Uslaner 1982. The main source of criticism of Volcker’s tight monetary policy 
within the Administration was the Treasury, including the Secretary of the Treasury, Donald 
Regan. If Treasury criticism became extreme, the White House would ask Treasury to desist and 
a meeting would be arranged between the President and Volcker to settle relationships (Neikirk 
1987).  
The closest matters came to a crisis was in January 1982, when President Reagan stated that an 
increase in the money supply was sending the wrong signal to the money markets and that 
industry investment was being delayed due uncertainty about what the Fed would do. Unlike 
previous occasions, the President only gave a neutral answer when asked whether Volcker 
should resign. Regan followed up with his own criticisms that the Fed could not control growth 
of the money supply. A week later, Volcker responded by arguing that high deficits were causing 
high interest rates. In mid-February, Reagan and Volcker had a private meeting. Little is known 
about this event, but three days later at a press conference Reagan fully endorsed the FOMC’s 
actions (Neikirk 1987). Reagan was balancing policy outcomes and outsourcing political risk. He 
was giving Volcker enough support to bring inflation back under control, while at the same time 
running a large deficit to be seen to support the economy. 
As 1982 progressed, the Fed began to ease monetary policy. This was partly due to the drop in 
inflation, but it was also due to the realisation that it was becoming harder to define the money 
supply due to financial innovation. Banks began offering accounts that combined a range of 
features, such as interest bearing accounts that supported cheques as well (NOW accounts). On 
5 October 1982, in a climate of falling inflation and the Mexican debt crisis, the FOMC eased 
policy and no longer strictly aligned monetary policy to the money supply (Axelrod 1985; Neikirk 
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1987). Although some inflation scares re-occurred during the 1980s (Goodfriend 2007), the 
worst was over and the United States economy performed relatively well by their targets for 
the next twenty years. In 1990, Volcker gave a lecture, The Triumph of Central Banking?, where 
he noted that public opinion would eventually support a disinflation, even though the short 
term cost was high (Volcker 1990). 
United Kingdom 
Through the sheer volume of literature, the US tends to become the base case in international 
comparisons. However, other countries can have some fundamental differences to the US. For 
example, the US was by far the world’s largest economy in the 1970s and issued the world’s 
reserve currency, the dollar. By and large, this meant that other countries had to react to the 
US and needed to regularly monitor their international position. The US, however, rarely had to 
do so; the main exception was in the late 1970s, discussed above. Another area of potential 
difference is labour relations. Unions played a small part in stagflation politics in the US due to 
low levels of union membership and low levels of class division. Many other countries had 
different conditions. 
Both of these factors served as potential areas of difference in the UK. For much of the period 
after World War II, the UK pound was over-valued. This bred currency speculation and UK 
economic policy was, from time to time, motivated by the desire to avoid devaluation. Secondly, 
the UK had strong class divisions, which were reflected in the conduct of its unions. Together, 
these factors combined to produce an economy that lacked optimism and was instead 
characterised by poor productivity, uncompetitive exports and a propensity to import (Morgan 
1990). 
Establishment of the Bank of England 
This central bank was established in the late seventeenth century. In 1672, Charles II was heavily 
in debt to London bankers and solved the problem by suspending payment. This ruined the 
creditworthiness of the sovereign. When William and Mary took the throne, the sovereign was 
again in need of credit, this time to fight France. William Paterson proposed that a joint stock 
bank be created to facilitate government borrowing. Parliament passed the Tonnage Act in 1694 
to establish the Bank of England and the Bank’s capital of £1.2 million was fully subscribed in 
eleven days (Dean and Pringle 1994). 
The Bank of England proved to be very profitable. This was partly due to the many privileges 
that Parliament granted it. This included the requirement that all sums due to the government 
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had to be paid through the Bank. It was able to issue notes, had a monopoly in joint stock 
banking, and the right to deal in bullion. The Bank earned interest from its loans to the 
government, but then it was also able to issue banknotes (that matched the government loans) 
as loans to private borrowers, which also earnt interest. Funds invested in the Bank earned 
interest twice. The Bank was backed by the government, in particular by its duties on shipping 
and alcohol (Dean and Pringle 1994). 
From time to time, Parliament would renew the Bank’s charter, some additional privilege would 
be added, and the Bank’s capital would be increased to facilitate further borrowing. In 1764, 
the renewal included the Bank paying the Crown a fee of £110,000. Governments were keen to 
expand the Bank’s capacity to lend. At the start of the French Revolutionary Wars in the 1790s, 
William Pitt the Younger requested advances from the Bank, which were not permitted without 
the express permission of Parliament. The Bank agreed to legislation to make such advances, 
on the condition that they were legally capped. Pitt got the amendments through, but omitted 
the cap. 
The Bank Act of 1844 aimed to limit the Bank’s operations in various ways, such as capping the 
fiduciary note issue to £14 million. This meant it could issue notes backed by government 
securities up to £14 million. Any issue above this was to be covered by gold. It was hoped that 
this provision would act as a discipline on the Bank and the market. However, in times of 
financial stress, such as 1847, 1857 and 1866, the government was prepared to exempt the 
Bank from the ceiling to allow it to lend to support the market. This had public support. In other 
words, the government was prepared to override the constraint to achieve other policy aims, 
in line with the expectations of the general public. 
As the twentieth century progressed, economic theory developed and it became apparent that 
monetary policy could influence economic output through the interest rate. With increased 
suffrage, economic output became a politically important outcome. Therefore, the Bank 
became more than a tool of government finance. Its operations also needed to be managed 
politically. In 1925, the Conservative Government returned to the gold standard. Churchill was 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and the move was against his better instincts, but it had the 
support of the Bank and the business community. To maintain the rate for gold, the Bank kept 
interest rates high and unemployment stayed above 10 per cent (Wood 2005). The Conservative 
Government lost the 1929 election.  
During this Parliament, the Labour Opposition attempted to nationalise the Bank of England. 
James Maxton presented a private members’ bill in 1926 to this effect that would also have 
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required the Bank to present full accounts, the appointment of three Commissioners to set a 
price for the Bank’s shares, and for the establishment of a sinking fund and depreciation fund. 
However, the Bill could not proceed due to contravening parliamentary Standing Orders in 
relation to affecting private interests. Eventually Labour had its way. Upon coming to 
government in 1945, it had a general agenda of nationalising much of the British economy, and 
the Bank of England was a priority. The Bank was nationalised in 1946, although with much less 
transparency or process than in Maxton’s bill. The share price was the market price. This only 
considered future income streams, without allowing for asset values. Further, the bill made no 
requirements in relation to accounts or for an annual report. What information was published 
was generally available elsewhere (Hennessy 1992).  
From nationalisation to the 1990s, the Bank was largely implementing government policy 
(Cairncross 1995). 
The Bank of England has been credited as assisting the United Kingdom in becoming the world’s 
superpower in the nineteenth century. The Bank reduced risk for those who lent to the Crown, 
reducing the interest rate. The Crown could therefore borrow to fund warfare and other 
enterprises more cheaply than its geopolitical rivals (North and Weingast 1989).  
The Great Inflation 
The 1960s saw the introduction of wages policies by both sides of politics, none of which were 
completely successful. The sectors involved tried to beat them, governments tended to 
introduce them in a crisis, and economic policy was not consistent with them (Dawkins 1980). 
In 1969, the Labour Government became concerned that union power was getting out of hand. 
The 1966 Seaman’s Strike led to a run on the pound and the courts found that unions’ 
agreements with their employers were not binding, which gave them a free hand in 
undermining their employers’ business (Morgan 1990). The Government released a White 
Paper titled In Place of Strife, which sought to place some legal controls on unions. This was 
strongly opposed by the Parliamentary Labour Party, including by James Callaghan, a senior 
minister. The Government used an agreement with the Trades Union Congress (TUC) to drop 
the White Paper. The TUC promised to monitor strikes and use moral suasion to resolve them. 
However, no-one expected it to work and many people argued it made the UK ungovernable 
(Morgan 1990). 
Inflation became a headline issue in the election of June 1970. At this point, annual inflation 
had been around 6 per cent for the past eighteen months. When in opposition, the Tories had 
not developed a fundamental, thought out approach to the problem. Rather, inflation’s 
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intractable character meant they tended to defer it in policy meetings (Campbell 1993). During 
the election, it became a useful vote-winner and so the Tories were happy to capitalise on it. 
This became problematic because even their own advisers recognised that their policies had 
the effect of increasing inflation (Campbell 1993). 
Initially, Heath’s economic policies were neo-liberal. Fiscal policy was tight (Westaway 1980), 
some state enterprises were sold off, and wage regulation was dismantled in favour of collective 
bargaining (Derbyshire and Derbyshire 1988). However, by mid-1971, annual inflation had 
climbed to over 10 per cent. This was partly due to a generous Budget in 1971, designed to fight 
unemployment (Campbell 1993). It was also due to the removal of credit controls, which were 
designed to remove distortions to competition. The problem was that this allowed loose fiscal 
policy to fuel property speculation, which increased inflation (Cairncross 1995; Campbell 1993). 
The Government’s suggested wages policy of “n-1” (each year, workers would receive a pay 
increase 1 per cent lower than the year before) was destroyed by the first miners’ strike in early 
1972, which not only delivered the miners higher wages, but public support as well (Morgan 
1990; Campbell 1993). This political response was partly due to the erosion of miners’ wages in 
real terms, but it nonetheless indicated public support for unions and suggested that wage 
policies were unlikely to work in a disinflation crisis. 
During 1972, the Government introduced the “Dash for Growth,” which increased inflationary 
pressures. The miners’ strike convinced Heath to introduce a statutory price and wage policy at 
the end of 1972. He did try to get the unions to accept a voluntary policy, but they would only 
do so if prices were regulated, with wages unregulated (Campbell 1993). During 1973, the 
Government expanded its regulation of prices and wages, and announced a growth target of 5 
per cent. This was very popular, but the Government had to give up on it at the end of 1973 due 
to a falling pound, inflation, and a large balance of payments deficit (Campbell 1993). At this 
time, the National Union of Miners sought pay increases outside those permitted by Stage 3 of 
the wage and price policy, using the first oil price shock as leverage. Heath could have used 
various compromises to allow the miners their increase and to put pressure back on the unions, 
but instead chose to call an election under the theme “Who controls Britain?” He failed to 
energise the country over what was a crisis of governance and he lost the election in February 
1974 (Campbell 1993). 
When Wilson returned as Prime Minister, the UK was embarking on a period when it had the 
highest inflation of the G7 economies (Hill 1982). His main means of controlling inflation was 
the “social contract” with the TUC, negotiated in 1973 when Labour was in opposition. Labour 
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promised not to regulate trade unions and the unions promised wage restraint. However, the 
social contract did not moderate behaviour on the shop floor, where wages were effectively 
negotiated. Wage settlements regularly approached 20 per cent, and even the TUC was 
concerned (Morgan 1990). The two Budgets in 1974 were cautious, partly to not upset the 
unions (Morgan 1990), but worsening economic performance led the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer Dennis Healey to introduce an austerity Budget in 1975, with the TUC agreeing on a 
fixed wage increase of £6 a week for everyone. Inflation dropped and unemployment increased 
(Morgan 1990; Derbyshire and Derbyshire 1988). Wilson resigned in 1976 due to exhaustion 
and a loss in his powers of concentration, but the fact that he did not have any new strategies 
for dealing with inflation has also been cited as a factor (Ziegler 1993). 
Callaghan replaced Wilson. Early in his tenure, Treasury suggested a devaluation to boost the 
economy. Callaghan was not supportive, but when news leaked the pound started to drop and, 
in order to meet its international commitments, the UK took out a loan from the US. Healy 
delivered another austerity Budget to calm the markets, but the UK was unable to meet the 
terms of the US loan (Derbyshire and Derbyshire 1988). The UK then had to borrow from the 
IMF, which necessitated further spending cuts, divestiture of BP shares, and a commitment for 
tight control over the money supply (Morgan 1990). At its conference in September 1976, the 
Labour Party revolted through resolutions calling for nationalising the banks and introducing 
new welfare benefits. Callaghan responded with his “New Realism” speech where he made the 
textbook monetarist case that expansionary policy in the long run had only served to increase 
inflation without output benefits (Derbyshire and Derbyshire 1988). 
The Government embarked on a more conservative approach and started to have some success 
(Derbyshire and Derbyshire 1988). By early 1978, inflation was down to 10 per cent, but 
excessive pay claims started occurring again. Callaghan announced a new 5 per cent inflation 
goal without consulting his Cabinet, perhaps influenced by Helmut Schmidt. Cabinet waved it 
through, thinking that there would be an election soon (Callaghan 1987). However, Callaghan 
did not call the election until 1979. He believed that the economy would continue to improve 
and Foot and Healey supported him in this decision, although most observers were surprised 
(Derbyshire and Derbyshire 1988). 
Pressure for higher wages increased throughout 1978. Two senior union leaders (Jack Jones and 
Hugh Scanlon) retired, reducing the ability of the TUC to moderate wage claims. Cabinet agreed 
on 5 per cent pay rises in the middle of the year, but the TUC and the Confederation of British 
Industry would not formally commit to this goal, despite their informal support. In December, 
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pay demands escalated and Ford capitulated, giving its staff 17 per cent increases. Lorry drivers 
demanded up to 30 per cent and their union adopted it as an official dispute. Strikes occurred 
throughout the public sector including local government, with household refuse not being 
collected, rubbish building up in the streets, and (because gravediggers were on strike) 
newspaper reports about a build-up of unburied bodies. The so-called Winter of Discontent was 
very unpopular with the public and support for the unions and the government evaporated. The 
TUC did agree to moderate union demands, but a political turning point had occurred and the 
Government’s popularity was beyond repair (Callaghan 1987). Callaghan was forced into a May 
election when the devolution referenda went badly in Scotland and Wales. Scottish Nationalist 
MPs were frustrated and voted against the Government in a censure motion and the 1979 
election brought in Margaret Thatcher. 
Margaret Thatcher started her tenure in a difficult position because most of her Cabinet had 
voted for Ted Heath in 1975 and they were economic “wets.” However, the Winter of 
Discontent worked to her advantage because it gave her the evidence and political support to 
promote a tough economic policy (Evans 1997). One of her key tactics was to place loyal 
ministers in key economic portfolios (Derbyshire and Derbyshire 1988; Keegan 1984). During 
the 1970s, conservatives debated inflation and concluded that it represented a general malaise 
in society, in addition to its economic consequences, and that extreme measures were 
warranted in combatting it (Tomlinson 2012). Accordingly, Thatcher went to the election 
promising to cut inflation and curb union power (Derbyshire and Derbyshire 1988). 
Inflation initially surged because the Government increased VAT and carried out an election 
promise to implement the Clegg Commission’s recommendations on public sector pay 
(Derbyshire and Derbyshire 1988). But policy was consistently anti-inflationary from this point 
on. In 1980, the Government set money supply targets and introduced the Medium Term 
Financial Strategy, where the money supply was to be linked to public sector borrowing. The 
1981 Budget had steep cuts. This was an important political moment because it was a key test 
of the Government’s credibility and the wets folded (Derbyshire and Derbyshire 1988; 
Tomlinson 2012). By 1982, inflation was still high at 12 per cent, but it was starting to drop. This 
was not necessarily related to the money supply; the Government tended to miss its targets 
because it was dismantling much of the institutional framework. Rather, higher interest rates 
increased the value of the pound, producing cheaper imports and increasing unemployment, 
both of which reduced inflation (Tomlinson 2012; Hill 1982). 
111 
After implementing such extreme policies, the question was whether Thatcher would lose the 
next election. But in early 1982, she was not worried because the parties were even in the polls 
and she had the political momentum: inflation was dropping; productivity increasing; the 
Opposition was disorganised; and there were still two years to go to the next election 
(Derbyshire and Derbyshire 1988; Evans 1997). The Falklands War then intervened, giving her 
Government a further advantage. At the 1983 election, voters did not blame the Government 
for unemployment and Labour could not convince them that its programs would not reignite 
inflation, or that it could effectively address unemployment. Michael Foot was a poor leader 
and the Opposition were in disarray with the Labour Party still split by moderates and extremists 
despite the right leaving to create the Social Democratic Party (Derbyshire and Derbyshire 1988; 
Tomlinson 2012; Keegan 1984). Keegan (1984) also suggested that the Government was 
relentless in promoting its economic vision and managed to fool “enough of the people enough 
of the time”. However, the experience of the 1970s meant that the left had no credible 
economic policies. The Conservatives’ brand of politics suited the situation, supplemented with 
lessons learnt from the 1970s. 
The first postscript to the deflation was the decrease in union power and the reduced risk of 
wage pressure on inflation. Thatcher’s Government had restricted union powers with the 
Employment Acts of 1980 and 1982. The changes included restricting the definition of lawful 
picketing to the worker’s place of work, and making unions liable for damages for unlawful 
union action. The grand finale was the miners’ strike of 1984-85, where the National Union of 
Mineworkers was defeated.  
The second postscript comprised the later central bank reforms. Margaret Thatcher rejected 
her Chancellor’s proposal in 1988 for making the Bank of England more independent. She 
believed that inflation was a political problem and institutional change would not boost 
credibility. Lawson covered the issue in his resignation speech the next year and “The genie was 
out of the bottle” (Kynaston 2005; Wood 2005). 
The next major development was in 1992, when the UK was forced to withdraw from the 
European Exchange Rate Mechanism. Chancellor Norman Lamont raised CBI with the Prime 
Minister, John Major, who declined the proposal because CBI was a condition for entering the 
monetary union under the Maastricht Treaty and Eurosceptics within the Government would 
see increased CBI as a step towards that goal (King 2001). Instead, the Government announced 
an inflation target within the range of 1 to 4 per cent and invited the bank to publish a quarterly 
Inflation Report where it detailed its progress towards the target (Wood 2005). In 1994, the 
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Government announced that it would publish minutes of its monthly monetary policy meetings 
with the Bank (King 2001). 
Gordon Brown, as Shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer, faced a different set of problems. In 
particular, he needed to address perceptions that Labour was the party of financial instability, 
given previous crises in 1947, 1967, and 1976. Brown was introduced to CBI in 1992 by Ed Balls, 
who then worked at the Financial Times, but later became a senior Labour politician. Balls 
argued that CBI would give a Labour government anti-inflationary credibility and allow it to 
focus on fiscal and microeconomic policies. Balls and Brown followed this up with their own 
research, meeting central bankers in other countries and examining the legal arrangements that 
applied. From 1993, Brown flagged reform to the Bank of England, and in the 1997 Labour 
Manifesto this was expressed in terms of reforming the relationship between the Government 
and the Bank. Brown found the combination of CBI theory and political benefits to be persuasive 
(King 2001). 
Soon after its win in 1997, the new Labour Government announced that the Bank would set 
monetary policy independently of the Government through a monetary policy committee. 
Some commentators saw this as a “shrewd political move” to protect the new government 
against claims that it would not be able to manage the economy (Wood 2005, 395). 
Responsibility for debt management and banking supervision would be transferred to other 
agencies. As part of the reforms, the Governor would be required to write an open letter to the 
Chancellor if inflation strayed more than 1 per cent from the target and every three months 
after that. The target was initially 2.5 per cent, but later changed to 2 per cent. For the next 
decade, conditions were very stable and no letters were issued. However, from 2007 to 2012, 
the Governor wrote fourteen letters to the Chancellor (Bank of England, 2014; Bank of England 
website). 
Germany 
Establishment of the central bank 
Germany comprised a collection of States until its unification in 1871, and it was not until then 
that a central bank was permanently successful. Germany took a much more regulated 
approach than other countries for several reasons, including a view that full incorporation with 
limited liability was a privilege to be rationed, and a desire for greater economic integration 
between the German States. The discussion here focuses on Prussia because the Preuẞische 
Bank became the Reichsbank. Further, by 1870 the Prussian central bank had become the 
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dominant issuing bank, accounting for two thirds of the total banknotes in circulation (Tilly 
1994a; Tilly 1994b). 
In 1765, Frederick the Great established the Royal Bank of Berlin. Frederick preferred to make 
it a private joint stock bank, but could not raise the capital, and so it was created as a State 
bank. It enjoyed privileges, such as charities and courts being legally required to place their 
deposits with it, and it managed government funds. The Government also permitted it to 
suspend cash payments during the Napoleonic Wars. The Government reorganised it 
afterwards when Prussia’s loss of some Polish territory meant that the Bank had to write off 
significant assets. 
In 1833, a law was made prohibiting the issue of notes by banks, including the Royal Bank. The 
aim was to promote State paper money, which had started circulating in the Napoleonic Wars. 
There were also concerns that issuing banknotes could create monetary instability that would 
interfere with economic integration (Tilly 1994a). However, there arose a shortage of currency, 
particularly because gold was scarce. Silver was used instead, but this was heavy and 
impractical. Notes were sometimes sought at a premium. The Royal Bank was reconstituted in 
1846 as the Prussian Bank, partly backed by private capital. It had the power to issue notes, but 
was subject to limitations. These were a maximum note issue, a one third metal reserve for 
notes, and an interest rate limit of 6 per cent. 
These reforms did not meet the demand for notes and a movement sprang up in support of 
free banking. Some reforms were made in 1848, but they were marginal and had little effect. 
Neighbouring States allowed their banks to issue notes, and these started to circulate inside the 
Prussian border. In the 1850s the bank laws were further liberalised. This included granting the 
Prussian Bank unlimited rights of note issue. The Government also made the convenient 
arrangement that half of the State paper money would be commuted to interest-bearing State 
debt. 
The financial crisis of 1857 brought about a shift in policy away from free banking. The 6 per 
cent limit on interest rates was removed, as was the Prussian Bank’s ability to issue unlimited 
notes. The Bank itself behaved much like a central bank in a crisis, lending freely to reputable 
firms. Similar events unfolded in the 1866 financial crisis. The creation of the Norddeutscher 
Bund (a federation of twenty two north German States) in 1867 and the formation of the Reich 
in 1871 gave the final push to implementing a uniform monetary system.  
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The new bank issued a common currency based on the gold standard and the French indemnity 
from the Franco-Prussian War (1870-71) provided a ready source of reserves. However, the 
Germans were used to handling silver, which being heavy and difficult to transport, provided a 
practical barrier to currency flows. But once gold started to flow out of Germany in 1873, a scare 
arose that the gold would run out and Germany would go off gold.  
Germany revamped its banking legislation in 1875, following the provisions of the British Bank 
Act of 1844, but with more regulation. Thirty-three existing banks were nominated as note-
issuing banks nation-wide. No further banks could be so denominated, and if they renounced 
their right to issue notes, then it reverted to the Reichsbank. There was a legal maximum on the 
fiduciary issue of these banks and the Reichsbank, and a reserve requirement of one third of 
their total note issue. Banks could issue notes and avoid these requirements, but only if they 
operated in their home State.  
Germany now had a modern central bank and a new currency, the Goldmark. However, its links 
with the government were very close. The Chancellor was the Chair of the Reichsbank’s 
supreme board. The Reichsbank’s directorate, who comprised its day to day managers, were 
required to follow the Chancellor’s instructions (Marsh 1992). 
Initially there were few government interventions because adhering to the gold standard 
ensured a prudent approach. However, once the threat of war became apparent around 1910, 
the Reichsbank’s methods changed. It converted its foreign reserves to bullion. It also assisted 
with legislative changes to suspend the convertibility of gold and to be able to print more paper 
money. The original requirement was that one third of paper currency be backed by gold. The 
new provision was that the Reichsbank could set up loan offices (supplementary branches) that 
could issue loans. These were backed by collateral and paid out in loan office notes. If the 
Reichsbank held these notes, they could be counted as gold reserves for the purpose of backing 
the Goldmark (Marsh 1992). 
Germany used the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-71 as the financial template for World War I. It 
expected that it would be able to be in a position to charge its enemies for the cost of the war. 
However, the War was much longer and more costly than its predecessor. Further, Germany 
sought to finance the War through bond issues, rather than taxes, leading to a trebling of prices 
by 1918. From this point on, the Reichsbank occasionally raised the issue of monetary stability 
with the government of the day, but it rarely took a stand and rarely raised the issue publicly. 
The hyperinflations of the 1920s can be traced back to the Reichsbank’s wartime practices 
(Marsh 1992).  
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Germany’s first post-war central bank was the Bank deutsches Lander (BdL), established by the 
Allied founding law in 1948. It was largely based on the American Federal Reserve; operations 
were conducted by the Lander Banks and the policy committee mainly comprised the Presidents 
of the Lander Banks. Only two members of the policy committee came from the BdL, and they 
were elected by the Lander Bank Presidents. Its decisions were subject to the Allied Banking 
Commission until the Transformation Law of 1951. 
The Transformation Law say other changes for the BdL. For example, it became legally 
independent with the single goal of price stability (Berger 1997). There was some debate over 
whether it should be brought under government control, but the Lander did not want to lose 
the seigniorage profits they received from the bank’s operations (and which would normally go 
to a national government). Therefore, the bank remained independent but the Government 
received 20 per cent of seigniorage profits. The BdL was required to support government policy 
“within its duties,” that is, subject to its main goal of price stability. The Government could also 
suspend a BdL decision for eight days, but apart from this, the legal framework was much the 
same as before (Berger and de Haan 1999).  
The German Basic Law required that a new, permanent law be passed for the central bank. After 
much deliberation, this was addressed in 1957. There were three key issues. The first was the 
extent of centralisation, given the BdL was very decentralised. The compromise was to partly 
increase centralisation; there was a single bank with the Government holding its capital and the 
Lander appointing a representative each to the policy committee. The Government could make 
some of its own appointments as well, but there was a small majority in favour of the Lander 
appointees. The second issue was independence; the new bank would remain largely 
independent, with some ability for the Government to give instructions. Lastly, it was created 
as a public body, rather than private (Stern 1999). Erhard was the main supporter of the bank’s 
independence within the Government (Marsh 1992; Stern 1999). The bank’s role was to 
safeguard the currency, but it was also expected to follow the Government’s general economic 
direction. No guidance was given as to which had priority, so it was determined by politics. 
The Great Inflation 
Germany’s context was different again. Following World War II, its ruined economy had 
descended into a barter system. Two major reforms were implemented in June 1948 in the 
Bizone: the Allies abolished the discredited Reichsmark and replaced it with the Deutsche mark 
(DM), which was quickly adopted; and Ludwig Erhard, as Economics Director, started to remove 
price controls, albeit against Allied advice. Around this time, Konrad Adenauer was looking to 
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form a right wing party that would govern without the socialists (SPD), who at the time 
supported a planned economy. Such grand coalitions were common at the Lander level. Erhard 
was just the person Adenauer was looking for because his free market policies were too 
extreme for the socialists, and if his policies succeeded, then he would be popular, and an asset 
to whichever party he joined. Events followed just this course. By early 1949, after a difficult 
transition period, Erhard’s reforms were clearly successful. He joined the Christian Democratic 
Union (CDU) with a minimum of formality, and became Economics Minister in a CDU 
Government that formed a coalition with the liberals, the FDP. By 1959, the CDU’s economic 
policies were so successful that the SPD largely adopted them at its conference in Bad 
Godesberg (Nicholls 1994). Adenauer’s political machinations delivered long run economic 
benefits for Germany. 
Germany’s economic recovery after World War II was based on an undervalued currency, which 
facilitated growth through exports. This process had run its course by the late 1970s, but until 
then it allowed Germany to rebuild its economy. The difficulty with this approach was that it 
put upward pressure on the DM and Germany faced several revaluation crises, especially during 
the fixed exchange rate period under Bretton-Woods. Indeed, the Bank Deutsches Lander (BdL) 
and the Bundesbank spent a lot of their time directing monetary policy to managing Germany’s 
external position, instead of domestic price stability, and imported inflation as a result 
(Holtfrerich 1999). The CDU tended to oppose revaluation because it harmed the interests of 
its industrial, exporting base. The SPD tended not to have a typical position, and the BdL and 
Bundesbank tended to support the stability of the currency, although positions changed over 
time and often depended on which individual filled a key position. Ultimately, the DM was 
floated from March 1973. 
The other context issue is labour relations. German unions are known for being compliant and 
they have been attributed as contributing to Germany’s economic success (Medley 1982). They 
have an important role in economic negotiations, but the level of conflict they incite is low. For 
example, in 1967, the Economics Minister scolded the unions for not demanding a large enough 
pay rise so as to help Germany recover from recession (Medley 1982). Reasons advanced for 
this are that workers enjoyed the benefits of much of Germany’s post-war growth (Kreile 1977) 
and they have been given some responsibility through codetermination laws, where they have 
seats on the boards of larger companies (Nicholls 1994). 
There were several inflation crises after World War II. A preliminary encounter was in October 
1950, when the BdL raised interest rates to allow Germany to meet its external debt 
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requirements under the European Payments Union, part of the Marshall Plan. Although it had 
some of the hallmarks of an inflation crisis, including Adenauer summoning the policy 
committee to meet with him before it made a decision, it did not form an inflation precedent 
because it focussed on the balance of payments. Further, the BdL was technically under the 
supervision of the Allied Banking Commission, although by this time the Commission no longer 
had much influence (Marsh 1992). With some support from Erhard, the BdL increased rates by 
2 per cent (Berger 1997). 
The first inflation crisis came in 1955-56. The German economy had been booming since the 
middle of 1954 and the BdL started its tightening cycle in August 1955, raising the discount rate 
from 3 to 3.5 per cent. The BdL stated that this was a “warning” and also critiqued the 
Government’s fiscal policy. Neumann (1999) argues that the BdL’s actions were too little too 
late and economic policy generally followed a similar pattern. The Government introduced 
some weak stabilisation packages and the BdL postponed interest rate increases. In November, 
Adenauer wrote to Vocke, the President of the BdL, and warned him against any incisive 
changes in policy without consulting the Government. Vocke responded by stating that 
monetary policy was the preserve of the BdL (Neumann 1999). 
By the end of 1955, the BdL had formed an informal coalition with Erhard and Fritz Schaffer, the 
Finance Minister, to pursue tighter money. Erhard sought lower inflation and Schaffer wanted 
to preserve funds saved for German rearmament for that purpose, rather than have them 
diverted to pre-election spending. On 25 January 1956, the BdL narrowly voted against 
increasing the discount rate, and it then invited Erhard and Schaffer to its next meeting, 
scheduled for 15 February. However, ice on the rails precluded them travelling to the meeting 
and it was postponed to the 22nd. But on this day, Erhard was in the UK and Schaffer suggested 
by phone that the BdL delay the decision until he returned. The meeting finally occurred on 7 
March, but by this time Adenauer was involved, and he directed his Ministers to inform the BdL 
that the Government would exercise its suspensory veto. However, Erhard and Schaffer 
suggested to the BdL that Schaffer’s phone call of 22 February could be regarded as the 
suspensory veto, which only lasted for eight days, and so the BdL increased rates from 3.5 to 
4.5 per cent. The BdL formed a political alliance with two senior ministers and was able to invoke 
their authority for increasing rates. 
In March, Adenauer wrote to Erhard, criticising him for not coordinating policy with the BdL and 
Schaffer. These comments did not make a great deal of sense, and are probably more a 
reflection of Adenauer’s frustration. In April, unknown to Adenauer, Erhard set up a 
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Stabilisation Policy Council comprising himself, Vocke and Schaffer. In early May they met and 
agreed on increasing interest rates, cutting import tariffs, and reducing government spending. 
They announced the policies and stated that they would regularly meet again in future. On 16 
May, Adenauer publicly responded by condemning the policies and stating that the meetings 
would not take place again (Mierzejewski 2004). On 17 May, Erhard and Schaffer surprised 
Adenauer by submitting a new stabilisation program to Cabinet, and on the 18th, they joined 
the meeting of the BdL policy committee where it put rates up by 1 per cent. Erhard and Schaffer 
were pushing their luck and the crisis reached its climax. On 23 May, Adenauer gave a speech 
in Cologne, which was attended by the leadership of the BDI, the German industry body. He 
publicly criticised the BdL, Erhard and Schaffer, stating that rates were too high and that it was 
hurting industry. The next day, Adenauer and Erhard had an argument in Cabinet and Erhard 
offered to resign, but Erhard’s importance to the government meant that Adenauer did not 
accept it (Mierzejewski 2004). Public support swung behind the BdL and Adenauer was widely 
criticised. No government has criticised the German central bank so strongly since then and 
Adenauer did not intervene in economic matters again (Prittie 1972). The political lesson was 
clear; the German public supported the central bank’s actions to control inflation. 
The next key inflation event revolved around the first oil price shock. In the early 1970s, the 
SPD’s increased spending programs led to inflationary pressures. The Stability and Growth Act 
of 1967, which gave the Government the power to implement short term fiscal measures, did 
not provide price stability because it did not cover wages. Employers were happy to pay higher 
wages because they believed they could recoup the higher costs through higher prices. The 
Bundesbank was limited in the extent to which it could control inflation because it was 
constrained by supporting fixed exchange rates and increasing interest rates often led to large 
capital inflows (Kitterer 1999; Medley 1982; von Hagen 1999). The Bundesbank did initiate tight 
money in 1970, but after this point it lost control of the money supply (von Hagen 1999). 
In January 1973, Willy Brandt announced that monetary policy would be the main means of 
achieving price stability. The Government complemented this in March 1973, when it floated 
the DM, allowing monetary policy to focus on domestic inflation. In April, the Bundesbank 
advised the Government that it should tighten policy to restrict inflation, and the Government 
agreed and stated that the Bundesbank should do everything possible to prevent inflation (von 
Hagen 1999). Interest rates started increasing and, in May, the Government announced tighter 
fiscal measures (Nelson 2007). By December, there were signs that the economy was stabilising, 
but the oil price shock put policy makers in a dilemma in terms of which way economic policy 
should go. A dual strategy was adopted, with the Government announcing that it would relax 
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fiscal policy, and the Bundesbank announcing that it would maintain a tight monetary policy 
(Medley 1982). The aim was that monetary policy would control inflation, while looser fiscal 
policy would address the supply shock of oil prices. Broadly, this is what eventuated (Gibson 
1982; Goodman 1992). 
The crisis might have subsided here, except that Germany’s normally cooperative unions 
pushed for high pay increases. Brandt made a televised statement that wage settlements over 
10 per cent were not feasible, but it carried little weight, partly because he also stated that he 
did not want to risk unemployment (Kloten 1985). Public employees went on strike and local 
governments quickly gave large settlements. Brandt had no choice but to follow with federal 
employees, which made him appear soft (Marshall 1990). On 11 March 1974, Karl Klasen, head 
of the Bundesbank, and Helmut Schmidt, as Finance Minister, made a joint statement in a 
Bundesbank press release that inflation would not reach 10 per cent (Kloten 1985). This gave 
the Bundesbank similar political protection to that the BdL received from Schaffer and Erhard 
in 1956. 
In fact, annual inflation had reached its peak at this point (Nelson 2007). The Bundesbank stated 
that it would not accommodate the oil price shock as it was a one-off structural adjustment and 
business would have to endure a profits squeeze (Medley 1082; Nelson 2007). Real wages 
increased because inflation was less than what the unions expected; unemployment increased 
and some workers were put on reduced time (Medley 1982). The recession bottomed out in 
1975 and the economy started to recover in 1976 (Kitterer 1999). The impact of the crisis was 
lessened because Germany had strong demand for its exports; OPEC countries had extra income 
to spend, and other developed countries ran much more expansionary policies in response to 
the oil price shock (Goodman 1992). 
From March 1973, the Bundesbank had a strong internal focus on the money supply. In late 
1974, the Council of Economic Experts proposed that the Bundesbank should announce money 
growth targets to prevent erroneous expectations destabilising the economy, such as what 
happened with union wage demands that year (von Hagen 1999; Kloten 1985). Schmidt was a 
strong supporter of the proposal and it became a central feature of monetary policy thereafter 
(Goodman 1992). 
The final inflation crisis revolved around the second oil price shock. In the late 1970s, both fiscal 
policy and monetary policy were too loose. In 1977, Germany came under pressure from other 
countries to become an engine of growth for the world economy. Initially Schmidt refused, but 
by 1978 he began to support it because domestic unemployment was high and inflation low. 
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After some poor election results in the summer of 1978, the FDP agreed. The Bundesbank 
acquiesced because the policy was popular, the bank was legally required to support 
government policy, and the policy had some internal support within the bank as well. At this 
time, monetary policy was focussed on supporting the US dollar, which increased the money 
supply (Goodman 1992). 
The Bundesbank began tightening policy in January 1979. Manfred Lahnstein, then the state 
secretary in the Finance Ministry, attended the meeting and argued against tighter policy, 
without success. He criticised the Bundesbank in a post-meeting press conference, and was 
then himself criticised in the media and by Lambsdorff, the FDP’s Economics Minister (Goodman 
1992). This is similar to Adenauer’s criticisms Adenauer in 1956, and it delivered a similar 
political response of support for the central bank in controlling inflation. 
By the middle of 1979, the second oil shock had commenced and placed Germany in a much 
more difficult position than the first oil shock. An export strategy was not open because many 
other countries were themselves deflating, reducing demand. Oil exporters had already 
purchased capital goods during the first shock and did not need to repeat it (Goodman 1992). 
Fiscal policy was already expansionary, and then in early 1980 the Government introduced a 
large stimulus package of tax cuts (Goodman 1992). The one positive during this crisis was that 
the unions had learnt the effects of badly-timed wage increases from 1974 and moderated their 
demands (Kloten 1985). Throughout 1980, the Bundesbank kept rates high, partly to support 
the DM in international markets. However, by framing monetary policy around the exchange 
rate, it weakened the case for keeping rates high to manage inflation (Baltensperger 1999).  
The national elections were held later in 1980 and the SPD retained office, partly because of 
Schmidt’s popularity and partly because the conservative parties selected a divisive figure, 
Franz Josef Strauss, as their candidate. But it was also clear that the governing coalition between 
the SPD and FDP was not going to last as their policy differences were becoming marked after 
more than a decade together (Derbyshire 1987). Growth in welfare programs and stimulus 
packages contributed to an increased deficit and the question of how to control the deficit 
became the key political issue. Schmidt was sympathetic to controlling the deficit, but he was 
unable to obtain party support for it because he was not party Chairman and the left of the SPD 
had become stronger after the 1980 elections (Derbyshire 1987; Bering 1999). As 1981 
progressed, the Bundesbank tightened policy with greater focus on inflation. It also argued that 
the Government should repair the deficit, despite Schmidt's strong private criticisms about 
monetary policy. Further, the SPD became politically outflanked; the FDP started to echo the 
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Bundesbank's criticisms of the deficit and President Carstens (CDU) supported the Bundesbank 
by stating that inflation would be good for no-one (Kennedy 1991). The coalition ended in 
September 1982 when Economics Minister Lambsdorff submitted an economic policy paper 
which Schmidt could not tolerate. The political process enabled Kohl to become Chancellor, 
whereupon he started to repair the deficit. The Bundesbank reciprocated by cutting interest 
rates, pausing for the March 1983 elections (Goodman 1992). 
Analysis  
Before embarking on the process tracing, it is worth summarising the development of the three 
central banks. Certainly, the management of State finance played an important part and 
financing war prompted innovation. Wartime and other shocks placed existing constraints 
under pressure, sometimes rendering them meaningless. In the context of central bank 
independence, the example of the UK provides the interesting case study of a government 
overriding a constraint, namely the limit on the fiduciary issue, with the consent of the general 
public. The constraint was only binding if it had public support. The early central banks in the 
US enforced the useful liquidity constraint of requiring banknotes to be returned to these banks. 
However, this was unpopular with them and the central banks did not have their charters 
renewed. This resulted in financial and monetary instability for much of the nineteenth century.  
Extending this to current central bank theory, CBI will only work if it too has public support. 
Current theories do not take public support into account. 
It is also worth summarising the three case studies. In the United States, Presidents took on the 
inflation fighting role for much of the 1970s, but they never did it with much conviction. 
Although it is easy to be dismissive of their efforts, they did not have much support for it, from 
either the public or Congress, so their lack of success is unsurprising. The situation changed in 
the late 1970s when the dollar lost confidence in international markets, leading to the 
appointment of Paul Volcker at the Fed. He has able to finish the job under Reagan, who gave 
him the minimum political support necessary, while boosting his own political standing with tax 
cuts. The fact that it made Volcker’s job harder was for him to manage.  
In the United Kingdom, the central bank was only a bit-player and austerity policies in the 1960s 
and 1970s were driven by attempts to support the overvalued pound in international markets, 
rather than price stability. Addressing inflation in the UK required the additional step of 
reducing the militancy of the unions, which Thatcher was happy to do. The main task of breaking 
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expectations was achieved through tight monetary and fiscal policy. One reason for Thatcher’s 
success was that all other “reasonable” measures had been tried and failed. 
In Germany, the central bank built and made use of coalitions for its actions from the start. In 
its first crisis in 1956, it would not start tightening policy until it could do so in the presence of 
Adenauer’s two senior economics ministers. The victory was complete when Adenauer’s 
criticism of the bank was crushed by the German media and community. In 1973 and 1974, the 
central bank had the support of the Government. In the early 1980s, it had the support of the 
public and all parties, except the main government party, the SPD. The coalition’s days were 
numbered, and the bank was able to exploit this, intentionally or otherwise, when increasing 
rates. Berger and de Haan’s point about the bank being a “skilful player” is well made (1999, 
36). 
In all three cases, inflationary expectations were being brought back under control within 10 
years of the collapse of Bretton Woods. 
In terms of process tracing, CBI theory can explain much of what occurred. Consistent with 
Rogoff (1985), inflation was lowest in Germany and highest in the UK, inversely proportional to 
their levels of CBI. Consistent with Lohmann (1992), the Bundesbank refused to accommodate 
the first oil shock. This led to a short adjustment period whereupon the economy was much 
more stable than in other countries. Consistent with Walsh (1995), the UK enjoyed considerable 
stability between 1997 and 2007 under the enhanced CBI regime, although the bank was less 
able to maintain stability during the supply shock of the Global Financial Crisis. Its performance 
was similar to that of the Federal Reserve. 
However, the politics theory can explain this and more. In Germany, political support for stable 
money, and stability in general, has been strong since the hyperinflations and the currency 
reforms after World War II, and the central bank has utilised this during crises. This can explain 
why Germany had low inflation and did not accommodate the oil price shock. It can also explain 
why Helmut Schmidt put out a joint press release with the Bundesbank in early 1974, 
announcing that inflation would not reach 10 per cent. There was no similar event in the US. 
Finally, it can also explain why a legally independent bank like the BdL/Bundesbank was so 
attentive to either building, or taking advantage of, political coalitions and support for its 
actions. 
The politics theory It can also explain the timing of the disinflation of the UK; Thatcher came to 
power with a mandate to cut inflation and curb union power. The reforms to the Bank of 
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England in 1997 have also been put down to political forces. It is also a component in explaining 
the US disinflation; Volcker was appointed to settle the international markets, but he received 
some support from Reagan and was subject to less pressure from this President than previous 
Fed chairs were. Similar to Germany in 1956, Carter was himself criticised for criticising the Fed’s 
disinflation in 1980. Burns (1979) and Volcker (1990) both thought that public opinion was 
important. The politics theory is more powerful than CBI theory because the latter could only 
explain variation across the three countries, whereas the politics theory can also explain 
variation over time for each country. 
The evidence in the study also suggests two new theories about the Great Inflation. The first is 
that class division exacerbated inflation problems; inflation was much worse in the UK and 
Morgan (1990) noted that class division was often a barrier to progress. Class division would 
encourage loose fiscal policy because governments would have a higher incentive to reward 
their base before the other side of politics won power and did the same for their constituents. 
This is related to Bernhard’s (1998) paper on the causes of CBI in developed nations in the 1970s 
and 1980s. He argued that higher class voting was correlated with lower CBI because CBI would 
interfere with a government’s ability to reward the base. Higher class voting meant that 
rewarding the base would be more important to the political parties. Bernhard’s broader theory 
was that diffusion of power structures would be correlated with higher CBI. 
The second theory is the reverse of the CBI theory. Where a developed country had a legally 
independent central bank, the disinflation would almost certainly be conducted by the central 
bank. Conversely, where the central bank was not legally independent, the disinflation would 
be carried out by politicians, perhaps even more thoroughly and completely. The first reason 
for this is that a politician could adopt the Reagan strategy; let the central bank do the difficult 
work and be criticised at the time, but then the politician can take credit themselves for 
reducing inflation afterwards. Another possible reason is that, as demonstrated by Bernhard 
(1998), high levels of CBI were correlated with strong bicameralism. This was based on his 
diffusion of power theory; a powerful upper house, that had an opposition or mixed majority, 
would seek to remove government control of a central bank to prevent the government of the 
day using the bank for its own purposes. But, simultaneously, strong bicameralism would make 
it more difficult for a government to disinflate through fiscal policy because such policies are 
contentious. In other words, strong bicameralism can have a blocking effect, rather than being 
inherently anti-inflationary. The result would be that legally independent central banks were 
seen to be conducting the disinflations, adding to the perception that CBI brought about low 
inflation. But observers may have only been watching the outcome of political forces. It may be 
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that researchers since 1985 have developed a theory to explain what they saw, rather than 
what was causing it. 
Conclusion 
Regression analysis is a powerful tool, but its effective use depends on meeting some 
assumptions. One important assumption is that all important variables should be included. This 
paper has suggested that some important variables in the research on CBI have been omitted, 
particularly in relation to political dynamics. 
Researchers like to ensure that they have included all relevant variables in their analysis, but 
this task is almost limitless. There are dozens of potentially important variables to the 
researcher, especially in studies across nations. Some of these variables will need to be created 
from scratch. How should a researcher proceed? This paper suggests that a comparative case 
study can help. By setting out the detail and timeline of events, patterns can emerge that point 
a researcher to priority areas. An important caveat is that the researcher should not select on 
the dependent variable. In this study, therefore, countries were selected that had low, medium 
and high inflation rates. Selecting only countries that had low inflation rates would have 
increased the risk of simply confirming CBI theory, rather than challenging it. 
Of course, a comparative case study such as this lacks the breadth of a regression analysis with 
a large number of observations. It would be premature to say that CBI theory has been falsified. 
However, this paper gives us new ideas about how to test an accepted theory and gives us the 
potential of developing a stronger one. 
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5 – Is there an economic vote for 
inflation? 
Abstract 
The recent literature on the economic vote has drifted away from inflation. It has instead 
focussed on voter perceptions of the economy, unemployment and GDP growth. 
This paper divides elections in developed countries into four categories, depending on two 
criteria: whether voters have clarity of responsibility (i.e. no government coalition) and whether 
the grammar of the country’s main language specifically indicates the future tense. Research 
has indicated that, where a person’s language does not do this, they make longer term 
decisions. This is termed weak future time reference. 
The paper finds evidence for an economic vote based on benchmarked inflation (a comparison 
against the performance of other countries), but only for countries that show clarity of 
responsibility and weak future time reference. It also suggests that voting studies for developed 
countries should divide elections into the four categories due to the substantial differences 
across them for certain variables. 
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Introduction 
The idea that the economy influences voting has produced a substantial literature. Hellwig 
(2001, 1141) has described the economic vote as “one of the more successful research 
programs in the field of mass political behaviour.” Hellwig (2010) also notes that 75 per cent of 
voters who believe that the economy has got worse will vote against the government. 
Politicians corroborate this perception by debating the economy. 
The economic vote has not always been seen as a robust feature of elections. In 1991, Paldam 
accepted that there was an economic vote, but that it was “sadly lacking in stability” (9). Paldam 
suggested that there was possibly an omitted variable, the need for a reformulation, or “one 
little trick” that could explain the results. Powell and Whitten (1993) largely addressed this 
through their concept of clarity of responsibility. If a government included coalition partners for 
example, then it would make less sense to blame it for a bad economy. Similar factors would be 
opposition control of a second legislative chamber and a minority government. 
The other key advance in the economic vote has been to focus on voter perceptions of the 
economy, rather than the economy itself. This approach has a number of advantages. Firstly, it 
helps reduce the chances that the analysis is picking up on a third, unknown confounding 
variable (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2013). Secondly, it is generally accepted that it delivers a 
better fit (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier; Sanders 2000; Tverdova 2007). If the basic mechanism of 
the economic vote is that the economy affects voter perceptions, which then feeds to the vote 
(Sanders), then using economic perceptions will reduce measurement error. Thirdly, economic 
perceptions (unlike the economy) can vary across voters at a single point in time. Therefore, 
analysis can be undertaken at a single election, meaning that a large number of elections and/or 
surveys are not required. 
These two advances have been criticised, however. The problem with voter perceptions is that 
it can be influenced by a voter’s own party orientation, i.e. it is an endogenous variable. Wlezien 
et al (1997) re-examined Lewis-Beck’s results for Britain, France, Germany and Italy (1988) and 
found that partisanship did influence economic perceptions. Once endogeneity was taken into 
account, prospective economic voting almost disappeared. Retrospective economic voting was 
greatly reduced, although there was still some evidence for it. Nadeau et al (2002) suggested 
that the effect size of the economic vote is not large and Evans and Andersen (2006) used this 
concept to argue that the effect of the economic vote is overstated. Certainly, its effect size is 
no greater than political variables (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2013; Sanders 2003) and 
individual-level variables strongly drive economic perceptions (Duch et al 2000).  
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Despite these concerns, individual economic perceptions appear to be a valid way of 
investigating the economic vote. Niemi et al (1999) and Sanders (2000) argue that voters have 
enough knowledge of the economy to be able to deliver an economic vote. Paldam and 
Nannestad (2000) found that election campaigns inform voters, meaning that they are better 
informed when it counts. Duch and Stevenson (2010b) also confirmed an economic vote at the 
individual level. So while the economic vote may not be large once methodological concerns 
are addressed, it is relevant at the survey level. 
Anderson (2007) has criticised the literature for being so dependent on clarity of responsibility. 
He argued that the literature should be broader and that good government can extend beyond 
accountability to other concepts, such as responsiveness. Certainly, the literature has found a 
wide variety of clarity of responsibility variables, and other conditioning approaches. For 
example, Pacek and Radcliff (1995) found that the economic vote was reduced if there was a 
strong welfare system to cushion economic shocks; Palmer and Whitten (1999) found that 
unexpected variation in economic variables were strongly correlated with the vote; Anderson 
(2000) found that a larger governing party and a large number of small opposition parties were 
good alternative indicators of clarity of responsibility; Hellwig (2001 and 2008) and Duch and 
Stevenson (2010a) found that increased exposure to world trade reduced clarity of 
responsibility; Ebeid and Rodden (2006) found that clarity of responsibility decreased in US 
states that had more primary industry (due to its inherent volatility); and Kayser and Peress 
(2012) found that the media “pre-benchmarked” national economic growth for voters so that 
they would compare their nation’s growth performance against international standards. 
Samuels (2004) took a slightly different approach and focussed on presidential electoral 
systems, which have separate elections for the legislature and the executive. He inquired 
whether the occurrence of these elections (apart or together) affected the economic vote. If 
they were together, he found a large economic vote in the presidential election and a small 
economic vote in the legislative election. If they were apart, he found a small economic vote for 
the legislature. Hellwig and Samuels (2007) expanded this analysis to cover presidential, semi-
presidential, and parliamentary systems. They confirmed that there is an economic vote in 
presidential systems for both the presidential and legislative elections when they are held 
together. In semi-presidential systems, they found an economic vote for the president under 
unified government, and for the legislature under cohabitation. In parliamentary systems, they 
found an economic vote in high clarity cases only. 
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The literature on clarity of responsibility is more concerning, because it has not settled on a 
particular formulation. There have been a range of conditioning variables put forward, all of 
which appear plausible, and all of which have some evidence to back them up. One way of 
viewing the complexity of the literature is to take a broader view, as suggested in Anderson 
(2007). At an election, voters face a myriad of issues that they can give varying priority. An initial 
question is whether any issue is so fundamental that it is relevant in all elections, regardless of 
the institutional arrangements. The research into clarity of responsibility suggests that this is 
not the case for the economic vote. The literature to date has focussed on some of the political 
context and institutional arrangements as to whether an economic vote exists. What it has 
rarely examined is the effect of competing issues (such as a war), and whether voters in 
different countries have a different appetite for economic outcomes or prefer other policy 
outcomes more highly. This paper will take a new approach to the preferences idea, in particular 
to how voters discount the future. The approach is discussed in the hypotheses section below. 
Another important aspect of the literature is how to define “the economy”. The economic vote 
literature grew in the 1970s, at the same time as stagflation and the oil price shocks. With 
governments losing control of inflation, this variable was occasionally included in studies, along 
with unemployment and economic growth. But the growth of election surveys and the greater 
number of questions included in them meant that researchers had the opportunity to take a 
more sophisticated approach and use voter perceptions of the economy as the key variable. 
Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2000) state that the shift to voter perceptions in US studies occurred 
before researchers developed a view on the appropriate economic variables. 
Studies that showed an inflation effect include Norpoth (1984) and Beck (1991) on US 
presidential popularity, Lafay (1985) on French presidential popularity, Fiorina’s book on US 
national elections in the 1970s (1981), the study by Niemi et al (1999) on the US states, Jordahl’s 
study on Swedish voting intentions (2006), and the multi-country studies of Powell and Whitten 
(1993), Palmer and Whitten (1999), and Chappell and Veiga (2000). Norpoth cites further 
papers. 
It would be fair to say, however, that voters’ knowledge of inflation is less accurate than their 
knowledge of the real economy. In a survey study during the 1992 US presidential election, 
Holbrook and Garand (1996) found that 36 per cent of voters in Milwaukee County were 
accurate within a 2 per cent band in relation to unemployment, but only 24 per cent were 
similarly accurate about inflation. Krause and Granato (1998) found that only high education 
groups in the US could accurately predict inflation. Paldam and Nannestad (2000) found that 
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voters’ knowledge of inflation in Denmark was only borderline. At the theoretical level, a 
reduced focus by voters on inflation is not surprising. Almost everyone benefits from economic 
growth and/or full employment. The few exceptions would be debt collectors and insolvency 
firms. But the effects of inflation are felt more unevenly, and partly depend on whether the 
individual is a saver or borrower. The financial sector is averse to inflation, to the extent that 
the bank presidents on the Federal Open Markets Committee at the US Federal Reserve are 
known for consistently voting for tighter monetary policy (Belden 1989). Savers lose out to 
inflation, especially when it is unexpected and interest rates are slow to adjust. Under these 
circumstances, borrowers can benefit. 
More recent papers rarely include inflation or price stability and focus instead on 
unemployment and/or growth (for example, Kayser and Peress 2012). Similarly, a recent 
literature review on the economic vote notes a lack of evidence for an inflation effect and 
concludes that the relevant economic variables are unemployment and growth (Lewis-Beck and 
Stegmaier 2013, 376). 
The graceful exit of inflation from the economic vote literature raises a puzzle; if inflation was 
relevant to earlier studies, why isn’t it relevant now? There are several possible explanations. 
One is that there has been a change in voters’ preferences; Norpoth (1984) noted that early 
studies had data issues in that politicians protected employment levels at the cost of higher 
inflation. Many countries did the reverse in the 1980s. Another possible explanation is that the 
inflation effect is exponential rather than linear. The goal of this study is to re-examine the 
elections in developed countries to determine whether there is an economic vote for inflation, 
and under which conditions. 
Hypotheses 
In order to examine whether there is an economic vote for inflation, the paper will test three 
hypotheses. The first relates to clarity of responsibility. This paper takes an approach consistent 
with Powell and Whitten (1993) which proposed that clarity of responsibility was an example 
of the way that voters used context in their judgements about a government. So if a government 
was excluded from implementing its policies by various political or institutional factors, then 
voters would neither reward it for good economic performance, nor punish it for poor 
performance. Examples of factors that would reduce clarity of responsibility would be whether 
opposition legislators were committee chairs, if there was weak party cohesion in voting, and if 
there was a minority government. Anderson (2000) found that clarity of responsibility was also 
stronger for a larger governing party and for a smaller number of alternative parties. 
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Clarity of responsibility will be incorporated into this paper through the following hypothesis: 
H1: Clarity of responsibility at an election is a necessary condition for an 
economic vote. 
The second hypothesis relates to future time reference, which is the extent to which a 
language’s grammar differentiates between the present and future tenses. An example of a 
language with strong future time reference is English, where the future tense is often marked 
by “will” as in “It will rain tomorrow.” The common counter-example is German, which relies 
more on context to indicate the future. A literal translation of the above sentence from German 
is “It rains tomorrow.” The concept is that a speaker of a language with weak future time 
reference will discount the future less and make longer term decisions. 
The general idea that language structure affects decisions is called “linguistic relativity.” It has 
been the subject of much debate among linguists, but evidence since the 1990s supports it 
(Wolff and Holmes 2011). Chen (2013) demonstrated that individuals who speak languages with 
weak future time reference make better health decisions, save more, and are wealthier when 
they retire. Perez and Tavits (2017) showed that bilingual speakers of Russian and Estonian 
(languages with strong and weak future time reference respectively) were more likely to 
support a tax increase to fund long term environmental programs when asked the question in 
Estonian. 
This research can plausibly be extended to whether voters might take inflation into account. 
Inflation increases instability which compromises people’s ability to make long term decisions. 
This could be of more concern to people whose language treats the present and future similarly. 
In other words, they have a stronger preference for price stability. This leads to the following 
hypothesis: 
H2: Weak future time reference is a necessary condition for an economic 
vote on inflation. 
The obvious way of operationalising these hypotheses would be to create four categories of 
elections based on the two sets of divisions. However, to do so implies that it provides a 
worthwhile gain, or in other words, elections across the categories are sufficiently different. 
The fact that politics and economics work differently in developed and undeveloped countries 
is well known (e.g. Gasiorowski 2000). The question here is whether there are further 
differences across developed countries. The final hypothesis is: 
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H3: The heterogeneity of elections across the categories (defined by clarity 
of responsibility and future time reference) is sufficient that each of the 
four categories is the appropriate level of study, rather than the aggregate. 
Data 
For its economic aspect, this paper uses economic variables, rather than economic perceptions. 
This is because voter surveys were not widely undertaken in the 1970s, the period that had the 
highest inflation. The dependent variable is the vote share of the main incumbent government 
party. This is the data used in Kayser and Peress (2012) and is sourced from Professor Kayser’s 
website. An important independent variable is the vote share of the same party in the previous 
election, also used in Kayser and Peress. The data is for twenty two countries, in most cases 
from the late 1940s to 2009.1 
Data on unemployment is sourced from the World Economic Outlook, published by the 
International Monetary Fund. This data commences in 1980. Data from 1955 for sixteen 
countries is sourced from Layard et al (1991). Data for real per capita economic growth was 
obtained from the Penn World Tables (Feenstra et al, 2015). Inflation data was sourced from 
International Financial Statistics, published by the International Monetary Fund. Inflation was 
not measured as the percentage change in the consumer price index over the previous year. 
Rather, it was measured as the natural log of the ratio between the consumer price index (CPI) 
of the current year and the previous year. Similarly to Kayser and Peress (2012), I used the 
weighted average of the election year’s economic variable and the previous year’s variable, 
depending on when the election occurred. Adjustments were made when there was less than 
a year between elections. 
Kayser and Peress (2012) used a benchmarking technique. In that paper, the authors argued 
that voters use other economies as a reference point for their own economy. For example, if a 
country’s growth is 1 per cent (which might be considered low), but other countries have -1 per 
cent growth, then comparatively that country is doing well with 2 per cent in benchmarked 
growth. This was the key innovation in Kayser and Peress and they found a robust positive 
                                                          
1 The countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece*, 
Iceland*, Ireland, Israel*, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg*, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal*, 
Spain*, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. An asterisk indicates that observations for the country 
commence around 1980 due to data limitations. Two countries were omitted: Switzerland because its 
power-sharing arrangements are not consistent with the idea of a government vote share; and the United 
States because it drove the world economy, which is inconsistent with the benchmarking idea used in 
this paper. However, both countries were included for benchmarking the economic variables. 
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correlation between benchmarked growth and the incumbent party’s vote across the whole 
dataset. 
Kayser and Peress (2012) used three benchmarks: the median of all other countries in the study; 
principal components decomposition (weighting by integration into the world economy and 
integration into the regional economy); and the weighted average performance of a country’s 
trade partners. Although principal components decomposition gave the best model fit and 
trade weighting the worst, the results were similar across the three benchmarks, especially 
when other variables were added. A median benchmark was developed in this dataset for 
inflation. 
This paper takes a different approach to the real economy. Generally, studies of the economic 
vote treat unemployment and growth separately. However, they are two aspects of the same 
thing. Unemployment is a measure at a point in time (often averaged over a period) and growth 
is a measure of the change in Gross Domestic Product over a period. A simple analogy is to a 
public company. This entity has a balance sheet that states its financial position at a point in 
time, typically the end of the accounting period. It also has an income statement that shows 
how it performed over the accounting period. In assessing whether to invest in the company, 
analysts look at both.  
This paper argues that voters undertake a similar analysis for their domestic economy, taking 
into account both unemployment and growth. An economic variable was developed called “real 
economy”. It was calculated by subtracting the unemployment rate from the growth rate. These 
two variables had similar standard deviations, so this approach was acceptable. This new 
variable had more explanatory power than benchmarked growth in regressions across a range 
of specifications for the full dataset (c.f. Kayser and Peress 2012) and was used instead. The 
dataset had 307 observations from 1956 to 2009. 
A number of secondary (non-economic) variables are also used. A dummy variable for the 
incumbent was created and had a value of one where the leader of the government party had 
firstly been the leader at the previous election and secondly had been in power continuously 
since then. The expectation is that this would indicate a “healthy” government. A dummy 
variable was also created for election timing and had a value of one where an election occurred 
six months or more ahead of schedule. If a party were governing in its own right, this would be 
seen as an opportunistic act designed to maximise the vote. If a party were in coalition, it would 
more likely indicate a breakdown in the coalition and something imposed externally on the 
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government, which would indicate a vote risk. Both of these concepts were used in Hellwig 
(2010). 
Another non-economic variable was the time interval, in quarters, between elections. A 
common maxim in elections is that the longer a government has been in power, the less votes 
it will receive. This variable was correlated with early elections with an r statistic of -0.60. 
Chappell and Veiga (2000) used a time interval variable in their cross-country study and it was 
consistently statistically significant. Vote erosion has been found in other studies (e.g. Norpoth 
1984).  
New democracies can be volatile while parties and voters find their feet. An age of democracy 
variable was created based on data from Boix et al (2013), who have coded numerous countries 
on a 0/1 basis for whether they have a functional democracy. The age of democracy for each 
country was calculated for each election year and then transformed by the natural logarithm. 
A similar concept was used in Hellwig (2010). Finally, an annual time trend was created. 
Categories linked to the hypotheses were also created. Clarity of responsibility was based on 
whether a government was in coalition. Kayser and Peress (2012) provided coalition 
information in their dataset. The main modification to their data was that, if coalition parties 
had always been in coalition, and not raised the possibility that they might break their coalition, 
then they were treated as a single party. This meant that the two Australian conservative 
parties, the Nationals (country) and Liberals (business) were treated as a single party. Clarity of 
responsibility was determined to apply if the coalition size was one.  
Strong or weak future time reference was determined from a country’s official languages, and 
then matching this against language data in Chen (2013). This created an issue for Belgium, 
which has a mix of Dutch speakers (weak future time reference) and French speakers (strong 
future time reference). This country was coded as weak future time reference because a greater 
proportion of Belgians have Dutch as their first language, compared with French. Extra 
regressions dropping Belgium were run to test the results. This would be expected to make the 
results stronger, which it did in some cases. This is explained further in the results section. 
Applying these two factor variables produced a four-way classification for each election (clear 
or unclear, and strong or weak). A country’s future time reference remained fixed, but its clarity 
of responsibility could change if its coalition status changed. The twenty two countries are 
organised into their most common categories in Table 1 on the next page. 
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Table 1: Countries listed by the majority of their election categories, 1956-2009, N=307 
Clear strong (104) 
Australia (20/20) 
Canada (18/18) 
Greece (10/10) 
Ireland (8/15) 
New Zealand (13/18) 
Portugal (6/9) 
Spain (9/9) 
United Kingdom (14/14) 
Clear weak (48) 
Japan (12/18) 
Norway (8/14) 
Sweden (14/17) 
Unclear strong (43) 
France (10/12) 
Israel (8/8) 
Italy (10/14) 
Unclear weak (112) 
Austria (12/17) 
Belgium (16/16) 
Denmark (13/20) 
Finland (12/14) 
Germany (15/15) 
Iceland (7/7) 
Luxembourg (6/6) 
Netherlands (16/16) 
Note: The figures after each country show how many elections are in the category compared with total 
elections for that country. If not all elections are in that category (for example New Zealand and Austria), 
then the remainder will be in the other category with the same future time reference. So New Zealand 
had five elections in the unclear strong category and Austria had five in the clear weak category. 
In total numbers, the table indicates that languages with strong future time reference may be 
consistent with single party government, and that languages with weak future time reference 
may be consistent with coalition government. This could be an area for future research. 
The table produces some expected groupings, but also some unusual ones. For example, New 
Zealand, Canada and the United Kingdom are together, but then they are also grouped with 
Greece, Portugal and Spain. Germany and Austria had lower levels of inflation in the 1970s, 
perhaps from their hyperinflation experiences, but they have minimal levels of clarity of 
responsibility and so no economic vote is expected for them. In the clear weak category, an 
inflation vote would be expected for Japan with its high levels of saving, but less so for Norway 
and Sweden. 
Another way of representing the categories is graphically. Figure 1 shows the vote share of the 
lead government party across the different categories for the dataset. In the two clear 
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categories, the vote tends to sit at or above 40 per cent, whereas in the unclear categories, it is 
more variable, which is due to coalition government. A greater number of elections in the 
dataset each year would be expected from 1980 due to the greater availability of 
unemployment data. Perhaps surprisingly, there is a lower incidence of clear weak elections 
later in the dataset, which indicates a greater fragmentation of the vote in some countries. 
Figure 1: Vote share of the government party across categories, twenty two developed countries, 
1956-2009, N=307 
 
Summary statistics are included in the Appendix, for both the complete dataset and for each of 
the four categories. One feature of the data is that the average vote share for the government 
party at an election is always a little lower than at the previous election. This is consistent with 
the idea of vote erosion and the coefficient on the previous vote would be expected to be a 
little under one. Another feature of the data is that the average trend value for the clear weak 
category is lower than the other categories. As Figure 1 indicated, later governments in 
countries with weak future time reference have been more likely to involve coalitions as time 
progressed. Finally, countries with weak future time reference, with or without clarity of 
responsibility, have lower average benchmarked inflation. According to the theories discussed 
in this paper, this would suggest that lower inflation in these countries is a result of language 
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and its effect on how people think, rather than the clarity of responsibility or how consensual 
their politics may be. 
Results 
I test hypothesis three first. A range of least squares regressions were conducted on the vote 
share of the main government party. The approach was to conduct two regressions for each set 
of variables. The first regression excluded the categories (on the assumption that the categories 
had no effect) and the second would include the categories and their cross-multiples with the 
variables (on the assumption that they did). A likelihood ratio test was then conducted to 
determine whether the extra variables, as a group, were statistically significant. The results are 
in Table 2 on the next page. 
The bottom row shows the p-value of the likelihood ratio test of the null hypothesis that there 
is no difference in the regressions across the four categories. Five of the seven specifications 
rejected the null hypothesis at the 5 per cent level of significance. One more specification 
rejected the null hypothesis at the 10 per cent level. Insights into these results can be found in 
the table under the “different regressors” heading. This part of the table returns results on 
whether any of the cross-products were statistically different from the base case (the clear 
strong category). It should be noted that dropping Belgium made little difference to the results. 
Column 1 reports results on the simplest specification, for which the independent variables 
were the previous vote, cross-products against the category factor variable, and the category 
factor variable itself. In this case, both the unclear strong and unclear weak dummy variables 
within the category factor variable were different from the clear strong dummy variable at the 
5 per cent level (making one different regressor). Then the unclear weak cross-product with the 
previous vote was statistically different from the clear strong cross-product with the previous 
vote at the 5 per cent level as well (making the second different regressor). These results reflect 
the fact that, if a party is governing in its own right, its vote will sit around 40 to 50 per cent and 
the formula underlying this will have a larger constant and a smaller coefficient for the previous 
vote. If a party is governing in coalition it will have a lower, more variable vote (for example 25 
to 45 per cent) and the formula underlying this will have a small constant and a larger coefficient 
for the previous vote. 
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Table 2: Least squares regressions on the vote share of the government party to test the differences across categories, twenty two developed countries, 1956-2009, N=307 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Previous vote ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Real economy  ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Inflation (ln)  ? ? ?    
Benchmarked inflation (ln)     ? ? ? 
Secondary variables   ? ?  ? ? 
Fixed (country) effects    ?   ? 
Initial model        
Degrees of freedom 1 3 8 29 3 8 29 
Log-likelihood -959.1 -949.7 -939.0 -930.3 -949.7 -938.9 -930.3 
Model with categories        
Degrees of freedom 7 15 35 55 15 35 55 
Log-likelihood -951.1 -941.7 -915.1 -898.9 -939.6 -911.0 -894.4 
“Different” regressors 2/2 2/4 2/9 2/9 3/4 3/9 3/9 
Category ? ?   ?   
Previous vote ? ?   ?   
Real economy    ?   ? 
Benchmarked inflation (ln)     ? ? ? 
Early election   ?   ?  
Time between elections   ? ?  ? ? 
P-value of LR test 0.014 0.19 0.002 7e-5 0.062 9e-4 4e-6 
Note: Secondary variables are a time trend, the natural log of the age of democracy, an early election, a continuous incumbent leader, and the time interval between elections. 
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Table 3: Regressions on the vote of the government party, dataset split by category, 22 developed countries, 1956-2009 
Variables Clear strong Clear weak Unclear strong Unclear weak 
Previous vote   0.61** 
(0.17) 
  0.032 
(0.13) 
  0.076 
(0.13) 
  0.77** 
(0.092) 
  0.77** 
(0.088) 
  0.84** 
(0.11) 
  0.84** 
(0.11) 
  0.83** 
(0.07) 
  0.83** 
(0.072) 
  *real economy  -0.040* 
(0.017) 
-0.042 
(0.019) 
      
Real economy   0.38* 
(0.17) 
  2.11* 
(0.80) 
  2.18* 
(0.89) 
-0.0028 
(0.24) 
  0.12 
(0.21) 
  0.082 
(0.26) 
  0.081 
(0.26) 
  0.055 
(0.098) 
  0.053 
(0.098) 
  *Italy  -4.11** 
(0.71) 
       
Inflation (ln)   1.25 
(11.7) 
  3.58 
(11.5) 
 -9.78 
(17.6) 
   3.02 
(4.57) 
   0.023 
(4.45) 
 
Benchmarked inflation (ln)     30.6 
(30.4) 
 -74.7** 
(15.2) 
   2.61 
(4.78) 
 -6.70 
(8.13) 
Early election   0.60 
(1.15) 
  1.12 
(1.78) 
  1.11 
(1.80) 
-2.93 
(2.17) 
-2.89 
(1.79) 
-6.59* 
(2.76) 
-6.55* 
(2.77) 
  3.56 
(1.62) 
  3.73* 
(1.59) 
Continuous incumbent leader   1.46 
(1.50) 
  0.44 
(1.30) 
  0.49 
(1.31) 
  2.68* 
(1.24) 
  3.30** 
(1.14) 
  0.17 
(2.09) 
  0.20 
(2.09) 
  0.34 
(0.92) 
  0.30 
(0.91) 
  *Spain    22.1** 
(2.57) 
  20.2** 
(2.12) 
      
Age of democracy (ln) -1.67 
(1.59) 
  7.37* 
(2.97) 
  9.89** 
(2.87) 
-2.64 
(1.99) 
-1.78 
(1.79) 
  1.10 
(2.10) 
  1.05 
(2.11) 
-4.35 
(2.44) 
-4.13 
(2.49) 
Trend   0.022 
(0.054) 
-0.17* 
(0.063) 
-0.19* 
(0.065) 
-0.062 
(0.049) 
-0.086 
(0.050) 
  0.010 
(0.090) 
  0.0058 
(0.089) 
-0.0057 
(0.045) 
-0.011 
(0.045) 
Time between elections -0.41** 
(0.14) 
-0.19 
(0.16) 
-0.21* 
(0.14) 
-0.34 
(0.27) 
-0.35 
(0.18) 
-0.21 
(0.29) 
-0.21 
(0.29) 
  0.15 
(0.12) 
  0.17 
(0.11) 
Italy  -7.93 
(5.82) 
       
Spain  -9.47 
(9.36) 
-4.56 
(9.67) 
      
Fixed effects  ? ?     ? ? 
Constant 26.0* 
(12.1) 
  13.0 
(15.5) 
  1.54 
(14.6) 
 24.3 
(12.4) 
  20.4** 
(10.1) 
 3.03 
(11.5) 
  3.40 
(11.5) 
  19.2 
(9.65) 
  18.1 
(9.95) 
N 104 104 104 48 48 43 43 112 112 
Standard errors Robust Robust Robust Robust Robust Standard Standard Robust Robust 
R-square (within) 0.36 0.49 0.46 0.86 0.89 0.74 0.74 0.73 0.73 
Notes: * indicates statistically significant at the 5 per cent level. ** indicates significant at 1 per cent. Standard errors in brackets. Diagnostics tests comprised tests for linearity (RESET) and normally distributed residuals. 
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Columns 2 and 5 show the results for the initial equation after the economic variables have 
been added (for the real economy and inflation, in levels in column 2 and then benchmarked in 
column 5) have been added. Under these specifications, there is little variation across the 
categories in the coefficients for the real economy, and variation only exists for benchmarked 
inflation. The variation across categories for the economic variables is insufficient to reject the 
null hypothesis at the 5 per cent level for these specifications. 
However, the regressions substantially change once the secondary variables are added in 
columns 3 and 6. The dummies for the category and the variable for the previous vote no longer 
vary substantially across categories. This indicates that the variation they were demonstrating 
is due to underlying factors picked up by the secondary variables, namely early elections and 
the time period between elections. For early elections, the coefficient for the unclear strong 
cross-product was much lower than that for the reference case (clear strong). This is consistent 
with expectations. For the time between elections, the coefficient for the unclear weak cross-
product was much higher than that for the reference case. A higher coefficient means that 
governments under in this category tend to lose less of their vote over time. In other words, 
their vote is more stable. Voters with weak future time reference would be expected to prefer 
long term stability, which is consistent with these results. 
Adding country dummies for fixed effects increases the differences across the categories. This 
includes producing a high coefficient for the real economy in the clear strong category, 
compared with the other categories. Finally, the benchmarked inflation coefficient for the clear 
weak category is much lower than in the other categories, which is consistent with the theories 
in this paper. This result appears robust because it occurs in all three specifications with that 
variable. The other robust result is the variation in the coefficient for the time period between 
elections. 
There are two main lessons to draw from the analysis. Firstly, the four categories generally 
behave as different groups and there is evidence supporting hypothesis three. The second 
lesson is that this partly depends on the variables included in a regression. Not all variables 
behave differently according to the category of the election. Including more variables that 
behave differently increases the chances of different behaviour overall. Variables that tend to 
be sensitive to the category of the election include previous vote share, the real economy, 
benchmarked inflation, an early election, and the time between elections. Including fixed 
effects also makes it more likely that the categories will behave differently. 
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Table 3 above shows the results for least squares regressions for each of the four categories of 
elections. The approach was to conduct two regressions for each category; one with the log of 
inflation, and a second with benchmarked inflation instead. Diagnostic tests were conducted 
for normality of residuals, functional form (the RESET test), heteroscedasticity, and whether 
fixed effects were required. The null hypothesis of no fixed effects was rejected in the clear 
strong category. In the other three categories the null hypothesis was not rejected, but fixed 
effects were added in the unclear weak category to improve the distribution of the residuals. 
The clear strong category failed the RESET test and various country cross-products were added 
to address this. Finally, robust standard errors were used when heteroscedasticity was 
indicated.  
To demonstrate the effect of the diagnostic additions to the clear strong regressions, a “vanilla” 
regression without cross products or fixed effects is included as the first column of results. This 
initial regression shows some expected results, such as a positive, significant coefficient for the 
real economy and a coefficient for the previous vote lower than that for the other categories in 
the next two columns. The negative coefficient for the cross-product between the real economy 
and the previous vote indicates that the economic vote in this category tapers off if the 
government had a large win at the previous election. The negative coefficient for the cross-
product between Italy and the real economy indicates that, in the four elections where there 
was clarity of responsibility, the real economy played no role. The large, positive coefficient for 
the cross-product between Spain and an incumbent leader suggests that Spanish elections 
largely turn on whether the leader of the winning party in the previous election is running again. 
If Italy and Spain are removed from the clear strong regression, the results are close to the 
vanilla regression, but with appropriate diagnostics. The main difference is that the coefficients 
for the previous vote and constant are 0.46 and 41 respectively. 
Broadly, hypothesis one is quickly dealt with. This stated that an economic vote only applies if 
there is clarity of responsibility. None of the economic variables are statistically significant in 
either the unclear strong or unclear weak regressions, whereas some of them are significant in 
the clear strong and clear weak regressions. The hypothesis is confirmed. 
There is also evidence for hypothesis two, which stated that a vote on inflation would occur in 
elections with weak future time reference. Combined with hypothesis one, this indicated that 
an economic vote would only occur in elections in the clear weak category. This has occurred, 
with the coefficient for benchmarked inflation being statistically significant and having the 
expected negative sign. 
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Effect sizes were investigated through multiplying the variables’ coefficients and standard 
errors. For three of the categories, the government party’s vote in the previous election has the 
largest effect size. The exception is the clear strong category. In this case, the cross products 
involving Italy and the real economy have the largest effect size. 
Dropping Belgium had a noticeable effect for the unclear weak category. The coefficient for the 
previous vote increased; for the regression with benchmarked inflation, it changed from 0.83 
to 0.90. The coefficient for an early election increased from approximately 3.6 to 4.5 for the 
regression with inflation, and from 3.7 to 4.8 for the regression with benchmarked inflation. In 
this latter regression, the distribution of residuals was sufficiently improved that country 
dummies were not required. This analysis is consistent with the theory that a particular 
combination of clarity of responsibility and future time reference produces a distinct type of 
political behaviour. 
The prediction for early elections was that its coefficient would be positive for elections with 
clarity of responsibility because the party in power would be governing in its own right and 
would not have to manage coalition partners in setting the election date. Therefore, the 
government could set the date to maximise its vote. The reverse was expected in elections 
without clarity of responsibility. Although the coefficient for an early election is statistically 
significant for two of the categories, it has the expected sign in only one of them, unclear strong. 
The variable’s coefficient is positive and statistically significant for unclear weak. 
The theory about early elections proposed here needs to be revised and the results suggest a 
two-step process. Where a government has clarity of responsibility, it can set the election date 
to maximise its vote, but, perhaps informed by the opposition, the electorate perceives this 
tactic and there is no reliable benefit or cost. Where a government does not have clarity of 
responsibility, then an early election date is not perceived as a cynical tactic, but rather an 
indication about how the parties in government have managed their coalition. Voters in 
elections with weak future time reference value the future more, so they may prefer 
governments to run their full course and for elections to occur at the scheduled time. This may 
not apply in elections with strong future time reference. Rather, voters may expect the lead 
government party to demonstrate strength and leadership in managing the coalition. So if there 
is no clarity of responsibility and an early election occurs, the government party’s vote would 
increase (decrease) if the electorate’s main language had weak (strong) future time reference. 
Table 4 elaborates. 
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Table 4: Theorised impact of an early election across the four categories 
Clear strong 
No effect 
Government picks an election date for 
maximum positive effect but voters perceive 
the tactic. 
Clear weak 
No effect 
Government picks an election date for 
maximum positive effect but voters perceive 
the tactic. 
Unclear strong 
Negative 
An election date is forced on the 
government externally which does not suit it 
and it may be perceived as losing control. 
Voters do not mind the earlier date. 
Unclear weak 
Positive 
Voters have a preference against the earlier 
date. However, they do not blame the 
government for it because it has most likely 
been externally imposed, for example by 
coalition partners, who instead bear the 
cost. 
 
Finally, the coefficient for the vote share at the previous election deserves comment. It is lowest 
for the clear strong category but highest in the unclear categories. This suggests that the 
coefficient will be higher depending on two factors: if there is no clarity of responsibility; and if 
there is weak future time reference. If there is no clarity of responsibility, then the electorate 
has less useful data to judge the government and inertia is more likely. If there is weak future 
time reference, then the electorate is more likely to take the long view and less likely to impose 
quick judgements on the government. 
These two proposed theories match the coefficients in Table 3 and represent areas for further 
research. 
Conclusions 
This paper has used a four-category system to analyse the economic vote with a focus on 
inflation. The categories of elections were generated by grouping elections according to 
whether there was clarity of responsibility and whether a country had strong or weak future 
time reference. The divisions represent whether it makes sense to hold a government 
accountable for its performance, and what sort of economic performance voters prefer. 
The analysis is consistent with an economic vote, but also that a great deal of nuance and 
variation is involved. For example, there is substantial variation in elections across the 
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categories, even though, as developed countries with reasonably strong democratic processes, 
they might be regarded as homogenous. Research has shown that politics and economics in 
developed and undeveloped countries are very different, but this study suggests that the 
heterogeneity is deeper. 
The elections most likely to show an inflation vote are those with clarity of responsibility and 
weak future time reference. This is the second smallest category in the study and in a sense also 
endangered; only three out of twenty two countries have the majority of their elections in this 
group and these elections are less common in the later part of the dataset. The variables that 
are statistically significant within this category are the previous vote, benchmarked inflation, 
and a continuous incumbent leader. The clear strong category, with clarity of responsibility but 
a different perspective of the future, would also be expected to have an economic vote, but not 
necessarily in relation to inflation. Accordingly, the variables that are statistically significant 
here are the previous vote, the real economy, and the time between elections. The two 
categories without clarity of responsibility did not demonstrate an economic vote, as expected. 
The statistically significant variables in these cases were the previous vote and an early election. 
The study has produced four areas for further research. The first is the correlations in relation 
to early elections. The results suggest a theory based on clarity of responsibility and future time 
reference where governments do not gain where there is clarity of responsibility due to an early 
election date being perceived as a tactic. In the unclear weak category, the theory is that voters 
prefer that governments go full term and they punish minor parties in the coalition and the 
opposition for not supporting this. For the unclear strong category, voters do not prefer a full 
term and perceive poor performance by the government in not maintaining its coalition. Case 
studies to flesh out these dynamics are one possible way forward. 
The second research possibility relates to the extent to which the government party’s vote at 
the previous election transfers to the current election. In other words, whether the coefficient 
for the previous vote variable is close to 1. The results in this study suggest that this is more 
likely without clarity of responsibility and with weak future time reference. Where neither of 
these apply, in a clear strong election, the government’s vote may in fact depend on economic 
performance and the political context, rather than precedent. 
The third area for possible research is to examine whether a real economy variable, that 
combines both unemployment and growth, is superior to these variables singly, or 
benchmarked versions of them. The contentions in this paper are that both unemployment and 
growth matter, a real economy variable is not a complex concept, and that voters have 
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sufficient information available to make the necessary judgements. Growth data is widely 
available through the Penn World Table. The main restriction on developing such a variable is 
unemployment data. 
The final area covers the correlation in the paper between weak future time reference and 
coalition government. Such a correlation has a theoretical basis. Coalitions share the spoils of 
government, whereas single party government is along the lines of “winner takes all.” 
Therefore, coalitions reduce risk and increase stability, consistent with the preferences of 
speakers of languages with weak future time reference. Similarly, Cusack et al (2007) argue that 
higher degrees of economic co-ordination increased the likelihood of a country adopting 
proportional representation. They generate an economic co-ordination index for developed 
countries at around 1900, which has a correlation statistic with weak future time reference of 
0.83. It would be worth investigating whether future time reference influenced a country’s 
electoral system. 
An attractive feature of the economic vote is that it supports democratic accountability. If a 
government cannot deliver good economic outcomes, then it is fitting for the electorate to 
replace them with someone else who might deliver instead. This study has shown that about 
half of elections in developed countries (those with clarity of responsibility) most often meet 
this ideal in relation to output, and sometimes in relation to prices. In the other half of elections, 
the main differentiation appears to be whether there was an early election, which this paper 
interprets as being a proxy for how the governing parties have managed their coalition. A more 
open-ended challenge is to determine if there are other mechanisms by which developed 
countries secure economic outcomes, be it the demands of elites, the ongoing process of 
debate, a longer term perspective, or simply an acceptance of the free market and the 
institutions that support it. 
 Appendix 
Table A1: Summary statistics for the regressions in Table 3 
Variables Overall Clear strong Clear weak Unclear strong Unclear weak 
Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev. 
Vote 35.40 10.68 40.56 6.99 41.25 9.55 27.96 10.73 30.96 10.29 
Previous vote 37.62 10.37 43.89 4.95 43.02 9.93 31.26 10.09 31.93 9.78 
*real economy -193.09 226.92 
Real economy -2.92 4.98 -4.55 5.25 0.99 3.74 -164.99 155.64 -2.17 4.14 
*Italy -0.14 0.75 
Inflation (ln) 0.058 0.096 0.06 0.048 0.055 0.035 0.11 0.22 0.038 0.051 
Benchmarked inflation (ln) 0.012 0.087 0.012 0.03 0 0.024 0.067 0.21 0 0.044 
Early election 0.40 0.49 0.46 0.5 0.4 0.49 0.47 0.5 0.32 0.47 
Continuous incumbent leader 0.59 0.49 0.71 0.46 0.46 0.5 0.37 0.49 0.63 0.49 
*Spain NA 0.077 0.27 NA NA NA 
Age of democracy (ln) 4.16 0.60 4.32 0.59 3.89 0.62 4.19 0.55 4.12 0.58 
Trend 29.04 15.33 28.21 15.1 21 12.76 35.09 14.06 30.93 15.68 
Time between elections 13.57 4.03 12.99 4.4 12.57 3.64 14.43 4.55 14.21 3.46 
Italy 0.038 0.19 
Spain 0.087 0.28 
???
 ???
??????????
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6 – Inflation and central banks during 
the Great Inflation in the OECD 
Abstract 
The classic example of central bank independence (CBI) delivering good policy is in developed 
countries during the oil price shocks of the 1970s. 
This study examines the robustness of correlations between inflation and CBI for twenty one 
OECD countries for the 1970s and 1980s. It finds that the normally strong correlations for legal 
CBI break down when political and cultural variables correlated with CBI are included, either 
directly or as instrumental variables. 
Central banks in developed countries during this period are better viewed as reflecting their 
politics and culture, rather than a commitment device. Research into whether institutions 
improve policy performance should also include an understanding of the forces that created 
the institutions initially. 
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Introduction 
The concept of central bank independence was developed through the experience of the Great 
Inflation, when developed countries experienced inflation outbreaks in the 1970s and 1980s. 
There were a range of causes, including oil price shocks in the mid and late 1970s, a priority on 
securing full employment compared with inflation, and a greater demand for government 
benefits and services. In the United States at least, there was also an under-estimation of the 
level of unemployment which was consistent with price stability (the non-accelerating inflation 
rate of unemployment, or NAIRU - Orphanides 2003). 
During this time, politicians in many countries seemed unable to bring inflation under control 
and were slow to develop a rhetoric that would allow policy makers to restore stability. In this 
context, economists developed theories about commitment and the challenges that politicians 
faced in promoting policies that had short run costs but long term benefits. They were also 
influenced by Friedman’s ideas about expectations (1968b). It became known as the time 
inconsistency literature. 
Kydland and Prescott (1977) argued that public policy, which involved discretion, could not be 
optimal in the long run because the expectations of agents depend on future policy. If future 
policy is discretionary, then there is no certainty about expectations and it is not possible to 
make optimal policy decisions now. They suggested that rules-based policy would address this 
problem. Barro and Gordon (1983a) built on this with a simple economic model and made the 
assumption that politicians would aim to bring inflation below the NAIRU. The long run result 
would be inflation (above the theoretical optimal level of zero) and unemployment at the NAIRU 
level.  
Rogoff (1985) used a microfoundations model of an economy to argue that society could avoid 
most of these costs through appointing a conservative central banker to handle monetary 
policy. This would not be a perfect solution, but it was the most practicable one. It also included 
the testable conclusion that inflation would be lower when monetary policy was conducted 
without the oversight of politicians. Lohmann (1992) generalised this result by applying a cost 
to politicians when they override a central bank when responding to an economic shock, with 
Rogoff’s paper being the unique case of an infinite cost. The paper predicts varying outcomes, 
depending on the size of the cost, the relative conservativeness of the central bank, and the 
size of the shock. 
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These theoretical papers prompted a range of empirical papers that tested the correlations 
between inflation and the independence of central banks (CBI) from politicians. The concept of 
independence was usually operationalised in the legal appointment and dismissal processes of 
central bank governors and senior staff, whether the government and central bank had to 
operate at arm’s length on financial matters, the extent to which the government could 
override the bank, and the priority that the bank placed on price stability. For less developed 
countries, a de facto measure of turnover of central bank governors was used.  
The empirical papers generally found clear correlations, initially with simple bivariate 
regressions (for example Grilli et al 1991; Cukierman et al 1992; and Alesina and Summers 
1993), but becoming more complex and including more independent variables (for example 
Franzese 1999; Brumm 2000; Keefer and Stasavage 2003; Way 2004). 
There were some criticisms of the research program. Posen (1995) argued that CBI merely 
reflected the interests of each country’s financial sector. Hayo (1998) suggested that it reflected 
social attitudes to inflation, as did Forder (1996, 1998). Later, Iversen and Soskice (2006) 
claimed that the CBI literature sought to downplay politicians’ achievements after World War II 
in delivering stable growth through coordinating various sectors of society, and that politicians 
were capable of doing so yet again in future. 
Despite these concerns, researchers stated that the relationship was robust by around 2000 (de 
Haan 2000). But surprisingly, given the early stage of the empirical work, many governments in 
the 1990s had already increased the independence of their central banks. Much of this reform 
was externally driven, such as a requirement of the Maastricht Treaty, but it was also embraced 
by political elites. 
These reforms had the unintended benefit of giving researchers new data. If CBI had increased 
in many countries, then there should be a corresponding reduction in inflation. It is ironic that, 
when CBI theories were driving policy reform, problems began to emerge. Acemoglu et al (2008) 
examined a wide range of countries from 1972 to 2005 and found that CBI was correlated with 
lower inflation only in countries with middle levels of governance, contrary to the early OECD 
studies. Klomp and de Haan (2010a) looked at over 100 countries for 1980 to 2005 and found 
that CBI was correlated with inflation for only 20 per cent of them. Daunfeldt and de Luna (2008) 
shed some light on this puzzle by examining the inflation performance of twenty nine OECD 
countries after 1975. They found that the majority of them had achieved price stability before 
CBI reforms, which suggests that other factors were at play besides the time inconsistency 
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problem. Some papers still found the expected results, however. Crowe (2008) and Crowe and 
Meade (2008) both contradicted Acemoglu et al. 
The state of the literature is summarised by Klomp and de Haan (2010b), who conducted a 
meta-regression analysis of the literature from 1991 to 2006 covering fifty nine studies and 
comprising over 350 regressions. They found that there was no general correlation in the 
literature between CBI and lower inflation. Such a correlation only applied in studies which 
covered OECD countries and studies that covered the 1970s. A correlation was also more likely 
in bivariate regressions, regressions that included the labour market as an independent 
variable, and where a regression corrected for outliers in OECD countries. 
The current state of the research is that CBI theories are robust in relation to OECD countries in 
the 1970s. In other words, the theory is back where it began, explaining how developed 
countries succumbed to the Great Inflation. The purpose of this paper is to determine whether 
this long-standing correlation is robust. Its finding is that, instead of being a commitment device, 
CBI legislation at that time reflected countries’ cultural and political preferences. CBI reforms in 
developed countries in the 1990s may well have been misguided. The question of what factors 
shape an institution is an important part of the answer to the question of whether an 
institutional reform will have policy benefits. 
Method 
This paper adopts the approach of determining which variables are correlated with CBI, and 
might be regarded as influencing it. These are then incorporated into regressions on inflation 
to determine whether the correlation between CBI and inflation is robust. Most of these 
variables are added directly, however, variables that are not correlated with inflation can be 
included as instrumental variables. 
This approach is similar to Posen (1995). There, Posen examined what economic and political 
factors were correlated with CBI in OECD countries in the decades between 1950 and 1990. He 
then used these proposed determinants of CBI to check whether the inverse correlation 
between CBI and inflation remained robust after they were added to a regression model. Many 
papers have conducted the second part of this analysis, and some papers have conducted the 
first part, but very few have put them together. This suggests a missed research opportunity 
because good candidates for testing the robustness of an institution or policy will be the factors 
that generated it in the first place. 
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Data 
In the first set of regressions, the dependent variable is CBI. Two aggregated legal indicators 
were used: that from Bernhard (1998) and that from Franzese (1999). The former used Grilli et 
al (1991), Cukierman (1992), and Alesina and Summers (1993). The latter divided the Grilli 
indicator into its economic and political parts, and then used the QVAU and LVAU indicators 
from Cukierman (1992), and finally Alesina and Summers. 
This indicator was developed for 1970 to 1990 from these original sources for twenty one OECD 
countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. Not all these countries were covered 
in the initial studies, so some regressions were conducted to allow a fully aggregated figure to 
be developed based on partial data. Where a country was included in all the initial studies, there 
was a close match to the figures in Bernhard (1998) and Franzese (1999). 
Two original CBI indicators were also used. These were the general legal CBI indicator from 
Cukierman et al (1992) and a 0/1 dummy based on low/high CBI in Alesina (1988). In the second 
case, the countries with high CBI were Japan, the United States, Germany and Switzerland. An 
example of a paper that used a dummy based on Alesina is Oatley (1999). 
The first set of regressions use six independent variables, generated for 1960-1990. The first 
was class voting, measured by the Alford index. The rationale is that the closer political parties 
are to their base, the greater their interest in controlling the central bank to better direct the 
benefits of government to the base, rather than governing for the whole community. This is 
what Bernhard (1998) found and it is similar to the institutional argument made by de Mesquita 
et al (1999). Data from Nieuwbeerta (1999) was used to supplement that in Bernhard, with 
regressions being used to expand partial data for some countries. A higher Alford index would 
be expected to be positively correlated with inflation because governments would be more 
likely to govern for their supporters, rather than for the whole community. 
The next variable was strong bicameralism. This is a dummy variable with a value of 1 where a 
legislature has a second chamber that has similar powers to the first chamber, but a different 
electoral system. This applies in Australia, Germany, Switzerland and the United States. This 
would be expected to improve legal CBI because the second chamber would be a constraint on 
a government seeking to establish a compliant central bank. Bernhard (1998) found this 
relationship in his study. As a constraint, it would also be expected to reduce inflation. 
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A further constraints-type variable was included. This was the polity variable from the Polity IV 
dataset. 
Reflecting Posen (1995), a dummy variable was included for regulation of universal banking, 
which had a value of 1 if banks were allowed to conduct at least two of the following: 
commercial lending, securities, and insurance. Universal banking would represent the strength 
of the financial sector and be expected to be correlated with higher CBI and lower inflation. In 
Posen’s study, this variable was statistically significant in regressions on CBI (the LVAU measure 
in Cukierman 1992), but not in regressions on inflation.  
Two variables representing the preferences of the general community were developed. The first 
was a dummy variable for whether a country had experienced hyperinflation in the twentieth 
century. The traditional definition is monthly inflation of at least 50 per cent (Cagan 1956). The 
website of the Cato Institute lists the countries that have experienced hyperinflation. The 
countries in this study that did so were Austria (1921-22), Germany (1920, 1922-23), and Greece 
(1941-45). Hyperinflation experience is expected to be correlated with higher legal CBI and 
lower inflation. De Haan and van ‘T Hag (1995) used a similar variable in their study (based on 
inflation between 1900 and 1940) and concluded that it was positively correlated with legal CBI. 
The other variable representing community preferences is future time reference, developed by 
Chen (2013). This variable measures the extent that a language differentiates between the 
present and the future. Some languages, such as Japanese, German and those in Scandinavia, 
make little difference between the two tenses. Therefore, the future is less different to the 
present and people who speak these languages are theoretically more likely to take actions now 
that provide a future benefit. Chen’s paper finds that the speakers of such languages tend to 
save more and make better health decisions. This paper uses the sentence ratio measure in 
Chen (728). This codes strong future time reference as approaching 1 (such as 0.98 for French 
and 0.93 for American English) and weak future time reference approaching 0 (such as 0 for 
Japanese and German). A pro-rata value was given for Belgium (0.39) and Switzerland (0.29). 
The data listed above was used for the first stage of regression analysis, namely to determine 
which variables were correlated with CBI. A summary data table is in the Appendix. 
The second stage was to develop a regression on inflation and check whether CBI variables were 
correlated with inflation, and whether this correlation was robust after adding variables 
correlated with CBI or using them as instruments. For inflation, this paper uses the GDP deflator 
sourced from Franzese (1999), who used OECD data. Annual inflation averaged across the 
twenty one OECD countries is given in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1, Average percentage inflation, 1960-90, 21 OECD countries. 
 
Note: Inflation measured through the GDP deflator. Source is Franzese (1999). 
The Figure shows that inflation in the 1960s was low and that it started to increase in the early 
1970s. The two oil price shocks in the mid and late 1970s are evident. The 1980s shows inflation 
dropping, although it does not quickly return to levels in the 1960s, which indicates some 
persistence. The graph suggests that oil inflation and lagged inflation should be included in the 
inflation regressions. A cross-country comparison of inflation for the twenty one countries in 
the sample from 1970 to 1990, along with CBI data, is in Figure 2 on the next page. 
The Figure shows that seven countries had average inflation rates below 6 per cent: the United 
States, Japan, Germany, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland. The attraction of 
CBI theory is apparent because four of these countries – the United States, Germany, the 
Netherlands and Switzerland – also had rescaled legal CBI values above 6. However, Chen’s 
future time reference concept also appears applicable, because all of the seven countries, 
except for the United States, have a coding less than 0.5 for this variable. 
Six countries had an average inflation rate greater than 10 per cent: Italy, Greece, Ireland, New 
Zealand, Portugal and Spain. All of the three countries with low polity scores are in this list, so 
the polity variable may also be important. However, legal CBI also appears important because 
three of these six countries – New Zealand, Portugal and Spain – have low CBI values. 
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
10.0
12.0
14.0
16.0
19
60
19
61
19
62
19
63
19
64
19
65
19
66
19
67
19
68
19
69
19
70
19
71
19
72
19
73
19
74
19
75
19
76
19
77
19
78
19
79
19
80
19
81
19
82
19
83
19
84
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
154 
Figure 2 – Average inflation and central bank independence, 1970-90, 21 OECD countries 
 
Note: Inflation measured through the GDP deflator in Franzese (1999). CBI measured through the 
replication of Franzese’s (1999) index. Legal CBI rescaled by being multiplied by 10. 
Franzese (1999) used largely institutional and political variables. This paper enhances Franzese’s 
approach by using some economic variables. It is accepted that increased output, holding all 
other factors constant, is more likely to be inflationary. Therefore, the logged real per capita 
output measure from Franzese’s dataverse was differenced to generate a growth variable. 
OECD data of general government accounts (the net saving statistic) was used to generate a 
deficit variable expressed as a percentage of GDP. Some splicing of the data was required due 
to changing definitions for government accounts. Further, some early observations for Portugal 
were dropped in some equations because the OECD did not publish government accounts data 
for these years. Deficit data for New Zealand was sourced from the IMF’s International Financial 
Statistics. The deficit variable in levels tended to mirror output growth and was not statistically 
significant in the regressions. Therefore, the difference in the deficit was used instead. 
It is also accepted that movements in a country’s currency can have inflation effects through 
making imports cheaper or more expensive. This paper uses data on the trade weighted index 
from the website of the Bank for International Settlements. The last economic variable 
developed was inflation in the price of oil. The price of West Texas Intermediate from the FRED 
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database of the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis was used for this purpose, adjusted by a 
country’s exchange rate with the United States. Of all the time-varying variables, this was the 
only one that was treated as exogenous and was not lagged. 
A time trend was also included as an economic variable. It commenced at 1 in 1973 and rose to 
18 in 1990. In this context, a negative trend in inflation would be consistent with policy learning, 
similar to that discussed in Sargent et al (2006). 
Most of the dependent variables from Franzese (1999) were also included. The first was 
openness to trade. This was calculated by adding a country’s imports and exports and dividing 
by GDP. The next was inflation abroad, which comprised the average inflation rate of the other 
twenty countries. Also included was a left/right politics scale, increasing with greater 
conservatism. The proportion of workers who were union members was also used. The final 
variable was a corporatism measure, which decreased with greater fragmentation of 
organisations in wage negotiations, for both employers and employees. Franzese (1999) 
included data on financial sector employment as a share of total employment, but this variable 
was not used because regression tests indicated that it was endogenous to CBI and inflation.  
A summary data table for the regressions on inflation is in the Appendix. 
One last variable was used as an instrument in some of the regressions not reported in this 
paper. This was strong and inclusive committees. Following Powell and Whitten (1983), this 
occurs where the committee system distributes chairs proportionally among all parties and has 
two of the following three characteristics: more than ten committees, mirroring the 
bureaucracy in expertise; and limiting the number of committee memberships that a legislator 
may hold. Data on parliamentary committees was sourced from Bernhard (1998) and the Inter-
Parliamentary Union (1986). 
Results 
Results from the first part of the analysis, examining which variables are correlated with CBI, 
are given in Table 1 on the next page. 
Although the regressions performed differently across the measures of CBI, the strong 
bicameralism variable was statistically significant and of the same sign across all four measures. 
The regressions for the Franzese and Bernhard measures were similar, which is to be expected, 
since these dependent variables are themselves similar. Of the statistically significant variables 
in the first two regressions, the effect size for strong bicameralism was almost twice as large as 
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for class voting (measured as multiplying the coefficient by the independent variable’s standard 
deviation). In the Cukierman regression, the effect size for hyperinflation was about a third 
larger than for strong bicameralism. 
The regressions were generally routine; residuals were normally distributed, there was little 
evidence of heteroskedasticity, and the RESET test did not suggest any non-linearity in the 
variables. 
Table 1 – Regressions on various indexes of central bank independence, 1960-1990, 21 countries. 
Variable Franzese Bernhard Cukierman Alesina Alesina 
 OLS OLS OLS Logit Logit 
Class -0.68** 
(0.22) 
-0.70* 
(0.24) 
-0.40 
(0.29) 
-14.7 
(12.8) 
 
Strong 
bicameralism 
  0.23** 
(0.049) 
  0.25** 
(0.052) 
  0.15* 
(0.064) 
  4.38* 
(1.93) 
 
Polity   0.013 
(0.0072) 
  0.013 
(0.0076) 
  0.0050 
(0.0094) 
 Omitted 
Hyperinflation   0.023 
(0.058) 
  0.053 
(0.062) 
  0.23** 
(0.077) 
  0.09 
(2.00) 
 
Grammar -0.12 
(0.058) 
-0.094 
(0.061) 
  0.024 
(0.076) 
 -1.84 
(1.76) 
Universal   0.031 
(0.043) 
  0.050 
(0.045) 
  0.099 
(0.056) 
 -0.96 
(1.40) 
Constant   0.52** 
(0.10) 
  0.47** 
(0.11) 
  0.28 
(0.14) 
-0.48 
(1.93) 
  0.05 
(1.32) 
R-square 0.80 0.80 0.68 0.49 0.06 
N 21 21 21 21 17 
Notes: * indicates significant at the 5% level and ** indicates significant at the 1% level. Standard errors 
given in brackets. Cukierman refers to Cukierman et al (1992). In the last column, the polity variable was 
omitted because it was a perfect predictor, resulting in four observations being dropped. Pseudo R-
square reported for the logit regressions. 
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Table 2 – Regressions on the inflation rate, 1973-1990, 21 countries. 
Variable OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
CBI -4.29** 
(1.58) 
-2.56* 
(1.30) 
-2.91* 
(1.15) 
  0.44 
(2.99) 
  0.62 
(2.06) 
-2.13 
(1.56) 
-2.18 
(1.63) 
-2.11 
(1.93) 
Inflation (-1)   0.46 
(0.24) 
  0.46* 
(0.20) 
  0.16 
(0.18) 
  0.19 
(0.17) 
  0.16 
(0.25) 
  0.22 
(0.24) 
-0.16 
(0.19) 
-0.16 
(0.19) 
Inflation2 (-1)   0.050* 
(0.025) 
  0.052* 
(0.020) 
  0.068** 
(0.016) 
  0.073** 
(0.017) 
  0.064** 
(0.024) 
  0.059** 
(0.023) 
  0.082** 
(0.016) 
  0.082** 
(0.019) 
Inflation3 (-1) -0.002* 
(0.0007) 
-0.002** 
(0.0006) 
-0.002** 
(0.0005) 
-0.002** 
(0.0005) 
-0.002** 
(0.0007) 
-0.002** 
(0.0006) 
-0.002** 
(0.0005) 
-0.002** 
(0.0005) 
Currency (-1)   -0.077** 
(0.021) 
-0.084** 
(0.019) 
  -0.055** 
(0.019) 
-0.055** 
(0.018) 
Deficit (diff’d) 
(-1) 
    0.24* 
(0.11) 
  0.27* 
(0.13) 
    0.19 
(0.10) 
  0.19 
(0.12) 
Growth (-1)     0.34** 
(0.064) 
  0.38** 
(0.084) 
    0.30** 
(0.063) 
  0.30** 
(0.073) 
Oil inflation     0.010* 
(0.004) 
  0.010* 
(4.6e-3) 
    0.010* 
(0.004) 
  0.0097* 
(0.0046) 
Trade (-1)   -0.36 
(0.28) 
-0.26 
(0.44) 
  -1.05 
(0.62) 
-1.05 
(0.67) 
Inflation 
abroad(-1) 
  -0.085 
(0.12) 
-0.13 
(0.14) 
    0.20 
(0.11) 
  0.019 
(0.13) 
Trend   -0.17** 
(0.062) 
-0.16** 
(0.056) 
  -0.16** 
(0.061) 
-0.16** 
(0.053) 
Politics (-1)     -0.016 
(0.091) 
-0.041 
(0.11) 
-0.16* 
(0.068) 
-0.16 
(0.10) 
Unions (-1)       0.73 
(1.11) 
  0.64 
(1.30) 
  1.99* 
(1.00) 
  1.99 
(1.25) 
Corporatism     -1.16 
(0.73) 
-1.50 
(1.04) 
-1.48* 
(0.64) 
-1.47 
(0.93) 
Polity (-1)     -0.25** 
(0.08) 
-0.24** 
(0.057) 
-0.14* 
(0.067) 
-0.14 
(0.076) 
Class vote  
(-1) 
      0.097** 
(0.035) 
  0.080* 
(0.035) 
  0.031 
(0.020) 
  0.032 
(0.031) 
Universal 
banking (-1) 
      0.66 
(0.38) 
  0.68 
(0.40) 
  0.79* 
(0.39) 
  0.79 
(0.48) 
Strong bicam    0.42 
(0.31) 
   -0.63 
(0.50) 
 -0.14 
(0.46) 
 
Hyperinf. 
Experience 
    0.34 
(0.25) 
   0.78 
(0.42) 
  0.88* 
(0.36) 
  0.48 
(0.26) 
  0.48 
(0.39) 
Grammar       2.16* 
(0.99) 
  1.44 
(0.90) 
  1.26 
(0.74) 
  1.28 
(0.82) 
Constant   4.21** 
(1.34) 
  3.30** 
(0.99) 
  1.96 
(1.12) 
  0.36 
(1.85) 
  5.02 
(2.88) 
  7.02** 
(2.19) 
  8.73* 
(2.69) 
  8.68 
(2.93) 
R-square 0.69 0.68 0.75 0.75 0.72 0.72 0.77 0.77 
N 378 378 372 372 378 378 372 372 
Instrument  Bicam.  Hyper  Bicam.  Bicam. 
Notes: Six years for Portugal dropped in some regressions due to lack of government account data for deficits. * indicates significant at the 5% level and ** indicates significant at the 1% level. OLS regressions use panel corrected standard errors. 2SLS 
regressions use standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. CBI variable in this table is from Franzese (1999). Results are similar for other CBI variables. 
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The second stage in the analysis is to use these candidate determinant variables for CBI in 
regressions on inflation, or as instruments, to determine whether CBI is itself robust. To do this, 
a general inflation equation was generated. Four sets of variables were used: lagged inflation 
with CBI and an instrument (base variables), then the base variables with economic variables, 
the base variables with political and cultural variables, and finally all variables together. Two 
approaches were used: OLS with panel corrected standard errors, and two-stage least squares. 
In the second approach, the instruments were usually strong bicameralism or hyperinflation, 
although strong committees were used a few times (sometimes in combination with 
hyperinflation), and left/right politics once. Results are reported in Table 2 for using the CBI 
measure from Franzese (1999). Regressions were also run for the other CBI measures, including 
the four disaggregated measures of CBI from Cukierman et al (1992). The measure using 
Franzese’s CBI measure produced the results most sympathetic to CBI theory. 
The CBI variable is statistically significant in the first three equations, but none of the remaining 
ones. Instrumenting in the equation with economic variables changes its sign to positive. 
Instrumenting in the last two sets of equations gives the variable the expected sign and 
coefficient size, but it is not statistically significant. A possible explanation for the results is that 
CBI was not a driving force behind inflation performance, but was part of the general cultural 
and political landscape, similar to variables such as corporatism and future time reference. 
Determining how these variables interact could be an area for future research. 
Lagged inflation features squared and cubed terms. These were added because a RESET test of 
the OLS regressions was statistically significant. The squared term is used to reflect the reality 
that, if there is negative inflation in a country in one year, there is usually positive inflation the 
next year. The cubed term lessens the amount of “curve” caused by the squared term. Of the 
remaining variables, the currency, growth, oil and trend variables are consistently statistically 
significant. Effect sizes were generated by multiplying variables’ standard deviation by the 
coefficient. The lagged inflation variables had by far the largest effect sizes. Of the remainder, 
the largest was growth. 
As noted above, these eight regressions were repeated for seven other measures of CBI. None 
of them performed better than the results using the CBI index from Franzese (1999). In three 
individual regressions, the CBI variable had a coefficient of the wrong sign and was statistically 
significant. This occurred in the equations with the political and cultural variables only, which is 
consistent with the view that CBI is a reflection of the wider cultural and political landscape.  
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The results place serious doubt on the common view that CBI played a key role in the inflation 
of developed countries during the Great Inflation. Rather, they suggest that the features 
common to all countries during the Great Inflation was an outbreak of inflation caused by the 
collapse of Bretton-Woods and the oil price shocks. As time passed, countries developed 
appropriate responses and brought down inflationary expectations. Individual countries were 
able to manage inflationary pressures by maintaining a strong currency and taking a 
conservative approach to growth.  
Discussion 
CBI is a plausible theory. The lukewarm attitudes of politicians in the 1970s towards controlling 
inflation were the initial drivers for the theory. However, all theories must be tested with data. 
The results here suggest that previous studies have been affected by omitted variable bias and 
endogeneity. In the past literature, CBI theory has managed to bounce back after a study has 
cast doubt on it. The same may be true here. However, this paper’s results are sufficient to 
permit some further discussion. 
Determining whether a literature is subject to omitted variable bias or endogeneity is a difficult 
matter. Theory is likely to contribute a large number of possible variables, but there is always 
the doubt that something has been missed. For the institutional literature, a useful pointer 
towards possibly omitted variables or endogeneity is those variables that determined the 
evolution of an institution, or are at least correlated with it. Asking what created an institution 
is integral to the question of whether the institution has any effect. 
If CBI theory is not reflected in the data, it is necessary to consider whether there are any 
weaknesses or omissions in Barro and Gordon (1983a), and Rogoff (1985) and Lohmann (1992). 
The results in Barro and Gordon rely on politicians seeking to push unemployment ever lower, 
below the NAIRU. This was evident in the 1970s, especially in the United States. However, 
Orphanides (2003) has suggested that this was due to an error in measuring the NAIRU. In the 
1970s, the official estimate of the NAIRU was around 4 per cent, when it was closer to 6 per 
cent. Therefore, it is only natural that policy makers at the time would have sought to push 
unemployment “too low.” More accurate estimates of the NAIRU now mean that the 
probability of this behaviour is much reduced. 
In relation to Rogoff (1985) and Lohmann (1992), cross-national comparisons of inflation 
performance may have been picking up differences in inflation preferences between countries, 
whereas Rogoff’s assumption relates to comparing inflation preferences within countries (the 
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central banker against everyone else). The author is not aware of studies that focus on this 
internal difference. Further, the costs applied to politicians for overriding a central bank may be 
close to nil if there is public support for doing so. In this sense, not only must the politicians be 
restrained, but the general public as well. Legislation on its own will not achieve this and political 
leadership is required to let the central bank do its job. 
The other way of looking at this problem is to ask if there have been examples where an 
independent monetary authority consciously went against popular sentiment in monetary 
policy. Coleman (2001) provides an example of this with the Australian Notes Issue Board in the 
1920s. This agency had a high degree of independence and conducted policy in accordance with 
the quantity theory of money. This meant the supply of money was inelastic to seasonal 
demand and the exchange rate, leading to large fluctuations and opposition from primary 
producers and commercial banks. The Government lobbied the Board to be more flexible, to no 
avail. The Government then put legislation through the Parliament to wind up the Board and 
transfer the functions to another agency. 
In other words, monetary agencies that depart too far from popular sentiment, or the 
sentiment of key stakeholders, may find themselves legislated out of existence. A different 
example is the Federal Reserve in the 1970s. This agency was subject to intense Congressional 
scrutiny when it sought to control inflation. Kettl (1986) argues that, although higher interest 
rates were technically warranted, they were not politically sustainable. If the Federal Reserve 
had pushed interest rates higher, its legislation would have been amended to give politicians 
more control over monetary policy. This suggests that, instead of central banks constraining 
politicians, the constraint works the other way. 
A final comment is that this paper only extends as far as OECD countries for the 1970s and 
1980s. It cannot be regarded as falsifying CBI theory entirely. On the other hand, Klomp and de 
Haan (2010b) show that CBI theory is strongest for studies that include these nations and the 
1970s, so this paper is a strong challenge to that theory in favour of the theory that central bank 
legislation reflected a range of cultural and political factors. 
Conclusion 
This paper has falsified the classic narrative of CBI theory, that CBI kept inflation low in 
developed countries during the Great Inflation, in favour of the theory that legal CBI reflected 
a package of cultural and political factors. The approach used was to examine which factors 
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were correlated with CBI and could be regarded as causing it. These were then included in 
regressions on inflation, either directly or as an instrumental variable. 
Papers seeking to check the robustness of CBI in regressions on inflation do not usually check 
whether competing variables are themselves related to CBI, or what variables might be related 
to it. The results here suggest that this is a serious omission and indicates a lack of 
understanding of CBI, the key concept under consideration. A literature debating the value of 
institutional reform cannot be regarded as authoritative unless it has seriously considered the 
question of how a particular institution came into being in the first place. 
Lastly, the author notes Coleman’s concluding comments that legal CBI does not necessarily 
protect monetary policy against vested interests. These interests can lobby the Government 
and secure their preferred result. Nations will be better off if the political process is used to 
bring the general interest to bear against vested interests (2001, 746). In other words, a higher 
quality of political constraints, political leadership and political debate will make a society better 
off. It may be more useful to ask what politicians can do for central banks, rather than viewing 
politicians as the problem. 
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Appendix 
Table A1 – Summary data for the OLS regressions on various indexes of central bank 
independence, 1970-1990, 21 countries (N=21). 
Variable Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
Franzese CBI 0.50 0.15 0.25 0.86 
Bernhard CBI 0.48 0.16 0.24 0.84 
Cukierman CBI 0.37 0.16 0.16 0.69 
Alesina CBI 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 
Class voting 0.21 0.09 0.01 0.39 
Strong bicameralism 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 
Polity 8.69 2.96 0.58 10.00 
Universal banking 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Hyperinflation 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 
Future tense grammar 0.56 0.47 0.00 1.00 
 
  
164 
Table A2 – Summary data for the regressions on the inflation rate, 1973-1990, 21 countries 
(N=378). 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Inflation 8.71 5.43 -1.4 27.2 
Inflation (-1) 8.81 5.34 -1.4 27.2 
Inflation2 (-1) 106.04 119.52 0.04 739.84 
Inflation3 (-1) 1544.13 2531.08 -2.74 20123.65 
Franzese CBI (-1) 0.5 0.15 0.25 0.86 
Currency (-1) -1.08 7.46 -28.05 21.38 
Deficit, diff’d (-1) 0.18 1.52 -4.82 6.75 
Growth (-1) 2.26 2.59 -8.13 11.01 
Oil inflation 18.95 43.81 -61.62 195.34 
Trade (-1) 0.5 0.25 0.09 1.4 
Inflation abroad (-1) 8.06 2.76 3.73 13.67 
Trend 9.5 5.20 1 18 
Politics (-1) 5.58 1.67 2.78 10 
Unions (-1) 0.44 0.17 0.1 0.85 
Corporatism 0.43 0.36 0 1 
Polity (-1) 19.36 2.68 1 20 
Strong bicameralism 0.19 0.39 0 1 
Class voting (-1) 18.91 8.57 4 37.3 
Universal banking 0.52 0.5 0 1 
Hyperinflation experience 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Future tense grammar 0.52 0.41 0 1 
Note: N=372 for the differenced deficit due to lack of data for early years for Portugal. 
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7 – Conclusions 
Overview 
This thesis has examined the issues around the theory of central bank independence (CBI). This 
theory seeks a way of constraining politicians so that they implement the best technical policy, 
rather than the most popular policy, or the policy that best suits their political base. The impetus 
for the theory was the Great Inflation in the 1970s, where politicians and the general public 
showed little resolve to keep inflation under control. Researchers were more impressed by the 
efforts of central banks, especially when they had a free reign in monetary policy. 
In Chapter 1, the thesis analysed and critiqued the CBI literature and argued that it had several 
weaknesses. One of the most important weakness was that, if loose money is popular, then the 
cost to the government of overriding a legally independent central bank will be low. CBI will be 
ineffective in delivering technically correct policy. Chapter 2 examined the academic economics 
literature from 1947 to 2006 to determine whether it may have influenced economic policy. 
The results were that the literature was less conservative in the 1960s (that is, to take an 
inflation first approach or argue that the long run Phillips Curve is vertical). This was too early 
to have a direct effect on policy, but it may have had an indirect effect through influencing 
politicians, advisers and so forth. 
Chapter 3 studied the reaction function of the Federal Open Markets Committee (FOMC), the 
main decision-making body for monetary policy in the US. It found support for the idea that 
policymakers in the US made errors in estimating the real time output gap in the late 1960s and 
1970s, producing looser monetary policy than was technically optimal. Since 1982, the FOMC 
has most likely been less responsive to the output gap. Chapter 4 compared events during the 
Great Inflation across the US, the UK and Germany. It found that a theory of political constraints 
on politicians was better able to explain these events than CBI, which is a theory of legal 
constraints. After all, if politicians write the laws, then they may find legal constraints to be 
more flexible than the general public would. This concept of political constraints was explored 
in Chapter 5, in particular whether politicians were directly punished for high inflation. The 
evidence was that this only occurred on a conditional basis, so it is more likely that a political 
response worked through other channels, such as the interests of elites. This is plausible 
because the costs and benefits of inflation are borne unevenly across the electorate. 
Chapter 6 covers the simple question of whether there is a correlation between CBI and inflation 
in the classic example of OECD countries in the 1970s. It finds that the correlation drops away 
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once endogeneity and other cultural factors are taken into account. CBI theory may have been 
a misinterpretation of this classic case study, in which legally independent central banks took 
on a leading role in fighting inflation. What may have instead happened was that politicians 
found it safer to delegate disinflation to a legally independent central bank while running their 
own agenda from a safe distance. In other words, CBI is a theory designed to explain 
observations, without being able to explain the underlying incentives of political actors. 
The chapters and these arguments are further discussed below. 
Chapter 1 – Introduction 
This chapter covers the CBI literature. It had its origins in the work of Milton Friedman, who 
argued in support of long run, stable policy, rather than the adaptive policy that became popular 
in the 1960s. Friedman was making these arguments as early as 1948, and was able to give them 
more theoretical rigour with his famous 1968 paper, which argued that inflation could not be 
used to boost employment in the long run because people’s inflationary expectations adapted 
to the government’s actions. 
The literature then shifted from explaining the economic effects of policy to explaining how the 
policy came about. Kydland and Prescott (1977) raised the problem of time inconsistency, 
namely that the policy choice at a particular point in time need not be optimal in the long run 
because a particular political leader cannot constrain his or her counterparts at other points in 
time. However, the policy problem that the paper is trying to solve is quite specialised. Many 
policy questions are straightforward and have a consensus behind the solution. Kydland and 
Prescott’s paper is really about the conflict between policy and politics when the technically 
correct policy is apparent to elites, but not the general public, and there are significant losers 
from it, preventing a consensus solution. The passage of time and the process of debate would 
be expected to reduce these differences. 
Barro and Gordon (1983) made the argument that the Great Inflation was caused by politicians 
seeking to drive unemployment below the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment 
(the NAIRU). Following Friedman in 1968, this results in excessive inflation while unemployment 
remains at the NAIRU. However, Orphanides (2003) has a competing explanation that mistakes 
in estimating the NAIRU caused this behaviour. It is just as plausible and is better supported by 
the data. It has certainly been influential because the Federal Reserve now publishes its real 
time estimates of the output gap (see the website of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia). 
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The literature then moved from explaining how policy comes about to developing a solution. 
Rogoff (1985) proposed giving a central bank complete legal independence from government 
to pursue more conservative monetary policy. Lohmann (1992) generalised this paper to apply 
a variable cost to the government of overriding the central bank, which interacted with the size 
of an economic shock to produce various outcomes. The intuition was that, for small shocks, 
governments tended not to override the central bank, but the chances of overriding increased 
with greater shocks. The problem with these papers is they do not consider the effect that 
political opinion might have on the cost of overriding the central bank. If loose policy is popular 
to protect jobs during high inflation, then a central bank will have trouble pursuing this policy 
in the long run. 
Walsh (1995) proposed a different policy solution, namely to have a contract between the 
central bank and the government to ensure that the central bank met a particular inflation 
target. The mistake here is that it assumes these two parties operate at arms’ length, similar to 
two businesses in the private sector. This is partly true in the US where the Federal Reserve 
banks are owned by the private sector, but not true at all in other countries because 
governments own these banks. But even in the US, it is clear that a united Congress and 
President would very much hold the upper hand in any dealings with the Federal Reserve.  
Overall, the “cost of overriding” and the “contract” solutions overlook the fact that politicians 
set the rules and have the choice of whether to be bound by them because they can change 
them. 
Some researchers have incorporated political dynamics into theories of institutions. Riker 
(1980) argued that institutions can slow down the process of policy adapting to public opinion. 
However, an institution cannot create too many losers from its policies, or else it will be 
abolished or substantially reformed. Moore (1995) used the related concept of the authorising 
environment, which is simply what the general public or relevant interest groups will accept 
from an institution. The general conclusion from these authors is that the community sets the 
boundaries of the acceptable decision set and the central bank needs to operate within that. 
We don’t often see central banks or other institutions go outside this decision set because 
organisations tend to support their own survival. One example of where a central bank went 
outside the acceptable decision set was the Australian Notes Issue Board in the 1920s, which 
implemented technically correct policy by the standards of the day, but put offside the banks 
and farmers. It failed to respond to political pressure and had its leadership replaced (Coleman 
2001). Another example is the second and third US central banks, which promoted the prompt 
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return of banknotes to the issuing banks. This limited the amount of notes they could issue, 
which increased banks’ stability in return for lower profits. Under pressure from the financial 
sector, these banks did not have their charter renewed (Smith 1936). 
One way of entrenching the position of a central bank is through a constitution, which generally 
requires a supermajority, or series of majorities to be changed. This may well be effective, but 
implementing such a change would itself require a supermajority or similar process. If this were 
to occur, it would imply widespread support for the reform, which would again imply that CBI 
isn’t necessary because of the widespread public support for the institution or its goals. 
Chapter 2 – The Phillips Curve literature 
In many countries, the 1960s saw a shift away from stable economic policy towards economic 
policy that maximised output (for example, see the Economic Report of the President for 1962). 
This shift came about through Phillips (1958) and Samuelson and Solow (1960), which explored 
the link between inflation and real output. In particular, the latter paper argued that inflation 
of 4 to 5 per cent was the necessary cost of keeping unemployment below 3 per cent. Phelps 
(1967) and Friedman (1968) responded that an inflationary stimulus could not increase output 
in the long run as individuals came to expect inflationary surprises. They were not the first to 
make these arguments. Lutz (1952), Cagan (1956) and Felix (1956) had all done so before from 
different perspectives. But Phelps and Friedman were the first to do so in the context of the 
Phillips Curve. 
During the 1950s and 1960s, the volume of literature on this question was not particularly large, 
but it increased greatly during the 1970s as inflation got out of control. Thanks to policy failure, 
economics had a major dispute on its hands, which gradually resolved in favour of Friedman’s 
expectations argument. 
Chapter 2 takes the innovative approach of quantifying the academic literature between 1947 
and 2006 on the relationship between unemployment and inflation. A paper is classed as 
conservative if it recommends an “inflation first” approach to economic policy, or if it rejects a 
long run trade-off between inflation and unemployment. The dataset is drawn from the top 10 
economic journals in the US. 
The paper finds that the 1960s were less conservative than the remainder of the study period. 
This is consistent with the idea that economic literature can be strongly driven by theory 
because Phelps (1967) and Friedman (1968) were theoretical papers. By 1975, conservatism 
was the majority view and after 2000 it became the consensus.  
169 
There were also some auxiliary findings. For example, after the Federal Reserve broke the back 
of inflation in 1982, the literature became less conservative after an increase in unemployment. 
This correlation, however, took place within a generally conservative literature while inflation 
was under control. Another finding was that having “inflation” in the title of a paper meant it 
was likely to be more conservative, which might be expected. A less expected finding was that 
this effect was reduced if both “inflation” and “unemployment” were in the title, perhaps 
signalling that the paper concerned was more likely to support a diagonal Phillips Curve. Finally, 
as economic conditions worsened over time, papers with “monetary” in the title became more 
conservative. This could reflect Friedman’s success in promoting stable monetary policy. 
The finding that the less conservative literature occurred during the 1960s makes it unlikely that 
the literature had a direct link to the Great Inflation, which was largely a phenomenon of the 
1970s and 1980s. However, it is possible that the literature had an indirect effect by influencing 
policy makers, political leaders, and the general debate. 
Chapter 3 – The Federal Reserve’s reaction function 
The idea that the Federal Reserve and its main policy setting body, the Federal Open Markets 
Committee (FOMC), reacted to particular economic conditions was initially investigated by 
Havrilesky (1967) and Christian (1968). These authors found that the FOMC responded to 
inflation and unemployment. The next innovation came from Bernanke and Blinder (1992), who 
argued that the FOMC had a fundamental change in policy from 1979 to 1982 by focussing on 
the money supply. 
These results are not surprising. Paul Volcker publicly announced the switch to the money 
supply in late 1979 and responding to inflation and unemployment could be regarded as the 
bread and butter of economic policy. In other words, the FOMC could be expected to officially 
admit to these methods. However, the literature has gone further, making claims about FOMC 
decisions that the FOMC has not admitted to. These are that: the FOMC learnt from stagflation 
(Sargent et al 2006); the FOMC made a mistake by over-estimating the output gap in the late 
1960s and 1970s, resulting in looser policy than it might have intended (Orphanides 2003); and 
that the FOMC generally became more conservative after 1982, compared with pre-1979 (Sims 
and Zha 2006), especially by being more inflation averse (Clarida et al 2000). 
This chapter examines the evidence in favour of these theories by developing reaction functions 
across four dependent variables: the quarterly federal funds rate; the annual federal funds rate; 
decisions to tighten policy; and decisions to loosen policy. A variable is robust if it is statistically 
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significant for both the first two dependent variables and at least one of the second two 
dependent variables. Regression models were developed for these cases including typical 
independent variables such as inflation expectations, the money supply, the Volcker disinflation 
period (Q4 1979 to Q3 1982), and an output measure. The deficit and presidential signalling 
were also included. 
In some cases, the point of the regressions is to determine whether the FOMC responded 
differently to particular variables before 1979 and after 1982. In other cases, where the variable 
represents change over time, the test is whether this variable is statistically significant. 
There is evidence for Orphanides’ 2003 theory of real time mistakes in estimating the output 
gap. It usually fits the data better than the unemployment rate. There is no evidence for 
learning, as proposed by Sargent et al (2006) and the evidence for greater inflation aversion 
(Clarida et al 2000) is thin. Rather, the data better supports less aversion to the output gap after 
1982. This shift is consistent with the advice of Volcker (1990), who argued that giving a central 
bank a single focus on prices would prevent inflation getting out of control. It is also consistent 
with the advice of Orphanides (2003), who argued that the real time output gap was difficult to 
measure, and so central banks would be better off concentrating on inflation. The advice of 
Volcker and Orphanides is in fact illegal; the Federal Reserve’s legislation requires it to pursue 
full employment. The Fed appears to have taken the next best option of reducing its emphasis 
on jobs. 
Considering the current literature, the results are closest to Sims and Zha (2006), who found 
that the Federal Reserve became more conservative after 1982, but not drastically so, and 
certainly not sufficient to face down another inflation outbreak such as the 1970s. The 
conclusion is that the Federal Reserve is not an inflation hawk and appears better suited to 
times of price stability, rather than inflation crises. 
Chapter 4 – Historical case studies of Germany, the US and the UK 
This chapter seeks to compare the explanatory power of two theories: that CBI, or legal 
constraints, set the boundaries for politicians and central banks; and the theory that political 
constraints governed their actions instead. The technique is to follow through the chain of 
events in three leading democracies that had different inflation experiences in the 1970s and 
determine which theory best fits the data. 
In the US, Presidents spent the 1970s trying different costless ways of reducing inflation, but 
the problem only got worse and they could generate little support from Congress or the wider 
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community. In July 1979, Carter announced that the Chair of the Federal Reserve, William 
Miller, would become the Treasury Secretary. This vacancy at the Fed caused a run on the dollar 
and Jimmy Carter was forced to appoint Paul Volcker as Chair of the Federal Reserve to restore 
confidence. Volcker advised Carter before his appointment that he would pursue tighter policy, 
but Carter had no other options. With less than 18 months before the next election, Carter had 
little room to move and Reagan won handsomely. 
In 1981 and 1982, Reagan gave Volcker the minimum required support to do the job. This meant 
he could pursue his own generous fiscal deficits. It also meant that, by doing it early in the 
electoral cycle, he had more choices and did not have the issue imposed on him. Ultimately, 
Reagan was able to have his cake and eat it by running a popular fiscal policy, delegating an 
unpopular but effective monetary policy, and claiming credit for the results afterwards. 
In the UK, various governments also sought different costless ways of reducing inflation. The 
context here was different because high rates of union membership and the large amount of 
power unions enjoyed through protected strike action meant that inflation had a large cost-
push component. So the inflation problem was entwined with a union problem. Labour’s 
attempts to reduce union power in the late 1960s were derailed by union interests within the 
party. Ted Heath failed against the miners’ strikes in the early 1970s and the subsequent Labour 
government took a softly-softly approach with the unions, until “the Winter of Discontent” in 
1978 and 1979 ruined its election chances. 
Margaret Thatcher combined the inflation crisis and union problems to deal with both 
simultaneously at the beginning of her tenure. She put a range of industrial relations changes 
through Parliament, reducing unions’ powers during strikes and appointed supporters to key 
economic positions in Cabinet. From 1981, she harmonised both monetary and fiscal policy to 
be anti-inflationary. Thatcher had the political momentum and she won the 1983 election easily 
after the Falklands War. Thatcher then defeated the miners in their strike of 1984-85 through a 
combination of the earlier legal changes and learning the lessons of Ted Heath’s experiences. 
Germany had experienced a key political conflict over inflation before the 1970s. In 1955-56, 
the Bank deutsches Lander (BdL) commenced its first tightening of monetary policy in response 
to inflation. Adenauer sought to delay and weaken this process to support the industrial base 
of his party (the Christian Democrats), but his two key economic ministers, Ludwig Erhard and 
Fritz Schaffer, supported the BdL. Adenauer publicly criticised the BdL for tightening policy, but 
was then roundly criticised in the German media for making these comments. Adenauer did not 
venture into economic policy thereafter. 
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In the first oil shock, Helmut Schmidt as the Finance Minister for the Social Democrats put out 
a joint media release with the Bundesbank and committed to keeping inflation below 10 per 
cent, which duly occurred after a prompt tightening of monetary policy. In the second oil shock, 
the Bundesbank raised interest rates, but it and other commentators argued that fiscal policy 
was too loose. The Social Democrats’ junior coalition partner, the Free Democrats (liberals), 
proposed a significant tightening of fiscal policy. The Social Democrats were not willing to 
accommodate this, so the Free Democrats changed their support to the Christian Democrats 
under Helmut Kohl. The Christian Democrats tightened fiscal policy and the Bundesbank cut 
rates while inflation subsided. 
CBI theory can explain some of these developments, for example why inflation was lower in 
Germany than in the US, and why the UK had higher inflation than both. But it cannot explain 
when the disinflations occurred. In all three cases, political events brought about the 
disinflations: the 1979 election in the UK; the Free Democrats switching allegiance to the 
Christian Democrats; and the markets forcing Volcker on Carter, with Volcker receiving 
parsimonious support from Reagan afterwards. If politicians are meant to be the problem, CBI 
theory has little to say about them. 
These case studies also suggest two new theories. Looking to the UK experience, the first theory 
is that class division exacerbates inflation problems. This is partly due to the cost-push effects 
of wage increases, but is also due to a winner-takes-all approach to policy, rather than a stable, 
longer-term method. The second theory looks especially to the US experience, where the 
disinflation was conducted by the central bank while fiscal policy was expansionary. The theory 
is that CBI is a predictor of who will disinflate. Unlike growth, the costs and benefits of inflation 
cut across a society differently. In most cases, cutting inflation at the expense of growth will not 
produce a universal gain for a leader. The best circumstances under which a leader can conduct 
a disinflation but distance themselves from it is if it is managed by a legally independent central 
bank. 
Chapter 5 – Inflation and the economic vote 
This chapter partners Chapter 4. If there was a political drive to disinflate in developed 
countries, then one way of corroborating this would be to examine whether there was a direct 
link, such as a correlation between inflation and the vote. The chapter seeks to explain the 
government vote in elections in 22 developed countries from 1956 to 2009. 
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The literature on the economic vote got under way in the 1970s, when inflation, output, and 
the relationship between them were headline issues. Accordingly, papers on the economic vote 
found a correlation between inflation and the vote for the government. These days, however, 
papers rarely include inflation as an independent variable. This is presumably because a 
correlation with the government’s vote is absent. 
The key innovation of the paper is to divide elections into four categories and to test for 
variation across them. The categories are determined by clarity of responsibility and future time 
reference (clear/unclear and strong/weak). Since Powell and Whitten (1993), many papers have 
sought to analyse an economic vote in the context of whether there is clarity of responsibility; 
that is whether the government has sufficient control so that it makes sense to hold it 
accountable for economic performance. The chapter measures it by whether the government 
was in coalition or not.  
The concept of future time reference is based on linguistic relativity, which is the idea that the 
structure of language is correlated with different ways of thinking and making decisions. Some 
languages such as English and French have strong future time reference and clearly mark the 
future tense, for example “it will rain tomorrow”. Other languages such as German and 
Japanese have weak future time reference and mark the future by context, a rough translation 
being “it rains tomorrow.” The intuition is that a speaker of a language with strong future time 
reference will differentiate the future more and discount it more, leading to poorer long term 
decisions. For example, Chen (2013) found that speakers of languages with weak future time 
reference saved more and made better health decisions.  
These two distinctions are expected to be relevant to the economic vote. Firstly, an economic 
vote is expected where there is clarity of responsibility. Secondly, countries with weak future 
time reference would be expected to be concerned about long term stability, and therefore 
place significant weight on inflation. High or unpredictable inflation would compromise or 
threaten their savings. So while elections in both the clear strong and clear weak categories 
might respond to output or employment, the chances of an inflation response would be higher 
in the clear weak category. 
Interestingly, elections tended to fall into two categories. Countries whose main language had 
strong future time reference tended to have elections with clarity of responsibility. Where a 
country’s main language had weak future time reference, their elections tended not to have 
clarity of responsibility; that is they usually had governing coalitions. This arrangement 
produces policy stability because more parties share power more often. “Winner take all,” 
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which occurs more often in countries where the main language has strong future time 
reference, is correlated with large policy swings. This may be a chance effect, or it is possible 
that voters prefer policy stability where the main language has weak future time reference. 
Statistical tests confirmed that the four categories usually behave differently. For example, the 
coefficient for the government’s previous vote, when the government’s current vote is 
regressed on to it, is over 0.8 for the two unclear categories, but this coefficient in the clear 
strong category is 0.61. A variable for the real economy (real per capita growth less 
unemployment) is statistically significant for the clear strong category, but in none of the other 
categories, and so on. 
This real economy variable is an important new development. It performs better across the four 
categories than unemployment, growth, or benchmarked growth (a comparison of a country 
against an international benchmark, in this case the median). It is also a justifiable approach 
because it measures both point in time and movement over time, similar to how corporations 
are evaluated by a statement of financial position (point in time) and a statement of financial 
performance (over time). 
Another new finding from the chapter is the interesting behaviour of the coefficients for the 
dummy variable of an early election (measured as occurring six months or more before the 
scheduled date). In the clear categories, this variable is never statistically significant. Since these 
governments are not in coalition, they can choose their election date, presumably for electoral 
benefit. The lack of statistical significance for this variable suggests that the electorate perceives 
the tactic and there is no benefit to the government. In the unclear strong category the 
coefficient was negative and statistically significant and in the unclear weak category it was 
positive and statistically significant. The proposed explanation here is that the electorates are 
making a judgement about how the government parties have managed their coalition. In the 
unclear weak category, electorates prefer stability so they also prefer governments to run their 
full term. The positive coefficient here may be a way of penalising all other parties (except the 
lead government party) for destabilising conduct. In the unclear strong category, an early 
election may be perceived as the lead government party’s inability to manage the coalition, or 
as a sign of weakness, with the appropriate penalty. 
Returning back to the thesis, the important result is that the government vote in the clear weak 
categories varies inversely with benchmarked inflation; that is, how a country compares against 
an international benchmark (in this case the median). No other category shows an inflation 
effect. Concluding, it is not possible to say there was a universal voter backlash against inflation 
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in developed countries; only three of the 22 countries in the study had the majority of their 
elections in this category (Norway, Sweden and Japan). So if we believe there was a political 
backlash against inflation in developed countries, then it occurred through some other 
mechanism than elections, such as through elites. 
Chapter 6 – The correlation between inflation and CBI 
The classic case of CBI delivering low inflation is developed countries in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Indeed, after conducting a meta-analysis in 2010, Klomp and de Haan found that studies were 
most likely to find a correlation between CBI and inflation when they covered OECD countries 
in the 1970s. This chapter conducts a study of the variables that are correlated with inflation 
for 21 OECD countries from 1973 to 1990, in other words when a correlation between CBI and 
inflation is most likely. 
A key issue in studies of CBI and inflation is whether CBI is endogenous and how to manage it 
(Fernandez-Albertos 2015). The chapter initially regresses CBI on cultural, political and 
institutional (“secondary”) variables and finds that strong bicameralism and a hyperinflation 
experience are correlated with various CBI measures. These are used as instruments in 2SLS 
regressions.  
Inflation was regressed on a range of CBI measures, lagged inflation, economic variables, and 
secondary variables. Starting with the largest effect size, the variables with a robust correlation 
with inflation were: past inflation, real growth, a decreasing time trend, oil prices, and currency 
shifts. The chapter shows that inflation was very much correlated with economic variables. The 
exception was the annual trend variable, which had a coefficient of -0.16. This reflects policy 
learning or shifting expectations over the 18 year study period. 
The best performing CBI variable was the composite measure from Franzese (1999). It was 
statistically significant and was negative in OLS regressions with lagged inflation, and economic 
variables and lagged inflation. It performed similarly in a 2SLS regression with lagged inflation. 
However, it became positive in a 2SLS regression with lagged inflation and economic variables. 
It was not statistically significant in OLS or 2SLS regressions with lagged inflation, economic and 
secondary variables. All the other measures of CBI fared worse. 
One observation from the chapter is that the effect size of CBI is small. In the regressions, its 
coefficient was usually between -2 and -3, which we will set at -2.5 for the sake of argument. 
This is for a variable that is measured between 0 and 1 and has a standard deviation of 0.15. If 
a meaningful shift in the variable were 0.5, for example, then a high level of CBI would have 
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decreased a country’s inflation during the 1970s and 1980s by 1.25 per cent. During the Great 
Inflation, many developed countries had inflation rates over 10 per cent, compared with a 
typical target rate of 2 per cent. So at its best, CBI would have only made a marginal effect on 
inflation performance. 
From the start, the CBI research program faced an uphill battle because, in the 1970s and 1980s, 
there were very few changes in countries’ CBI measures. This produced cross-sectional variation 
with little time series variation. Therefore, researchers had a challenging task in separating out 
what were CBI effects and the extent CBI was transmitting the effects of other variables. After 
CBI changes in the 1990s, the study by Acemoglu et al (2008) had data with both time series 
and cross-sectional variation and found no correlation in developed countries between CBI and 
inflation. This chapter is consistent with their paper and, given these results, it is difficult to 
accept CBI as a credible theory. 
Conclusions 
There are two perspectives to the Great Inflation in the 1970s and 1980s. Technically, it was a 
failure because many developed countries came close to losing control of their currencies, 
despite enough economic theory being available to support good technical policy. But it was 
politically constructive because coalitions were forming to address inflation and the broader 
society was catching up to economic theory. This indicates the importance of political 
leadership, in particular the ability to accelerate the acceptance of technical solutions to a 
problem. The three case studies in this thesis demonstrated political leadership at various 
points. 
One aspect of politics that is not often acknowledged is its role in unifying communities and 
harnessing human co-operation. People are social creatures. It is obvious that, all else being 
equal, a group that co-operates better will enjoy better outcomes. What this thesis proposes is 
that the co-ordination effect far outweighs the economic gains from better policy. The CBI 
literature, and much of economics and perhaps other fields, assume that societies will hold 
together when placed under the stress of technical reforms. The election of President Trump, 
and other populist episodes, cast doubt on this assumption. 
The CBI solution to inflation attempts to force an analytical solution on a society that either 
hasn’t made up its mind about inflation, or has a significant sector blocking change. The most 
likely outcome of a central bank “going it alone” will be similar to Arthur Burns’ experience in 
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the US; doing what can be done but never really getting there. If the central bank goes too far, 
the institution or its leadership risk being replaced. 
In countries with high levels of CBI, central banks become key players. Originally designed to 
address issues around government finance and the stability of the money supply, their central 
role in the economy – a financial factotum backed by government – has meant that they have 
been well-placed to take on other roles. Sometimes this has included financial sector regulation, 
but it has almost always included monetary policy.  
Monetary policy has two important effects. By changing the supply of credit it affects economic 
activity, which can reduce inflation or prevent an asset price bubble. But, depending on what 
other countries are doing, it can also change demand for the home country’s currency and 
therefore change its exchange rate. This affects how the country trades. It also affects the price 
of imports, which has inflation effects.  
Unlike the universal good of increased growth, these effects impose simultaneous costs and 
benefits across a society. They also have political consequences, in particular expressed as the 
following questions: what should monetary policy aim to achieve; and who should be 
responsible for it? The first question has a substantial technical basis. The current consensus 
appears to be that long run price stability, of say 2 per cent annual inflation, is preferred, and 
activist policy that could deliver a boom/bust cycle should be avoided. This was the technical 
consensus for most of the post-war period, except for the 1960s. 
The answer to the second question is much more political. The government of the day bears 
some responsibility for all policy outcomes, unless there is a clear reason why not. Delegation 
to a technical agency reduces this responsibility, but does not absolve a government from it. If 
poor outcomes persist, voters may expect the government of the day to wind up the agency or 
replace its leadership. Other factors could mitigate responsibility, for example if the 
government comprised a coalition (clarity of responsibility), if the issue involved overseas 
events, if the decision was obviously technical, or the decision was made by an agency with a 
long history of bipartisan activity in the field, such as the judiciary.  
One day, monetary policy may be “obviously technical,” but this is still some time off. Therefore 
monetary policy still has a political component, some of which will remain under delegation. 
Further, although many countries have electoral systems that regularly deliver coalitions, this 
is not guaranteed. So any government potentially has some responsibility for monetary policy. 
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Viewed from the perspective of political responsibility, CBI is implausible. So it should not be 
surprising that this thesis has found other problems across the CBI literature. Its assumptions 
do not think through the delegation decision. Delegation is also important for tackling 
endogeneity. This thesis has argued that CBI reflects, and is part of, many other social and 
institutional factors. Finally, CBI theory assumes that social cohesion will continue despite the 
implementation of unpopular policies. 
Given the lack of evidence for a robust relationship between inflation and CBI, we should ask 
whether any theories can be substituted in its place. Riker (1980) argued that institutions do 
not necessarily block preferences, but that they slow down the convergence between outcomes 
and preferences. Therefore, CBI might be correlated with less variability in inflation. CBI might 
also lead to more stability in a finance sector, perhaps increasing the sector’s output or 
employment. Finally, the comparative case study in this thesis raised the possibility that CBI 
increases the likelihood that disinflations will be conducted through monetary policy instead of 
fiscal policy. All these theories are worth pursuing. 
CBI has generated a broad literature because it has combined so many interesting and 
important issues: whether politicians make good technical decisions, how technical agencies 
get created, what is good monetary policy, and the relationship between technical agencies and 
political leaders. Hopefully, this thesis has brought insight to some of them. 
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